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ABSTRACT 
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The doctrine of the conceptual priority of the perfect 
(CPP) is the claim that the concept of the perfect is prior 
to that of the imperfect insofar as possessing the latter 
presupposes a grasp of the former, but not vice versa. The 
goals of this study are to provide an account and defense 
of the Cartesian argument for CPP, to determine the 
consequences of this priority for the relationship between 
our concepts of human and divine properties, and to explore 
its implications for bottom-up accounts of theological 
concept formation. 
I argue that the predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in 
Descartes’ version of CPP are equivalent to “true” or 
“genuine” and thus function in the same way they would in 
geometrical examples where the perfection at issue is 
definitive of the kind and where imperfection constitutes 
falling short of the kind. I can thus be said to have the 
idea of a “perfect” circle (of that which is “infinitely” 
circular, as it were) merely by virtue of having the idea 
of a circle, yet I cannot apprehend something as imperfect 
or finite insofar as it resembles but fails to be a circle 
unless I already possess a concept of the kind in question—
a true or perfect circle. 
CPP thus implies a qualitative distinction between the 
perfect and imperfect that, when applied to God and 
creation, is consistent with a theory of analogy. Unlike 
traditional ‘bottom-up’ theories of analogy, however, CPP 
entails a ‘top-down’ order of derivation in which concepts 
of creaturely perfections are derived (via a sort of 
‘partial negation’) from concepts of divine ones.  
The ‘top-down’ order of derivation yields 
epistemological advantages over the traditional approach, 
which had always struggled to explain how we can derive 
analogical concepts of God from creatures. Further, CPP 
enables its proponents to address the classic 
anthropomorphism critiques leveled at practitioners of 
Perfect Being Theology. Though I acknowledge that CPP is 
not without its own weaknesses, I present a largely 
sympathetic account of the argument and its relevance for 
contemporary philosophy of religion.  
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Introduction 
The doctrine of the conceptual priority of the perfect 
(CPP) is the claim that the concept of the perfect is prior 
to that of the imperfect insofar as possessing the latter 
presupposes a grasp of the former, but not vice versa. In 
Descartes’ philosophy, as well as in that of his 
rationalist successors such as Leibniz and Malebranche, CPP 
is most often used to show that our idea of God, or 
infinite being, is conceptually prior to the idea we have 
of ourselves.
1
 Despite the fact that Descartes appeals to 
CPP throughout his philosophical works and even though it 
plays an important role in his arguments concerning the 
nature and origin of our idea of God, the Cartesian account 
                                                          
1 Examples from Descartes will follow. Malebranche, in The Search After 
Truth, quotes Descartes’ statement of the priority in his April 1649 
letter to Clerselier almost word for word: “But not only does the mind 
have the idea of the infinite, it even has it before that of the 
finite. For we conceive of infinite being simply because we conceive of 
being, without thinking whether it is finite or infinite. In order for 
us to conceive of a finite being, something must necessarily be 
eliminated from this general notion of being, which consequently must 
come first” (232). In his own statements of the priority, Leibniz 
prefers to use the term “absolute” to characterize divine infinity. In 
the New Essays on Human Understanding, a dialogue written in response 
to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the character 
espousing the Leibnizian position argues that “the true infinite, 
strictly speaking, is only in the absolute, which precedes all 
composition and is not formed by that addition of parts” (157) and 
further that the “idea of the absolute is internal to us, as is that of 
being: these absolutes are nothing but the attributes of God; and they 
may be said to be as much the source of ideas as God himself is the 
principle of beings” (158). Spinoza will also employ something like 
CPP, but for him the priority seems to be the same as the priority of 
substance to that of mode.  
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of CPP has been largely neglected by scholars. It is too 
easy, perhaps, to view it as a relic of Descartes’ 
religious milieu—as one more regrettable respect in which 
the Enlightenment philosopher failed to be a fully modern 
thinker—or to dismiss it as a sop to religious authorities, 
served to make his less-palatable philosophical innovations 
more appetizing. Especially when viewed in light of his 
occasional expressions of apparent fideism, e.g., “I have 
never written about the infinite except to submit myself to 
it” (CSMK 172), one might forsake CPP as impenetrable to 
philosophical analysis.  
Such interpretations lose much of their appeal when 
CPP is correctly understood. In the first chapter, I 
explain how CPP shows that our concept of “perfect” or 
“infinite” being is not produced by merely negating the 
qualifications “imperfect” or “finite.”  I argue that the 
predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in CPP are equivalent to 
“true” or “genuine” and thus function in the same way they 
would in geometrical examples where the perfection at issue 
is definitive of the kind and where imperfection 
constitutes falling short of the kind. In this sense, I can 
be said to have the idea of a “perfect” circle (of that 
which is “infinitely” circular, as it were) merely by 
virtue of having the idea of a circle, yet I cannot 
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apprehend something as imperfect or finite insofar as it 
resembles but fails to be a circle unless I already possess 
a concept of the kind in question—a true or perfect circle. 
Descartes’ own application of CPP to our cognition of 
geometrical figures, his assertions that our unqualified 
notion of being or substance is an idea of infinite (or 
perfect) being or substance, his denial that “being” or 
“substance” can be predicated univocally of creatures and 
God, and his use of the image/model analogy to describe the 
relationship between the perfect and the imperfect, all 
lend support to this interpretation.  
 In the next chapter, I explore the role CPP plays in 
Descartes’ response to his critics’ claims that our idea of 
God is constructed by amplifying our concepts of creaturely 
properties. Descartes believes that such amplification is 
guided by an innate concept of God. Though other 
interpreters have suggested that this follows from the fact 
that amplification presupposes an awareness of absolute 
imperfection, I argue that it is necessary given the 
qualitative gulf that, according to CPP, must separate 
creaturely from divine properties. I conclude that 
amplification is, for Descartes, a heuristic tool employed 
to guide the “natural light” in rendering explicit the 
contents of our innate idea of God.  
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If creaturely goodness or wisdom falls short of 
goodness and wisdom as such, what could justify the 
extension of the predicates “good” or “wise” to creatures?  
In the third chapter, I evaluate various ways of making 
sense of the positive relation that CPP implies. I argue 
that Descartes’ commitment to the principle that creatures 
are images and likenesses of God suggests that the positive 
relation is one of resemblance. I proceed to evaluate 
various ways of making sense of this resemblance, 
concluding that it cannot be attributed to any form of 
qualitative identity. For a number of historical and 
textual reasons, including Descartes’ explicit denial of 
univocity as well as his defense of analogical predication 
in the context of his analysis of divine self-causation, I 
argue that the resemblance between creatures and God ought 
to be interpreted as analogical and hence irreducible or 
primitive.  
In the following chapter, I step away from Descartes 
to provide a historical overview of the theory of analogy. 
I emphasize that the traditional theory of theological 
analogy does assume that there is a primitive ontological 
resemblance between creatures and God. I also isolate a 
feature of the traditional theory that is inconsistent with 
CPP, namely, the assumption that our concepts of God are 
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derived from our concepts of creatures. Instead, I argue 
that CPP will require a ‘top-down’ theory of analogy in 
which concepts of creaturely properties are derived, via a 
sort of ‘partial negation,’ from concepts of divine ones.2  
The fifth chapter is devoted to explaining and 
defending the ontology and cognition of analogical 
resemblance. Analogy assumes that a single term can, 
through concepts that resemble one another without sharing 
content, signify things that resemble one another without 
sharing a common nature or form. I first show how late 
scholastic advocates of analogy such as Cajetan and John of 
St. Thomas responded to the Scotistic critique that such 
analogical concepts possess insufficient unity (or 
resemblance) to be employed in reasoning without committing 
the fallacy of equivocation. They suggest that analogically 
similar concepts can be ‘confused’ in thought such that 
they can be regarded as a single concept, which is neither 
a generic concept derived by abstracting shared content nor 
the concept of a mere arbitrary collection. I argue that 
the very same examples of scalar properties (e.g., colors) 
that Scotus employs to illustrate his own account of 
univocity by way of modal distinction show that theories of 
abstraction by confusion are themselves plausible. Finally, 
                                                          
2 The terms ‘top down’ and ‘partial negation’ are from Robert Merrihew 
Adams (2008). 
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I will attempt to render the ontology and cognition of 
primitive analogical resemblance a little less mysterious 
by connecting it to more contemporary accounts of concept 
formation in cases of inexact similarity. 
Abstraction by confusion assumes, however, that we 
already possess determinate concepts of the analogates in 
question. Scotus had argued that this leaves advocates of 
the bottom-up approach to analogy with a dilemma: either 
they must hold that we can obtain determinate concepts of 
divine properties from concepts of creaturely ones (which 
appears to violate the ontological difference between 
them), or they must accept that we can derive only 
indeterminate concepts of divine properties (which appears 
to undermine the scientific character of theology). In the 
sixth chapter I argue that, insofar as it is our concepts 
of the creaturely versions of perfections that are derived, 
via ‘partial negation,’ from concepts of divine ones, CPP 
does not face Scotus’ dilemma. I then show how Descartes’ 
explicit application of analogy to divine-self-causation 
illustrates the advantages of such top-down derivation for 
philosophical theology. I end the chapter with a discussion 
of a few examples of top-down derivation suggested by 
Charles Hartshorne.  
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In the next chapter, I explore the significance of CPP 
for contemporary perfect being theology (PBT). PBT is the 
effort to understand God’s nature by appealing to our 
intuitions about what properties a greatest or most perfect 
being must have. Critics have alleged that PBT yields an 
idolatrous and anthropomorphic concept of God insofar as it 
suggests that the divine perfections differ merely by 
degree from our own and because it appeals to fallible and 
biased notions of perfection when identifying candidate 
properties. To the extent that Descartes’ philosophy of 
religion is an example of PBT, it has been subjected to the 
same criticism. However, I argue that Descartes’ commitment 
to CPP would enable him to overcome these objections. Our 
possessing innate concepts of qualitatively distinct divine 
perfections not only enables us to apprehend our own 
properties as absolutely imperfect, but guides our own 
intuitions regarding which properties must be possessed by 
a perfect being.   
I dedicate the final chapter to a general analysis and 
critique of CPP. Taken as a transcendental argument, I 
argue that the weakest aspect of CPP is the premise that we 
apprehend ourselves as imperfect in the absolute sense. 
Though Descartes argued that we could never attain explicit 
concepts of qualitatively unique divine perfections by 
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amplifying concepts of our own unless we were at least 
implicitly aware of such absolute imperfection, both the 
claim that we do in fact possess these concepts as well as 
the assumption that we could not construct them solely by 
modifying concepts of our own properties are questionable. 
While one could appeal to more general and universal 
features of human experience as evidence for an awareness 
of absolute imperfection, such appeals are no less 
controversial than the alleged presupposition relations of 
amplification arguments. I end the chapter by noting how 
the purported primitive resemblance of simple properties 
(such as different shades of a single color) is 
disanalogous to the resemblance relation between creatures 
and God within CPP insofar as the latter assumes a 
resemblance between various complex (creaturely) properties 
and a metaphysically simple thing.  
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Ch. I. CPP and the Argument from Negation 
I. Contemporary Reception of Cartesian CPP 
The Cartesian doctrine of CPP, says Robert Merrihew 
Adams, “astonishes readers today.”3 The claim has indeed 
struck many readers as remarkable, and not merely because 
it, as Adams explains, “is so contrary to the modern 
tendency to seek to understand the more perfect, the more 
developed, in terms of the less perfect, the more 
rudimentary.” Many commentators have found it to be obscure 
if not downright incredible. “It is not obvious how exactly 
to take this priority,” says John Carriero, expressing what 
seems to be the opinion of many Descartes scholars.
4
 Other 
interpreters have been less restrained in their criticism. 
Anthony Kenny, for example, has argued that the “principle 
that the positive is prior to the negative is worthless.”5 
John Cottingham agrees, noting that “this alleged priority 
or ‘basicness for understanding’ evaporates under 
scrutiny.”6 More charitable interpreters have thrown up 
their hands as well. Janet Broughton, despite her best 
                                                          
3 2008, 91. 
4 2009, 191. 
5 1968, 136. 
6 John Cottingham, 1976. In some of his more recent work, however, 
Cottingham seems to view the argument more positively, though he does 
not discuss it in detail. See Cottingham, 1994. See also Cottingham’s 
article in Gaukroger, 2006. 
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effort to construct a plausible argument for the claim, 
concludes with regret that it is ultimately based on 
nothing more than an “abstract and contentious metaphysical 
doctrine.”7 
Not all recent commentary has been negative, however. 
Though Robert Rubin finds the priority claim “paradoxical,” 
he suggests that it might be analogous to the conceptual 
priority of the notion of substance to that of mode (in 
this sense aligning Descartes with Spinoza).
8
 Adams and 
Stephen Menn stand out amongst recent interpreters in 
defending the argument largely on its own terms. It is 
significant that both of these authors approach the 
argument with an eye towards its Platonic ancestry.
9
 Menn, 
however, is less interested in defending it than in drawing 
historical parallels to Neo-Platonic and Augustinian 
arguments for God.
10
 Adams is chiefly interested in the 
consequences the priority has for the broader rationalist 
program of constructing concepts of the attributes of 
finite beings from the concepts of the attributes of 
infinite being (and for this reason focuses on Leibniz, 
                                                          
7 2002, 152. 
8 Rubin, 2008. Anat Schectman also understands the priority relation as 
an instance of the same sort of ontological dependence relation that 
obtains between substance and mode. See chapter three of her 
dissertation, 2011. 
9 For a general account of the Platonic features of Descartes’ 
philosophy, see Buckle 2007.  
10 1998, 281-93. 
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rather than Descartes).
11
 Though he provides a plausible 
reconstruction and defense of the argument, his account is 
relatively brief and, as he himself notes, leaves important 
questions unanswered.  
 
II. The Correlative Concept Critique 
Anthony Kenny, John Cottingham and Georgette Sinkler 
have advanced the most pointed critique of Cartesian CPP. 
They have all argued that the concept of a perfect being 
cannot be prior to the concept of an imperfect one since 
the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” must be viewed as 
correlative—i.e., neither concept can be understood without 
the other. Needless to say, I believe the correlative 
concept critique is wrong. Yet understanding why it is 
wrong will help us to clarify the nature of CPP. As I will 
show, the critique fails to appreciate that when Descartes 
uses the predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in this 
context, they are synonymous with “real,” “true” or 
                                                          
11 2008, 91-9. Descartes will sometimes use the term “attribute” in the 
technical sense to refer to that which is the “essence of a thing” 
(CSMI 210). This sense is shorthand for “principal attribute.” The 
principal attribute of a body is extension, the principal attribute of 
a mind is thought. Yet there is also a looser sense of the term in 
Descartes’ works, where it is roughly equivalent to “property” or 
“mode.” I will use the term “attribute” interchangeably with “property” 
or “quality” throughout this work, unless I indicate otherwise. For a 
detailed account of this and other terminological ambiguities, see 
Garber 1992, 63-70.  
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“genuine.”12 He therefore does not employ the 
perfect/imperfect distinction as describing a degree of 
perfection within a given kind, but invokes it with respect 
to a narrower range of cases in which one thing falls short 
of a perfection that is definitive of another thing’s 
nature. This is indicated by Descartes’ application of CPP 
to the case of our idea of a perfect triangle, the only 
                                                          
12 It should be noted that, within the Cartesian account of CPP, the 
terms “perfect” and “imperfect” are (at least implicitly) always 
modifying something (usually being). Further, in the context of 
Descartes’ arguments for CPP with respect to being, the terms 
“infinite” and “finite” are used interchangeably with the terms 
“perfect” and “imperfect.” Recognizing one’s limitation can thus be 
described as either an awareness of finitude or as an awareness of 
imperfection. This seems to be due to the fact that, for Descartes, an 
infinite or a perfect being is simply a being possessing every 
perfection (or reality). Thus I disagree with Philip Clayton (2000, 
145) who suggests that Descartes uses the notion of perfection to 
control or limit the notion of infinity. What this suggests is that in 
ascribing infinity to God, Descartes thinks he has left himself open to 
the objection that God would thereby possess attributes incompatible 
with a perfect being (e.g., extension) and thus must invoke divine 
perfection to exclude such attributes. Yet Descartes never suggests 
this; rather, his use of “infinite” indicates that attributes such as 
extension are actually incompatible with the notion of an infinite 
being. Indeed, Descartes explicitly states that when he uses the term 
“infinite” it is synonymous with “greatest being.”  He tends to avoid 
using the term “infinite,” however, because he believed its grammatical 
construction encourages the mistaken view that it is equivalent in 
meaning to “not-finite.” When Descartes applies CPP to the case of our 
awareness that a given triangle is imperfect, however, triangle and not 
being is the subject and hence he does not use the terms “finite” and 
“infinite.” As I will explain in chapter two, Descartes also describes 
the human will as “infinite” insofar as it absolute or perfect in 
essence (i.e., qua kind faculty of the will). That he here uses the 
term “infinite,” rather than just “perfect” as he does in the case of 
triangles, can be attributed to the fact that Descartes thinks that the 
human faculty of the will does not appear to be any less perfect, qua 
faculty of the will, than God’s. Thus his use of “infinite” to describe 
the human will retains its theological significance. Since the terms 
“perfect” and “imperfect” are applicable however to every instance of 
CPP within Descartes’ works, since Descartes prefers these terms, and 
since the construction of “imperfect” as a grammatical negation of 
“perfect” corresponds with the conceptual priority asserted by CPP, I 
will describe the doctrine as the priority of the perfect rather than 
the priority of the infinite.  
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instance where he applies it to something other than our 
idea of God. There he argues that the notion of an 
imperfect triangle presupposes that of a perfect one 
insofar as the notion of a triangle as such is the notion 
of a perfect one. The priority at issue in CPP is thus 
simply the claim that the negative predicate “imperfect” in 
“imperfect being,” like the predicate “imperfect” in 
“imperfect circle,” has significance for us only if we 
already possess a notion of, respectively, being or 
circularity. Since we can nevertheless possess a concept of 
being or circularity without possessing a notion of 
something that is like a being or a circle but falls short 
of these kinds (imperfect being and imperfect circularity), 
the former concepts have priority.  
  When Descartes invokes CPP in his arguments for the 
existence of the idea of God, it is typically as a rebuttal 
to the (anticipated) counterargument that, since the term 
“infinite” (infinitum) is a grammatical negation of the 
term “finite,” the notion of infinite being is nothing more 
than the idea of a being that is not-finite (non finitum). 
That the idea of the infinite might be a negation of our 
idea of the finite is not the only argument Descartes’ 
interlocutors (real and imaginary) can and did wield 
against CPP. In the objections to the Meditations, for 
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example, Gassendi as well as others argue that the idea of 
infinite being could be created by amplifying our notion of 
finite being. As we shall see, Descartes believed that CPP 
overcomes this argument as well. Yet perhaps one of the 
reasons why he focuses on the negation counterargument is 
the fact that he believed that the relation between the 
ideas of infinite and finite being is a sort of negation 
(more precisely, a sort of partial negation). Addressing 
the negation argument is thus also a way for Descartes to 
clarify the relation between these ideas. In the famous 
Third Meditation assertion of CPP, the negation relation is 
not rejected but shown to run in the opposite direction: 
 
And I must not think that, just as my conceptions of 
rest and darkness are arrived at by negating movement 
and light, so my perception of the infinite is arrived 
at not by means of a true idea but merely by negating 
the finite. On the contrary, I clearly understand that 
there is more reality in an infinite substance than in 
a finite one, and hence that my perception of the 
infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my 
perception of the finite, that is myself. For how 
could I  understand that I doubted or desired—that is, 
lacked something—and that I was not wholly perfect, 
unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect 
being which enabled me to recognize my own defects by 
comparison. (CSMII 31) 
 
To say that the ideas of rest or darkness are produced by 
negation is simply to say that they are equivalent to, 
respectively, “not-light” and “not-moving.” Their 
15 
 
 
 
intelligibility is here presented as being entirely 
parasitic on the ideas of light and motion. The 
aforementioned critics of CPP find these examples to be 
less than convincing. Kenny, for example, observes that 
“there is no way of sorting predicates into positive and 
negative in the manner required by Descartes’ argument. He 
says that we perceive rest by the negation of movement; but 
one could as well say that we perceive movement by the 
negation of rest.”13 We ought to conclude, says Kenny, that 
“[t]he argument from doubting, if valid, proves only that 
the idea of perfection must be simultaneous with the idea 
of imperfection, not that it must be prior. […] The ability 
to use a predicate is not prior to, but identical with, the 
ability to use its negation.”14 Sinkler agrees with Kenny: 
“Does one come to recognize the light only after having 
recognized the dark, the dead after the living, or vice 
versa? Surely not. One can only recognize or understand 
these terms together; not one before or after the other.”15  
 These critics have misunderstood the significance of 
the examples of negation in this passage. Descartes is 
using them to illustrate only how conceiving of something 
as the absence of a perfection or reality (for Descartes, 
                                                          
13 1968, 135. 
14 Ibid., 136. 
15 1989, 79. 
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as we shall see, these terms are often synonymous) 
presupposes an idea of the perfection in question. He did 
indeed adopt the traditional view that things like darkness 
are, ontologically, merely the absences of something real 
and positive (the perfection of light).
16
 This ontological 
disparity ostensibly gives rise to a conceptual asymmetry: 
while we can conceive of darkness only by conceiving of the 
absence of the corresponding perfection (light), the 
perfection itself (light) can be conceived without 
comparing it to (and so conceiving of) its absence. Yet 
Descartes need not be read as denying that our ideas of 
rest and movement are correlative. Given his commitment in 
his physics that both rest and movement are equally real as 
modes of extended substance, he would not hold that there 
is “more reality” in the latter.17 There is no reason to 
believe that he wouldn’t endorse Kenny’s suggestion that we 
can also conceive of movement as the absence of rest. 
Descartes’ point is simply that if we conceive of rest as 
the absence (negation) of movement, then we must possess an 
idea of movement. The same presupposition relation would 
follow for conceiving of movement as the absence of rest. 
As Cecilia Wee puts it, “Descartes is merely using the 
                                                          
16 See Wee 2006, 97-101. Another example Descartes cites is the idea of 
blindness as the absence of sight (CSMII 134).  
17 Wee 2006, 157 endnote # 18.  
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example of rest and movement […] as an illustration of the 
point that some perceptions are of absences of perfections, 
rather than perfections.”18    
 Aside from the issue of whether these examples of 
negations are correlative or not, however, the question we 
should be asking is this: what do these examples tell us 
about the significance of the predicates “infinite/finite” 
and “perfect/imperfect” as employed within CPP? In fact, 
Descartes does not hold that the purported negation pairs 
are examples of the same relation that holds between our 
notions of finite and infinite being. He will argue that 
the notion of finite or imperfect being is obtained via a 
partial negation of the idea of being as such.
19
 Creaturely 
being is not apprehended as the absence of being in the way 
that rest can be apprehended as the complete absence of 
movement, for this would render the idea of finite being 
equivalent to the idea of nothingness (i.e., non-being).
20
 
                                                          
18 Ibid. As I will later argue, this same point is suggested by 
Descartes’ description of the idea of an imperfect triangle as a 
(partial) “negation” of a perfect one. This should be interpreted as 
simply the claim that we cannot conceive of a given figure as an 
imperfect triangle unless we possess the concept of a triangle. This 
claim does not preclude the possibility that we could conceive of the 
latter as a negation (imperfect instance) of the former.  
19 In a late letter to Cleselier, Descartes argues that “in order to 
conceive a finite being, I have to take away something from this 
general notion of being” (CSMK 377). In the Fourth Meditation, the 
narrator portrays his ontological status as falling somewhere “between” 
being and non-being (CSMII 38). 
20 For Descartes, the idea of nothingness is equivalent to the idea of 
non-being and is thus obtained via a complete negation of being. It 
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Rather, to grasp being as finite or imperfect is to 
apprehend it as falling short of being while nevertheless 
resembling it. Yet the fact that the relation is still a 
form of negation is significant, for it underscores that 
there is a distinction in kind between the two relata. Just 
as darkness is not a kind of light nor rest a sort of 
motion, so it will turn out that imperfect (finite) being 
is not really an instance of being, strictly speaking.  
 In his otherwise excellent commentary on Descartes’ 
Conversation with Burman, Cottingham is similarly misled by 
purported examples of negations.
21
 His account is worth 
analyzing in detail, however, since his interpretation will 
prove instructive. In response to Burman’s questions about 
the significance of CPP within a passage in the Discourse,
22
 
Descartes alludes to the above passage in the Third 
Meditation and provides the following explication: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
follows that we could conceive of being without conceiving of 
nothingness, but we could not conceive the latter without the former.  
21 It should be noted that the actual text of the Converstation with 
Burman was not written by Descartes himself, but represents notes taken 
by Burman (and perhaps dictated to another). Cottingham, however, makes 
a strong case for treating the Conversation as an accurate 
representation of Descartes’ views. See 1976, xvi-xviii.  
22 The passage in question is the following: “reflecting upon the fact 
that I was doubting and that consequently my being was not wholly 
perfect (for I saw clearly that it is a greater perfection to know than 
to doubt), I decided to inquire into the source of my ability to think 
of something more perfect than I was; and I recognized very clearly 
that this had to come from some nature that was in fact more perfect” 
(CSMI 127-8). 
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In that part of the Discourse you have a summary of 
these Meditations, and its meaning must be explicated 
by reference to the Meditations themselves. In that 
part of the Discourse, then, the author recognized his 
own imperfection by recognizing the perfection of God. 
He did this implicitly if not explicitly. Explicitly, 
we are able to recognize our own imperfection before 
we recognize the perfection of God. This is because we 
are able to direct our attention to ourselves before 
we direct our attention to God. Thus we can infer our 
own finiteness before we arrive at his infiniteness. 
Despite this, however, the knowledge of God and his 
perfection must implicitly always come before the 
knowledge of ourselves and our imperfections. For in 
reality the infinite perfection of God is prior to our 
imperfections, since our imperfection is a defect and 
negation of the perfection of God. And every defect 
and negation presupposes that which it falls short and 
negates. (CSMK 338) 
 
Cottinham observes that the priority in question is due to 
the fact that the idea of finite being is in some sense a 
negation of that of infinite being. Further, he correctly 
describes the relation of presupposition at the heart of 
CPP: “A possible answer [to what is meant by this relation 
of presupposition] is that X presupposes Y if in order to 
have the concept of X one must have the concept of Y, but 
not vice versa.”23 Yet Cottingham errs, like the others, in 
focusing on the difficulty of determining which of two 
opposite predicates is the negative and which is the 
positive one. He notes that Descartes’ examples of 
negations are always defects or privations of some sort, 
and allows that some cases, such as the pair “sighted” and 
                                                          
23 1976, 72. 
20 
 
 
 
“blind,” look “intuitively plausible” as examples of this 
priority: “in order to understand what ‘blind’ means, we 
have to have some concept of what it is to be sighted, 
while the converse does not seem to hold.”24 Using the 
example of an apple, however, he argues that when we apply 
this example to the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect,” 
no such priority can be found: “To understand what an 
imperfect apple is, it seems I must have the concept of a 
perfect apple; but the converse seems equally to hold: I 
could not know what was meant by a perfect apple unless I 
had the concept of an imperfect apple. There does not seem 
to be any priority at all here: in order to understand 
either of the two terms one must understand what is meant 
by the other. The two terms rank pari passu.”25  
Cottingham’s example is a useful one because it allows 
us to identify precisely how he has misunderstood the 
function of the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” in 
CPP. When Descartes employs these predicates within CPP, he 
is actually describing the relationship between the concept 
of a perfection definitive of a kind and the concept of 
imperfection as falling short of this kind. As I will 
argue, the actual claim is that in order to grasp that 
something is an imperfect X, I must already possess the 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 73. 
25 Ibid. 
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notion of X, which in this case is the notion of a perfect 
X. Indeed, Descartes makes just this point in his 
correspondence with Clerselier, his last writing on the 
doctrine of CPP:  
 
I say that the notion I have of the infinite is in me 
before that of the finite because, by the mere fact 
that I conceive being, or that which is, without 
thinking whether it is finite or infinite, what I 
conceive is infinite being; but in order to conceive a 
finite being, I have to take away something from this 
general notion of being, which must accordingly be 
there first. (CSMK 377) 
 
The notion of being is the notion of infinite being. The 
predicate “infinite” doesn’t modify or add to the concept 
of being. Indeed, in the paragraph preceding this, 
Descartes explicitly states that the predicate “infinite” 
has the same significance when joined with substance: “By 
‘infinite substance’ I mean a substance which has actually 
infinite and immense, true and real perfections. This is 
not an accident added to the notion of substance, but the 
very essence of substance taken absolutely and bounded by 
no defects.” The predicates “infinite” or “perfect” as 
applied to being or substance clearly do not have the 
significance suggested by Cottingham’s example. If the 
predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” functioned in his 
example as they do in these cases, then 1) we could be said 
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to necessarily possess the concept of a perfect apple 
simply by virtue of possessing the concept of an apple, for 
the perfection at issue would not be an ideal degree of 
sweetness or crispness but that which is definitive of the 
kind; and 2) our concept of an imperfect apple would not be 
the idea of something that is an imperfect instance of the 
kind (e.g., a mushy and bland apple), but the concept of 
something that is imperfect insofar as it fails to be an 
apple at all.  
 
III. CPP and the Perfect Triangle 
That the comparative predicates in CPP do not function 
in the way suggested by Cottingham’s example can be seen 
more clearly if we consider Descartes’ application of CPP 
to the idea of a triangle in the Fifth Replies and his 
explanation of this argument in the Conversation with 
Burman, the only time he explicitly applies CPP to 
something other than the idea of God. Though critics and 
defenders of Cartesian CPP have largely neglected this 
example, it is important for understanding Descartes’ 
argument for two reasons.
26
 First, it shows that the sense 
                                                          
26 One interpreter who has discussed the triangle example’s significance 
for Descartes’ argument for an innate idea of God is Deobrah Boyle. See 
2009, 128-136. To my knowledge, however, no one has yet used the 
geometrical example in an effort to understand Descartes’ application 
of CPP to the idea of God.  
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of “perfect” used in CPP is equivalent to “true” and 
second, it clarifies a distinction between conceiving of an 
object as perfect and merely conceiving of a thing that is 
perfect.  
 
A. Perfect as ‘True’ 
In response to Gassendi’s claim that our ideas of 
geometrical figures must be derived from ideas of 
sensation, Descartes responds that the figures available to 
the senses could not provide us with the concepts of 
geometrical objects since they fail to exhibit essential 
properties of these objects (in this case, perfectly 
straight lines). The “true triangle,” he says, “is 
contained in the figure only in the way in which a statue 
of Mercury is contained in a rough block of wood.” He then 
proceeds to explain, using the example of a face drawn on 
paper, what actually occurs in childhood when we seem to 
form a concept of a triangle through sense experience of 
triangle-like shapes: 
 
[S]ince the idea of the true triangle [veri trianguli] 
was already in us, and could be conceived by our mind 
more easily than the more composite figure of the 
triangle drawn on paper, when we saw the composite 
figure we did not apprehend the figure we saw, but 
rather the true triangle. It is just the same as when 
we look at a piece of paper on which some lines have 
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been drawn in ink to represent a man’s face: the idea 
that this produces in us is not so much the idea of 
these lines as the idea of a man. Yet this would 
certainly not happen unless the human face were 
already known to us from some other source, and we 
were more accustomed to think of the face than the 
lines drawn in ink; indeed, we are often unable to 
distinguish the lines from one another when they are 
moved a short distance away from us. Thus we could not 
recognize the geometrical triangle from the diagram on 
the paper unless our mind already possessed the idea 
of it from some other source. (CSMII 262) 
 
Descartes later discusses this passage with Burman who 
argues that we derive the notion of a perfect triangle from 
our idea of an imperfect one obtained through experience. 
Notice that “true” in “true triangle” is here treated as 
equivalent to “perfect,” and that Descartes’ argument for 
the priority of our concept of a “perfect triangle” mirrors 
his CPP arguments regarding the idea of God insofar as it 
explains the priority in terms of (partial) negation: 
 
Burman: But it is from the imperfect triangle that you 
frame in your mind the perfect triangle. 
 
Descartes: But why then does the imperfect triangle 
provide me with the idea of a perfect triangle rather 
than an idea of itself? 
 
Burman: It provides you with both: firstly itself, and 
then, from that, the perfect triangle. For you deduce 
the perfect triangle from the imperfect. 
 
Descartes: That cannot be. I could not conceive of an 
imperfect triangle unless there were in me the idea of 
a perfect one, since the former is the negation of the 
latter. Thus, when I see a triangle, I have a 
conception of a perfect triangle, and it is by 
25 
 
 
 
comparison with this that I subsequently realize that 
what I am seeing is imperfect.
27
 
 
The notion of a perfect triangle is here equivalent to the 
notion of a “true” one because the perfection at issue is 
the presence of those features (e.g., straightness of 
lines) that must be included within the concept for it to 
be a concept of a triangle. Triangularity is not a feature 
that admits of degrees—a figure either exhibits it or it 
doesn’t. An imperfect triangle is therefore a false one, 
i.e., not really a triangle at all. We may judge that an 
apple is imperfect because it is mushy and bland and thus 
falls short of the crispness and sweetness that we, at 
least implicitly, take to constitute apple perfection, but 
there is no sense in which the poor specimen thereby fails 
to be an apple. If we were to modify Cottingham’s example 
to fit the correct sense of perfection within CPP, an 
imperfect apple would be something along the lines of a wax 
replica of an apple, while a perfect one would just be an 
apple.  
 
B. Resolving an Ambiguity in CPP 
  Aside from its demonstrating that the sense of 
“perfect” in CPP is equivalent to that of “true,” 
                                                          
27 Cottingham 1976, 26. 
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Descartes’ account of the process by which we come to form 
the notion of a triangle is also important because it helps 
us to address an ambiguity in the account thus far. Applied 
to this example, the correlative concept critique is that 
the predicate “perfect” in the phrase “perfect triangle” is 
intelligible to me only if the predicate “imperfect” is 
too. I cannot judge that a given shape is a perfect 
triangle without also possessing a concept of triangle 
imperfection. Despite appearances to the contrary, CPP is 
entirely consistent with this observation, for the argument 
does not hold that the predicate “perfect” in “perfect 
triangle” could be intelligible without its correlate being 
intelligible too. When Descartes argues that “I could not 
conceive of an imperfect triangle unless there were in me 
the idea of a perfect one,” what he means by “the idea of a 
perfect one” is just the idea of a triangle as such. If I 
possess the concept of a triangle and yet never conceive of 
it as a standard against which to measure imperfect (false) 
triangles, the predicate “perfect” or “true” isn’t going to 
have significance for me in this sense (as far as triangles 
go). Yet since the perfection in question is definitive of 
a triangle as such, there is a sense in which I could be 
said to possess a concept of a perfect triangle simply by 
virtue of possessing the concept of a triangle; I do not 
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have to be aware of its perfection relative to non-
triangles. This feature distinguishes the idea of a perfect 
triangle from the idea of a perfect apple in Cottingham’s 
example—I could not, in this sense, be said to possess the 
concept of a perfect apple merely by virtue of possessing 
the concept of an apple, so long as the perfection in 
question (e.g., an ideal level of sweetness and crispness) 
is not definitive of an apple as such.  
 The concept of an imperfect triangle within CPP is, 
however, intrinsically comparative. Thus when Descartes 
claims that, without the idea of a triangle, “I could not 
conceive of an imperfect triangle” he is not claiming that, 
unless he had the concept of a perfect triangle, he could 
not conceive of a figure that happens to be an imperfect 
one. There is a sense in which I could be said to conceive 
of an imperfect triangle merely by conceiving of, for 
example, a drawing of a triangle on a chalkboard, or a 
three-sided figure the angles of which add up to 181 
degrees, for both of these things happen to be imperfect 
triangles. Descartes, however, does not hold that my being 
able to conceive of things that are imperfect triangles is 
contingent upon my possessing the concept of a perfect one. 
What does require a comparison and hence a concept of a 
perfect triangle is the apprehension of this figure as, or 
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the judgment that it is, an imperfect triangle. In order to 
judge that a given figure is an imperfect triangle, I must 
already posses the concept of a triangle as such. And if I 
did not apprehend this triangle as imperfect, there would 
be nothing to distinguish my conception from that of which 
is in fact a perfect triangle.  
Descartes’ example of the drawing of a face 
illustrates this distinction. Were I not already familiar 
with what is in fact a real face, I could not be said to 
conceive of the drawing as an image of a face, for if the 
object of my thought is to be something more than a mere 
assembly of lines on paper, I must relate what I see to an 
actual face. But, of course, I don’t need to recall the 
image of a face to be said to conceive of what is in fact a 
real face, for I can conceive of one of those simply by 
conceiving of a face. And if I, upon seeing the drawing, 
conceive of a face without noticing that the thing before 
me is, strictly speaking, only the image of a face (and 
hence imperfect), the object of my thought is a real face, 
not the image of one. So when Descartes concludes that “I 
could not conceive of an imperfect triangle unless there 
were in me the idea of a perfect one,” what he means by 
“the idea of a perfect one” is just the idea of a triangle—
not the apprehension of this triangle as perfect, which 
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indeed presupposes a comparison to imperfect ones. On the 
other hand, the phrase “conceive of an imperfect triangle” 
should be read as “conceive of a triangle as, or judge a 
triangle to be, imperfect” and hence presupposing a 
comparison to the standard (perfect) triangle. For 
Descartes, the idea of the imperfect within CPP is 
intrinsically comparative; the idea of the perfect is not.  
 An example Cottingham cites from the philosophy of 
language can help us to further disambiguate the roles of 
the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” within CPP. In his 
critique of CPP, he notes that the presupposition criterion 
for distinguishing positive from negative predicates is 
similar to J.L. Austin’s observation that the affirmative 
usage of a term is typically a “trouser word,” i.e., a term 
that needs to be understood if its opposite is to be 
intelligible.
28
 In fact, Austin’s analysis of the 
presupposition relation of the terms “real” and “fake” can 
be used to illustrate the true presupposition relation 
within CPP. Austin observes that, when it comes to these 
terms, it is actually the “negative use that wears the 
trousers,” since the assertion that something is real has 
significance only in comparison with ways in which it might 
                                                          
28 Cottingham 1976, 72.  
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be fake.
29
 “‘A real duck’,” says Austin, “differs from the 
simple ‘a duck’ only in that it is used to exclude various 
ways of being not a real duck.”30 Thus the term “real” and 
“fake” belong to the family of what Austin calls “adjuster 
words,” words that allow us to describe ambiguous or 
borderline cases by shifting the meaning of the terms they 
modify.
31
 If we discover an animal that looks and behaves 
somewhat like a duck, instead of inventing a new term for 
this animal we might simply say that it is like a duck, but 
it isn’t a real one.  
 We can grant Austin and critics of CPP that the 
affirmative usage of “perfect/real” can be understood only 
if we can grasp ways in which a given thing can be 
“imperfect/fake.” This is quite in line with our previous 
observation that we can be said to conceive of a triangle 
as perfect only if we can conceive of imperfect instances. 
Yet this is not the presupposition relation identified by 
CPP. Rather, the claim is that in order to conceive of 
various ways of being a fake duck, we must already possess 
the concept of a duck. According to CPP, therefore, it is 
the notion of a duck that “wears the trousers,” for the 
terms “real” and “fake” as applied to ducks have 
                                                          
29 Austin 1962, 70. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 73. 
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significance only insofar as the term “duck” does. As Coval 
and Forrest have argued in an article criticizing Austin’s 
account on just this point, the term “real” is not an 
adjuster word so much as a “re-adjuster word” since it not 
only excludes particular ways of being not-real but adjusts 
the meaning of the term it modifies back to the standard, 
“for if it merely excludes then it ambiguously leaves open 
the matter of whether or not other ways obtain under which 
it might still be not a real x, i.e. whether it might still 
be a temptingly aberrant rather than a re-adjusted x, a 
real x.”32 Even though it is true that the term “perfect” in 
the phrase “a perfect triangle” has significance for us 
only in comparison with an imperfect one, the concept of 
“an imperfect triangle” has significance only by reference 
to the standard it adjusts (a triangle), and it is this 
original notion of the standard that constitutes the idea 
of the perfect in CPP.  
Descartes’ argument is thus fully consistent with 
Kenny’s claim that “the ability use a predicate is not 
prior to, but identical with, the ability to use its 
negation.” The predicate “infinite” in “infinite being” can 
have significance for us only in light of the notion of 
finite being (which is the apprehension of being as 
                                                          
32 Coval 1967, 82. 
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finite). But Descartes’ actual claim is not that it is the 
apprehension of being as infinite or perfect that is the 
prior notion, but merely the idea of being itself. Yet we 
cannot be said to possess a notion of finite being without 
the notion of being as such, for the notion of finite being 
in CPP is the apprehension of being as finite. Though he 
was aware that the term “infinite” could lead to such a 
misunderstanding, Descartes explained that he retained it 
since “usage demanded that I use the negation of a 
negation. It was as if, to refer to the largest thing, I 
had said it was not small, or had no smallness in it. But 
by this I did not mean that the positive nature of the 
infinite was known through a negation, and so I did not 
contradict myself” (CSMK 192). The term “infinite” is a 
“negation of a negation” because it is a re-adjuster word, 
modifying (i.e., negating) the original negation, the 
adjuster word, “finite.” Yet it does not follow that the 
standard presupposed by the original negation (“finite”) 
does not expresses “the positive nature of the infinite,” 
for the positive nature of the infinite is being itself.  
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C. The Standard of Perfection 
It is clear that in order to apprehend a figure as an 
imperfect triangle we must already possess the idea of a 
triangle as such. Similarly, in order to apprehend a 
creature as a finite or imperfect being, we must already 
possess a concept of being as such. Yet there are two 
further features of the triangle example that may not apply 
to the case of infinite and finite being. First, the 
standard of perfection appears to be arbitrary. If we 
possess the concept of a figure that happens to be an 
imperfect triangle, it seems we could employ this concept 
as the standard and apprehend a figure that happens to be a 
perfect triangle as an imperfect instance of this non-
triangular figure. Second, employing a standard of 
perfection here appears to be unnecessary. Even if we 
lacked the idea of a triangle as such, we could still 
conceive of a figure that happens to be an imperfect 
triangle—we would merely be unable to apprehend it as an 
imperfect triangle.
33
  
 The Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth raises these 
concerns in his own, more extensive analysis of the process 
by which we apprehend the imperfection of corporeal 
                                                          
33 Or we would be unable to conceive of it (mistakenly) as a perfect 
triangle.  
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shapes.
34
 Clearly basing his discussion on the selections 
from Descartes noted above, Cudworth also uses the analogy 
of a portrait to explain the relationship between the 
sensation of an imperfect triangle and the innate idea of a 
(perfect) triangle. Noting how the idea of a perfect 
triangle was only “occasionally or accidentally invited and 
drawn forth from the mind” by the sensation of an imperfect 
one, he argues that a similar process occurs when a drawing 
of a face leads us to think of a man, or when a portrait in 
a gallery prompts the idea of a friend.
35
 If one did not 
possess a prior idea of a man or this friend, one “could 
think of nothing but just that was impressed upon him by 
sense, the figures of those inky delineations, and those 
several strokes and shadows of the pictures.” But what 
makes the idea of a man, or a triangle, the standard 
according to which we measure the imperfection of other 
things? After all, says Cudworth, “an irregular line and an 
imperfect triangle, pyramid, cube, are as perfectly that 
that they are [sic], as the other [perfect thing] is.”36  
 Descartes believes the idea of a “true” triangle is 
the standard because the “idea of the true triangle was 
already in us, and could be conceived by our mind more 
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easily than the more composite figure of the triangle drawn 
on paper.” Since innate concepts are both the earliest (as 
present from birth) and the simplest in terms of their 
intelligibility, they are naturally the standards according 
to which we judge other ideas. In the Rules, for example, 
Descartes characterizes those ideas he would latter deem 
innate as “pure and simple nature[s]” (CSMI 22) that we can 
grasp through “intuition,” i.e., a “conception of a clear 
and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that 
there can be no room for doubt about what we are 
understanding” (CSMI 14).  Cudworth seems to explain the 
priority in terms of these criteria as well. He claims that 
“the mind naturally delights more to think of simple and 
regular, than of compounded and irregular figures.”37 
Further, he argues that  
 
If there were no inward anticipations or mental ideas, 
the spectator would not judge at all, but only suffer, 
and every irregular and imperfect triangle being as 
perfectly like to that, which is the most perfect 
triangle, the mind now having no inward pattern of its 
own before it, to distinguish and put a difference, 
would not say one of them was more imperfect than 
another; but only comparing them one with another, 
[the mind] would say that this individual figure would 
be as imperfectly the imperfect triangle as the 
imperfect was the perfect.
38
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Thus for both Descartes and Cudworth, there is nothing in 
principle preventing us from treating the figure of what is 
in fact an imperfect triangle as the standard. It is only a 
psychological fact about us—our prior awareness of the true 
triangle and the ease with which we grasp it in comparison 
to the imperfect one—that leads us to treat the true 
triangle as the “rule, pattern, and exemplar” for our 
judgment.
39
  Descartes’ claim, in his conversation with 
Burman, that “I could not conceive of an imperfect triangle 
unless there were in me the idea of a perfect one, since 
the former is the negation of the latter” need not 
therefore be read as excluding the possibility that we 
could conceive of the drawn figure of a triangle in some 
other way or as possessing features a perfect triangle 
lacks.  Rather, the significance of the claim that an 
imperfect triangle is a “negation” of a perfect one is 
simply that we cannot conceive of the thing before us as an 
imperfect triangle except by comparing it to a triangle as 
such. To conceive of an imperfect triangle in CPP is to 
think of something exclusively in terms of the “real and 
positive” feature of triangularity that it lacks.  
Does the same analysis follow for being? Descartes 
does believe that the idea of God is innate and supremely 
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intelligible. In the Meditations, the narrator asserts that 
the idea of God is “the first and most important” of “the 
true ideas which are innate in me” (CSMII 46) and that the 
content of this idea (or a perfect being) is “self-evident” 
(CSMII 47).  Nevertheless, just as we may, somewhat 
perversely but nevertheless coherently, apprehend a real 
man as imperfect in comparison to an image of him (e.g., 
his lacking various features present in the image), so one 
might argue that we could, in principle, treat creaturely 
being as the standard according to which divine being is 
apprehended as imperfect. However, Descartes believes we 
cannot apprehend God as falling short of his creation since 
there is nothing “real and positive” found in creation that 
is absent in God. Note, for example, the following passage 
in his 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes: 
 
It is quite true that we do not understand the 
infinite by the negation of limitation; and one cannot 
infer that, because limitation involves the negation 
of infinity, the negation of limitation involves 
knowledge of the infinite. What makes the infinite 
different from the finite is something real and 
positive; but the limitation which makes the finite 
different from the infinite is non-being or the 
negation of being. That which is not cannot bring us 
to the knowledge of that which is; on the contrary, 
the negation of a thing has to be perceived on the 
basis of knowledge of the thing itself. (CSMK 192) 
(emphasis mine) 
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In the triangle example, what distinguishes the drawn 
figure from a perfect triangle could be attributed to 
features of the drawn figure that the triangle lacks. For 
example, the drawn figure could be said to possess a line 
with a certain curvature absent in a true triangle. It 
seems we could thus conceive of that which is a perfect 
triangle in terms of its lacking features of the drawn 
figure. Yet while each of these figures can be apprehended 
as imperfect instances of the other because their 
differences are attributable to the fact that each 
possesses features that the other lacks, Descartes believes 
that every perfection or reality found in creation must 
exist in God. Creatures do not have anything “real and 
positive” that God does not. “The idea of the infinite,” 
says Descartes, “which includes all being, includes all 
that there is of truth in things” (CSMK 377). Since we 
cannot conceive of God’s being in terms of positive 
features he lacks, we cannot measure him according to the 
standard of creation.  
Yet even if we cannot apprehend divine being as 
imperfect in comparison to creaturely being, must we 
conceive of creaturely being in light of a standard of 
divine being? Just as we can grasp a given image as a 
collection of “inky delineations” and “strokes and shadows” 
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and hence without comparing it to (or having any idea of) 
its model, or conceive of a figure that is an imperfect 
triangle without comparing it to the standard of a true 
triangle, can’t we conceive of that which is finite being 
without conceiving it as finite being, i.e., without 
comparing it to God?  In his own attempt to explain the 
“paradoxical” notion of priority in CPP, John Carriero 
suggests that the passages arguing for the priority of the 
perfect “are best read as claims about how we, beings 
endowed with an idea of God, conceive things that are 
finite.”40 Other beings that happen to lack an idea of God, 
he explains, would still be able to conceive of finite 
things, but they would not be aware that they are limited 
(qua beings).  
Like Carriero, I am inclined to believe that Descartes 
thinks we could conceive of creatures even if we lacked an 
idea of God.
41
 Again, when Descartes asserts in the above 
passage that “the negation of a thing has to be perceived 
on the basis of knowledge of the thing itself,” he should 
be interpreted as making the relatively uncontroversial 
                                                          
40 2009, 191. 
41 That possessing a concept of God is not a necessary condition for 
possessing other concepts appears to be confirmed by the narrator’s 
suggestion that “I have the idea of substance in me in virtue of the 
fact that I am a substance” (CSM 31). Of course, the narrator does not 
thereby possess an idea of true substance, but merely an idea of that 
which is finite substance.  
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claim, consistent with the triangle example, that 
apprehending A as a negation of B presupposes a notion of 
B. Just as I could conceive of a figure that happens to be 
an imperfect triangle without comparing it to a true or 
perfect triangle, so I could conceive of creatures (that 
happen to be finite beings) without comparing them to 
infinite being (God). Here it is important to see how the 
kind of partial negation involved in the case of finite and 
infinite being (or imperfect and perfect triangularity) 
differs from the complete sort of negation involved in 
examples such as darkness and light or being and 
nothingness. Since darkness is not imperfect light, but its 
complete absence, we cannot conceive of it except in terms 
of the absence of the positive reality in question (light). 
Yet creatures are not nothing—they have some reality of 
their own. Just as the idea of an imperfect triangle is 
more than the apprehension of the mere absence of 
triangularity, but the idea of something that is like a 
triangle though falling short of it, so the idea of 
creaturely being is more than the apprehension of the 
absence of being:  it is the idea of that which is not 
being but like it, i.e., finite or imperfect being.  
Yet the painting and triangle examples are, in a 
significant respect, dissimilar to the case of creatures 
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and God. If we lacked the idea of a (perfect) triangle we 
could still conceive of things that happen to be imperfect 
triangles by bringing them under some other concept of a 
positive property they satisfy fully (e.g. closed figure). 
Similarly, a painting of a man falls short of being a man, 
yet we would nevertheless say that it is a perfect—that is 
real or true—arrangement of shapes, piece of canvas etc. 
There are countless ways in which we might say that the 
painting fully satisfies the criteria definitive of a given 
positive property. Indeed, it is only because the model 
lacks positive features possessed by the painting that we 
can (somewhat perversely) use the painting as the standard 
and consequently apprehend the model as an imperfect 
instance of the painting. Even if we lack knowledge of the 
painting’s model and so cannot apprehend it with respect to 
this standard, we can nevertheless grasp other real and 
true aspects of it. But Descartes believes that every 
creaturely property is either an imitation of a property 
that exists formally (i.e., literally) in God or an even 
more remote version of one that exists eminently (in some 
higher way) in him.
42
 So while it seems that we could still 
                                                          
42 In the Second Replies, Descartes asserts that “Whatever exists in the 
objects of our ideas in a way which exactly corresponds to our 
perception of it is said to exist formally in those objects. Something 
is said to exist eminently in an object when, although it does not 
exactly correspond to our perception of it, its greatness is such that 
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conceive of creatures without a concept of God, we would be 
unaware of the fact that these properties are, at best, 
only imitations of the real thing.  
 
IV. Cartesian CPP and Platonism 
 Adams has argued that the priority of the perfect is 
“a main theme of the Platonic tradition.”43 Menn agrees, 
asserting that the Cartesian doctrine is actually “the 
crucial presupposition of Plotinus’ and Augustine’s 
arguments for God, and is originally the teaching of the 
Phaedo, arguing that the perfection of the approximately 
equal depends on a recollection of the equal-itself.”44 Our 
analysis of CPP provides further support for these claims, 
for both (A) the identification of “perfect” with “real” 
and (B) the claim that an explicit awareness of 
imperfection is necessary for distinguishing thought of the 
imperfect from that of the standard, are features that 
interpreters have found within Plato’s metaphysics and 
theory of recollection as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
it can fill the role of that which does so correspond” (CSMII 114). 
With respect to God, he says, we recognize that some of [the indefinite 
attributes of which we have some idea] (such as knowledge and power) 
are contained formally in the idea of God, whereas others (such as 
number and length) are contained in the idea merely eminently” (Ibid.) 
43 2008, 91. 
44 1998, 283. 
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A recurring theme within the Platonic tradition is an 
identification of perfection and reality. In his own 
analysis of the relationship between particulars and Forms 
in Platonic metaphysics, Richard Patterson has drawn out 
the consequences of such an identification. Patterson 
argues that the resemblance relation between Forms and 
particulars ought to be understood as analogous to that 
obtaining between models and their images. According to 
this reading, the imperfection of particulars in comparison 
with Forms is like the imperfection of images with respect 
to their models. Though using an image-model analogy to 
understand Plato’s theory of Forms is not novel, 
Patterson’s interpretation is especially relevant insofar 
as he emphasizes that this analogy underscores a negative 
relation between the perfect and the imperfect: the 
imperfect, insofar as it is imperfect, is not of the same 
nature as the perfect. As Patterson argues, 
 
Plato’s stock examples of images—paintings, statues, 
drawings, reflections in mirrors or water, dream 
images, songs, images in poetry or prose—are in no 
case related to their models as copies to standards or 
as qualified to unqualified exemplars. In these cases 
the image F is not ‘another real F such as its model’, 
nor does it resemble its model with respect to being 
F: the reflection of Cratylus in the mirror or on 
water is not another Cratylus; the black-figure 
warrior on a vase is not another, only qualified or 
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imperfect, warrior; the marble Hermes is not itself a 
god.
45
 
 
Just as an image of a horse is not a horse, so Patterson 
argues that a particular horse is not really a horse in the 
sense that the abstract nature of horse (the Form) is. A 
given form F is perfectly F in the sense that it is really 
F.
46
 
Descartes uses a similar image-model analogy to 
describe the relationship between the perfect and the 
imperfect in CPP.
47
 The imperfect triangle resembles a 
‘true’ one in the sense a shape carved within “a rough 
block of wood” resembles the statue of Mercury, or the way 
a portrait of a face resembles that of a “real” man.48 The 
                                                          
45 1985, 20. 
46 Patterson also uses Austin’s account of ‘real’ to illustrate his 
interpretation: “The use of ‘real F’ as applied to a model or 
paradeigma of this sort is what J.L. Austin called the ‘ellipsis 
excluding’ use of ‘real,’ while ‘image’ or ‘imitation’, as contrasted 
with ‘model’ or ‘original’ is akin to our usage in ‘imitation diamond’ 
or ‘imitation leather.’ To call the former ‘ellipsis excluding’ is to 
observe only that the statement ‘this is a diamond’ will in certain 
contexts be elliptical for ‘this is an imitation, but not a real, 
diamond.’ A portrait labeled ‘Napoleon’ is not a real Napoleon, but 
only –if we fill in the ellipsis –a portrait of Napoleon. On the other 
hand when we say this is a real (true, genuine) diamond we mean to 
exclude any such addition: This is no mere imitation, no piece of cut 
glass that only sparkles like a diamond, but the genuine article[…]” 
(1985, 21). 
47 Adams observes that “Of the relations suggested by Plato as obtaining 
between ordinary particulars and the Forms, the one most used in 
structuring philosophical theologies has been that of an imitation or 
imperfect copy to an archetype or exemplar; and something like that is 
envisaged in Descartes’ top-down approach” 2007, 99. 
48 Why does Descartes here use the analogy of an image of an image—a 
wooden representation of a statue of Mercury? Perhaps he is here 
observing a distinction between a perfect instantiation of a triangle 
and the abstract geometrical nature of the triangle itself—which, 
depending on your interpretation of Cartesian essences, may itself be 
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same analogy is explicitly applied to the relationship 
between creatures and God.  At the end of the Third 
Meditation, for example, the narrator claims that “the mere 
fact God created me is a very strong basis for believing 
that I am somehow made in his image and likeness […].” 
Later, the narrator notes that it is primarily in virtue of 
his will that he appears to “bear in some way the image and 
likeness of God” (CSMII 35). In fact, Descartes even uses 
the image-model analogy to highlight the sense in which 
creatures fall short of God. In the Fifth Objection, 
Gassendi argues that while the notion that we “are made in 
the image and likeness of God” is a principle of Christian 
faith, he wonders “how may it be understood by natural 
reason, unless you are putting forward an anthropomorphic 
picture of God?” (CSMII 213). In response, Descartes argues 
that it would be absurd to “deny that we are made in the 
image of God” merely out of fear that this would “make God 
like a man.” This objection, he says, is like  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
identical with the innate idea of a triangle. Descartes indicates that 
the imperfection of the drawn triangle is its lacking features 
definitive of triangularity (straightness of lines) not its being a 
material instantiation of what is really an abstract object. Thus a 
perfect instance of a triangle captures the essence of the abstract 
entity in the way that a perfect statue of Mercury captures the nature 
of the mythical being. Notice that this same ambiguity attends Plato’s 
account of the imperfection of particulars: are they imperfect simply 
because they are material instantiations rather than abstract objects, 
or are they imperfect because, as material instantiations, they fail 
(and necessarily so?) to exhibit qualitatively identical features?  
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trying to deny that one of Apelles’ pictures was made 
in the likeness of Alexander on the grounds that this 
would mean that Alexander was like a picture, and yet 
pictures are made of wood and paint, and not of flesh 
and bone like Alexander […] It is not in the nature of 
an image to be identical in all respects with the 
thing of which it is an image, but merely to imitate 
it in some respects. (CSMII 256-7) 
 
Notice that in denying that images must be “identical in 
all respects” with their models, Descartes is not 
committing himself to the view that images must then be 
qualitatively identical in some respects with their models. 
Rather, an image must merely “imitate [imitetur] it in some 
respects.” This passage is best read as supplying a 
sufficient rather than a necessary condition for a thing’s 
being an image—namely, if something is qualitatively 
distinct in every way from something else, it could 
nevertheless be an image of that thing so long as it 
imitates it in some respect.
49
 Since a thing can be an image 
of another thing without being qualitatively identical with 
the latter in any respect whatsoever, treating creatures as 
images of God does not presuppose any form of qualitative 
                                                          
49 So this still allows us to say that one thing could be an image of 
another by virtue of being qualitatively identical in some respects. 
Does this mean that the imitation relation is not a necessary condition 
for being an image? I don’t think so, for it seems that we would want 
to say that the former, considered as a whole and not with respect to 
its individual qualities, still imitates the latter. The thing taken as 
a whole is an imitation, though some of its attributes are copies 
rather than imitations of some of the model’s attributes. Of course, 
creatures cannot imitate God by being qualitatively identical with him 
in any respect, and consequently they can be considered images only 
insofar as they imitate (some of) God’s attributes. 
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identity and hence does not lead to anthropomorphism. The 
negative aspect, i.e., the feature that makes something 
merely an image rather than a reproduction of a model, can 
be secured by the imitation relation alone; an image could 
imitate its model in every respect and still be merely an 
image, so long as the relation is only one of imitation. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, Descartes holds 
that creatures are like God in only some respects, for God 
has many (perhaps infinitely many) attributes that 
creatures fail to imitate in any way. The above passage 
indicates, however, that Descartes considered creatures to 
be images of God not because they share qualities with him 
in a limited number of ways, but because they, in a limited 
number of ways, imitate him.
50
 Descartes’ use of the image-
model analogy thus underscores the negative relation 
implied in CPP—i.e., the claim that an imperfect thing is 
imperfect insofar as it fails to be the same kind as the 
perfect. As an imitation apple is not an apple, nor 
imitation wood real wood, so the respects in which a given 
image “imitates” its model are respects in which an image 
is qualitatively distinct from its model. In this sense, 
                                                          
50 Perhaps, however, Descartes would hold that if creatures imitated God 
in every way then they actually would possess a secondary-property in 
common with God –that of the extensive infinitude of attributes.  
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the image-model analogy has for Descartes the negative 
significance of the image-model analogy used by Plato.  
The image analogy is put under some strain within the 
tradition of Theistic Platonism, however, as philosophers 
and theologians sought to explain how the goodness or 
reality of creation could be conceived as not representing 
an addition to, or improvement upon, the goodness and 
reality of God. Particularly, the image-model analogy could 
lead one to the mistaken view that creatures differ from 
God in terms of their possessing something God lacks. In 
the example above, Descartes had suggested that the 
imperfection of a painting consisted, in part, of its 
having features (e.g. paint and wood) that are absent in 
its model. Yet creatures cannot be said to differ from God 
by virtue of having something God lacks, for Descartes is 
committed to the view that whatever reality exists in 
creatures exists formally or eminently (i.e. in some higher 
way) in God. Indeed, David Schindler has argued that since 
Plato normally invokes participation to explain the 
positive relation between participants and Forms, there has 
been some pressure within Theistic Platonism to find a 
principle explaining the difference between creatures and 
49 
 
 
 
God.
51
 Yet he argues that positing such a principle leads to 
a dilemma of assuming either “a Gnostic ultimacy of two 
principles, which is ultimately irrational, or to affirm 
difference as an ‘unjustifiable’ fall from unity.”52 In the 
Fourth Meditation, the narrator appears to grasp the second 
horn of Schindler’s dilemma, ascribing his imperfection to 
“participation in nothingness,” which he says is equivalent 
to his simply lacking features of God: 
 
I realize that I am, as it were, something 
intermediate between God and nothingness, or between 
supreme being and non-being: my nature is such that in 
so far as I was created by the supreme being, there is 
nothing in me to enable me to go wrong or lead my 
astray; but in so far as I participate in nothingness 
or non-being, that is, in so far as I am not myself 
the supreme being and am lacking in countless 
respects, it is no wonder that I make mistakes. (CSMII 
38) 
 
This passage suggests that the failure of creatures to be 
qualitatively identical in any respect with God is to be 
explained entirely in terms of their lacking features of 
the “supreme being.” They differ from God either in terms 
of failing to possess correlates of divine perfections, by 
possessing qualitatively distinct imitations of divine 
                                                          
51 “Aquinas, following the classical philosophical tradition, affirms 
that ‘that which is the principle of unity cannot be the principle of 
difference.’ If this axiom is simply true, we can find a principle for 
the difference of the image from the form—and ultimately of the world 
from God—only by positing a second principle for difference” (2005, 4). 
52 4. 
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perfections, or in terms of possessing properties (such as 
extension) that exist in God in some higher way 
(eminently). 
53
 
Alexander Nehamas confessed that he had always been 
puzzled as to why Plato would hold that a necessary 
condition of the recollection of likes is an explicit 
awareness that the object that reminds us “lacks something 
in respect of being similar to that which is remembered.”54 
Referring to Plato’s example of the portrait of Simmias, 
Nehamas asks “Is it really necessary for me to realize that 
Simmias' portrait, which reminds me of Simmias, does not 
match the color of his hair? Must I, in one breath, realize 
that I am looking at Simmias' portrait and that the 
portrait is inaccurate?” He concludes, however, that the 
awareness of imperfection is here necessary because it is 
the only thing distinguishing the apprehension of the 
imperfect from that of the perfect: “the fact that the 
portrait does not duplicate all the features of its model 
                                                          
53 As we shall see in later chapters, understanding the resemblance 
relation between creatures and God in terms of analogy might allow us 
to understand why creation does not represent an addition to God’s 
goodness or reality. Since the creaturely analogates of goodness and 
reality are qualitatively distinct from God’s goodness and reality, 
they are incommensurable. In his analysis of Aquinas, Gilson similarly 
sees analogy as providing a solution to this problem (as well as to the 
problem of pantheism): “A mere analogue of the divine being, the 
created being can neither constitute an integral part of the divine 
being, nor be added to it nor subtracted from it. Between two 
magnitudes of different orders there is no common measure” (2002, 133-
4). 
54 1975, 112. 
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must be clear to the spectator if he is to be aware that he 
is looking not at the model itself, but at a different 
thing, its portrait or copy, which resembles the model in 
certain relevant respects!”55  
As we have seen, an awareness of imperfection plays a 
similar role in Descartes’ account. Since our ideas of the 
divine perfections are innate and supremely intelligible, 
we are initially inclined to apprehend creaturely 
imitations of these properties as instances of the real 
thing. That the creaturely properties are merely imitations 
can be evident to us only if we grasp their dissimilarity 
to the divine properties. As Descartes puts it in the 
Principles, “We pass from knowledge of God to knowledge of 
his creatures by remembering that he is infinite and we are 
finite” (CSMI 201). If we are to apprehend a drawing of a 
face as an image of a face rather than a mere collection of 
lines, we must grasp its likeness to a real face; but if we 
apprehend this similarity without recognizing its 
dissimilarity, then this image will be indistinguishable to 
us from the real thing.  Likewise, if we are to apprehend 
creaturely being and goodness as imitations of true being 
and goodness, we must grasp their similarity to these 
properties; but if we do not recognize that the creaturely 
                                                          
55 1975, 113. 
52 
 
 
 
properties are imperfect, their likeness to the divine 
properties will lead us to mistakenly treat them as 
instances of genuine being and goodness.  
 
V. Why Must the Narrator Compare himself to God? 
Appreciating that “perfect” or “infinite” has the 
significance of “true” or “real”  in CPP also allows us at 
this point to address a common criticism of the Third 
Meditation version of the argument. There, as you may 
recall, the narrator had argued that his idea of the 
infinite must be prior to the finite, for otherwise “how 
could I understand that I doubted or desired—that is, 
lacked something—and that I was not wholly perfect, unless 
there were in me some idea of a more perfect being which 
enabled me to recognize my own defects by comparison?”  
(CSMII 31). Granting the narrator the uncontroversial point 
that he can’t judge himself to be imperfect without 
possessing some corresponding notion of perfection, critics 
have nevertheless questioned his implicit assumption here 
that the perfection in question must be absolute perfection 
(i.e. God’s). Broughton, for example, asks “Why must he be 
thinking, even implicitly, that he is not God-like?”56 All 
                                                          
56 2002, 149. 
53 
 
 
 
he needs in order to think of himself as imperfect, so the 
argument goes, is an idea of something a little more 
perfect than he is—an idea of a person who knows a bit more 
that he does, for example. He can remain uncertain as to 
whether this thing itself is “wholly perfect,” for all that 
he needs in order to understand that he is not “wholly 
perfect” is the awareness that something is “more perfect” 
than he is.
57
  
Yet this criticism fails to recognize that the 
argument from doubt expresses the narrator’s sense that he 
is imperfect as a thing. Indeed, at this point in the 
Meditation, the narrator knows only that he is a thinking 
thing and it is qua thing that he judges himself to fall 
short. After all, the line immediately preceding the 
argument from doubt asserts that it is the narrator’s idea 
of God understood as an infinite substance (or “thing”) 
that is prior to the idea he has of himself understood as a 
finite substance (“thing”).58 That it is as a thing that the 
                                                          
57 This is not, in fact, a new criticism—Gassendi raises this very 
critique in the Fifth Set of Objections: “you might have known a man 
who was healthier, stronger, better looking, more learned, more 
restrained and hence more perfect than you; if so, it would not have 
been difficult for you to conceive an idea of this man and, by 
comparing yourself with it, to come to understand that you did not have 
the same degree of health, strength and the other perfections that were 
to be found in him.” (CSMII 208) 
58 And as Bernard Williams observes, if Descartes is here claiming to be 
himself imperfect as a man rather than as a being, then “he has no 
proof that he is imperfect—for perhaps a perfect man is one whose 
experiences include doubt and sorrow” (1978, 147). 
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narrator judges himself to be imperfect is crucial for 
understanding the sense of perfection that is here being 
employed, for throughout his works Descartes often uses 
“perfection” as a synonym for “reality.”59 Derived from the 
Latin term res or “thing,” realitas or “reality” can be 
glossed as “thinghood” or “thingness.”60 When Descartes 
compares items according to their perfection understood as 
thinghood or reality, he usually does so in terms of a 
three-tiered ontological hierarchy: “There are various 
degrees of reality or being: a substance has more reality 
than an accident or a mode; an infinite substance has more 
reality than a finite substance” (CSMII 117). Kenny thus 
concludes that, taken in this way, Descartes’ ontological 
hierarchy “does not admit of degrees.”61 When Descartes 
talks about one thing being more perfect qua thing than 
another, he is making a comparison across these ontological 
                                                          
59 In his argument for the causal principle in the Third Meditation, for 
example, he equates “more perfect” with “contains in itself more 
reality” (CSMII 28).  Carol Rovane observes that, in addition to “the 
‘degrees of reality’ conception associated with the Principle: what is 
more perfect is literally more real” there are at least three other 
senses of perfection at work in Descartes. 1) A thing can have 
“perfections in the plural” in the sense that “one thing can possess 
various perfections.” Here “perfection” is more or less synonymous with 
attribute or property; 2) there is also “the more familiar notion of 
attributive perfection: with respect to a given property, one thing may 
be perfect or imperfect”; finally, 3) “the notion of absolute 
perfection associated with the idea of God” (1994, 95). See also Kenny 
1968, 134-5 and Wee 2006, 98-9. 
60 Adams 103 
61 1968, 134. 
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categories, not within them.
62
 Thus the idea of another 
finite thinking thing, even one vastly more intelligent and 
powerful than he, could therefore never explain the 
narrator’s awareness of his imperfection qua thing, for the 
narrator is no less a thing than any other finite thinking 
thing to which he can compare himself. Similarly, the idea 
of a sweet and crisp apple could never enable me to 
apprehend a bland and mushy apple as imperfect in the sense 
of failing to be an apple, for one is neither more nor less 
an apple than the other. Since no finite substance is more 
of a thing than he is, the narrator’s apprehension of his 
own imperfection qua thing can be explained only by his 
possessing an idea of that which has “more reality” than 
finite substance, and the only thing that has “more 
reality” than finite substance is infinite substance (i.e., 
God).  
                                                          
62 The story is more complicated than this, however. Though the three-
part ontological hierarchy suggests that all finite substances have an 
equivalent amount of formal reality, Descartes suggests in the Sixth 
Meditation that finite thinking substances are more “noble” than finite 
extended substance insofar as minds, unlike bodies, are indivisible—a 
claim that some have linked to the narrator’s suggestion in the Third 
Meditation that his mind might contain modes of extended substance 
eminently. That finite extended things might fall below finite thinking 
things in the hierarchy is, however, irrelevant with respect to the 
argument from doubt in the Third Meditation since the same conditions 
for the narrator’s grasping his imperfection (his possessing an idea of 
that which is more perfect qua thing than he is) would hold. For a 
detailed description of this complication of the three-part hierarchy, 
see Schmaltz 2008, 52-56, 67-71). My position is also consistent with 
the suggestion that when Descartes talks about necessary features of 
the (formal) causes of objective reality (of ideas), he may be invoking 
a more detailed ontological hierarchy.  
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One might object, however, that it makes no difference 
whether the argument from doubt assumes that all finite 
substances are equally perfect (or equally imperfect) qua 
things, for the notion of degrees of “reality or being” 
(“thinghood”) itself makes no sense. Edwin Curley remarks 
that “we do not naturally think of either being or 
perfection as admitting of degrees.”63 Indeed, the notion of 
degrees of reality struck Hobbes as nonsensical as well: 
“Does reality admit of or more and less? Or does he think 
one thing can be more of a thing than another?” (CSMII 
130).
64
 If one thing is no more a thing than any other, then 
it is hard to see how the idea of anything, even a divine 
thing, could give Descartes a sense of his own imperfection 
qua thing.  
In fact, his account is consistent with the 
commonsense intuition Curley and Hobbes express. That 
Descartes describes being or reality as something that 
                                                          
63 1978, 129. 
64 Descartes’ response to Hobbes provides further evidence for Kenny’s 
claim that, for Descartes, “reality does not admit of degrees.” Instead 
of explaining degrees of reality by citing gradations of perfection 
within the categories of creatures (finite being), which would be to 
understand “perfection” in its most common sense, Descartes once again 
explains the distinction of degree in terms of a distinction in kind: 
“I have […] made it quite clear how reality admits of more and less. A 
substance is more of a thing than a mode; if there are real qualities 
or incomplete substances, they are things to a greater extent than 
modes, but to a lesser extent than complete substances; and finally, if 
there is an infinite and independent substance, it is more of a thing 
than a finite and dependent substance” (CSMII 130). His account here is 
somewhat more complex since includes a distinction between complete and 
incomplete substances.  
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comes in “degrees” or increments of “more and less” is 
misleading, for it suggests that “being” “real” or “thing” 
is here used univocally.
65
 So as we might say that two 
apples are both sweet even though one is sweeter, 
Descartes’ language seems to allow us to say that even 
though God’s being is greater than our own, we are 
nevertheless both beings in the fullest sense of the term.  
Yet as we have noted earlier, the term “being” cannot be 
univocal since God alone is true being. Descartes’ explicit 
assertion in the Principles that “substance” is not a 
univocal term is indeed a consequence of his position that 
“infinity” signifies “the very essence of substance.” There 
he states that “the term ‘substance’ does not apply 
univocally, as they say in the Schools, to God and to other 
things; that is, there is no distinctly intelligible 
meaning of the term which is common to God and his 
creatures” (CSMI 51). 
 That “substance” or “being” as applied to creatures 
and God are not used univocally is indeed required by CPP.  
A “perfect” thing is perfect, according to CPP, in the 
sense that it is a “true” or “real” thing, and an 
                                                          
65 As I will describe in Ch. 3, Aquinas sometimes uses comparisons of 
“more” and “less” in cases where univocal predication is not possible. 
We can reconcile Descartes’ denial of univocity with his use of “more” 
and “less” by interpreting these comparisons as analogical in the sense 
indicated by Aquinas. God is “more” of a thing than any creature in the 
sense that he alone is a genuine thing (substance).  
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“imperfect” thing is apprehended as imperfect qua thing 
insofar as it is seen as falling short of this standard. 
Understood according to this sense of perfection, a finite 
substance is apprehended as finite or imperfect insofar as 
it fails to be a true substance or thing, just as a wax 
apple is apprehended as an imitation apple because it fails 
to be a genuine apple. And as we wouldn’t say that an 
imitation apple falls short of the genuine article by 
virtue of having a very low degree of appleness, so we 
ought not be misled into concluding that finite being or 
substance falls short by virtue of having only a very low 
degree of being or thinghood.  
 
VI. The Criteria of True Substance 
That substancehood, like triangularity, is something 
that does not admit of degrees, can be seen more clearly if 
we describe the criteria of true substance (or ‘thinghood’) 
according to which the narrator in the Meditations judges 
himself as falling short. In the passage from the 
Principles where Descartes denies the univocity of 
“substance,” the explanation for this denial is a 
distinction in terms of ontological dependence: “there is 
only one substance which can be understood to depend on no 
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other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all 
other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with 
the help of God’s concurrence” (CSMI 51). In his own effort 
to understand Descartes’ talk of “degrees” of being, Curley 
isolates the dependence criterion as providing evidence for 
the claim that the scale of being has only three levels 
(and that, consequently, any two finite substances have the 
same degree of being). According to this reading, 
“differences in degree of formal reality are a function of 
differences in degree of one property, the capacity for 
independent existence.”66 Yet Curley’s suggestion that the 
distinction ought to be understood in terms of variations 
within a shared property—“the capacity for independent 
existence”—is misleading. There are degrees of dependence, 
and thus we might say that modes are more dependent than 
finite substances since the latter require only God for 
their continued existence whereas modes depend on finite 
substances too. Yet the narrator does not grasp God as 
possessing a very minimal degree of dependence—God is not 
merely the least dependent being conceivable. God is 
apprehended as “independent,” as not exhibiting any 
dependence whatsoever.  
                                                          
66 1978, 129. 
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Though Bernard Williams notices that Descartes’ 
dependence criterion leads him to deploy the term 
“substance” in a somewhat equivocal way, he doesn’t think 
much of significance follows from this. Indeed, he thinks 
we can still speak of degrees of being within the category 
of substance. Though Descartes uses the term “substance” in 
two different ways, Williams claims that “since all he 
means by this is that the first sort are created, and God 
is not, it comes to very much the same thing.”67 Yet the 
dependence criterion is not the only one cited in the 
Meditations. In fact, at the time of the argument from 
doubt in the Third Meditation, the narrator has not yet 
grasped his imperfection as a dependent thing. Rather, here 
he judges himself to be imperfect by virtue of his 
incompleteness. The narrator tells us that his 
understanding that he “doubts and desires” is significant 
because it is an understanding that he “lacked something.” 
The implication is that he is here comparing himself to 
something that is lacking nothing, something that is 
“wholly perfect.”68 The idea of substance as such is an idea 
                                                          
67 1978, 136. 
68 The narrator’s awareness of his own incompleteness follows an 
apprehension of his intellectual limitations. Stephen Menn observes 
that God serves “not just as a standard of perfection in general, but 
specifically as a standard of intellectual perfection to the soul” 
(1998, 286). Since, at this point in the Meditations, the narrator’s 
only item of knowledge is that he is a thinking thing, it is natural 
that the standard of perfection according to which he will judge 
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of something complete or “wholly perfect” in the sense that 
“whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as being real 
and true, and implying any perfection, is wholly contained 
in [the idea of] it” (CSMII 32).  Because this completeness 
is definitive of substance as such, anything that is seen 
to lack all that is “real and true” will be apprehended as 
imperfect in the sense that it falls short of completeness 
and hence falls short of true substancehood.  
That the narrator would view completeness as a 
criterion of true substancehood is likely a reflection of 
the fact that Descartes held there was only a conceptual 
distinction between a substance and its attributes. 
Attributes are not, in other words, properties that inhere 
in substances. A body does not, properly speaking, have 
extension—it is extension. More precisely, every substance 
is identical with its principal attribute, its “essence,” 
and it is through this principal attribute that other 
invariable features, other attributes of the substance, are 
conceived.
69
 As the earlier quoted passage from Descartes 
                                                                                                                                                                             
himself will be an intellectual one. As he describes in his 
Correspondence, the idea of God at this point is an idea of 
“intellectual nature in general,” an idea “if considered without 
limitation, represents God, and if limited, is the idea of an angel or 
a human soul” (CSMK 55). Indeed, it was this notion of intellectual 
nature in general that the narrator examined in the Second Meditation. 
69 “A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but 
each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature 
and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. Thus 
extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of 
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suggests, the essence or principal attribute of substance 
is “actually infinite and immense, true and real 
perfections” which “is not an accident added to the notion 
of substance, but the very essence of substance taken 
absolutely and bounded by no defects.” To conceive of real 
or true (infinite) substance is to conceive of that which 
is “actually infinite and immense, true and real 
perfections.” As we will explore further in the next 
chapter, Descartes held that “the essences of things are 
indivisible” in the sense that “an idea represents the 
essence of a thing, and if anything is added to or taken 
away from the essence, then the idea automatically becomes 
the idea of something else” (CSMII 256). Thus to conceive 
of that which fails to be “actually infinite and immense, 
true and real perfections” is to think of some other 
essence, and is thus to conceive of something that falls 
short of substance as such.  
We should not therefore attribute Descartes’ denial of 
univocity to the dependence criterion alone, for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking 
substance. Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes 
extension, and is merely a mode of an extended thing; and similarly 
whatever we find in the mind is simply one of the various modes of 
thinking. For example, shape is unintelligible except in an extended 
thing; and motion is unintelligible except as motion in an extended 
space; while imagination, sensation and will are intelligible only in a 
thinking thing. By contrast, it is possible to understand extension 
without shape or movement, and thought without imagination or 
sensation, and so on; and this is quite clear to anyone who gives the 
matter his attention” (CSMI 210-11). 
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narrator’s intuition in the Third Meditation is that he is 
imperfect qua thing insofar as he is “incomplete and 
dependent.” When Descartes says that “there is no 
distinctly intelligible meaning of the term [substance] 
which is common to God and his creatures,” we can take him 
at his word and thus understand him to be including the 
completeness criterion as well. Substance as such is 
complete, and anything that fails to be complete cannot be 
a true substance.  Indeed, when the narrator summarizes the 
conclusion of the argument from doubt at the beginning of 
the Fourth Meditation, both criteria are noted: “[W]hen I 
consider the fact that I have doubts, or that I am a thing 
that is incomplete and dependent, then there arises in me a 
clear and distinct idea of a being who is independent and 
complete, that is, an idea of God” (CSMII 37).70 Again, the 
narrator’s apprehension of imperfection is not expressed in 
terms of seeing that God possesses the highest degree of 
something he possesses less of, but through noticing 
                                                          
70 Descartes seems to suggest that completeness might be ‘contained 
within’ the concept of an independent thing, though it is not obvious 
that the assertion “an independent being is complete” is analytically 
true since, in the Meditations, he seems to portray completeness as 
merely something an independent being would have the power to achieve. 
But in his reply to Arnauld, Descartes suggests the relationship is one 
closer to logical entailment: “a being whose essence is so immense that 
he does not need an efficient cause in order to exist, equally does not 
need an efficient cause in order to possess all the perfections of 
which he is aware: his own essence is the eminent source which bestows 
on him whatever we can think of as being capable of being bestowed on 
anything by an efficient cause.[…] his essence is such that he 
possesses from eternity everything which we can now suppose he would 
bestow on himself if he did not yet possess it.” (CSMII 168).  
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properties—completeness and independence—that he (and 
indeed every creature) lacks absolutely. The narrator 
grasps himself as imperfect insofar as he falls short of 
genuine substancehood, and he fails to be a true substance 
because he lacks the completeness and independence that are 
definitive of true substance.  
A critic might grant the claim that the narrator’s 
reference to completeness and independence lends support to 
the earlier assertion that his sense of imperfection in the 
argument from doubt is an awareness of falling short of 
substance as such. Yet completeness and independence are 
second-order properties, i.e., properties that supervene on 
more basic (first-order) ones.  If the first-order 
properties prove to be shared, it could be argued that the 
qualitative break suggested by the reference to binary 
second-order qualities is only superficial. The narrator 
judges himself to be incomplete with respect to knowledge 
and dependent insofar as he lacks the power to preserve 
himself in existence.
71
 So even if we accept the claim that 
the narrator’s awareness of his own imperfection in the 
argument from doubt is an awareness that he is not a true 
                                                          
71 In response to Arnauld, Descartes asserts that “the inexhaustible 
power of God is the cause or reason for his not needing a cause” (CSM 
165). The narrator’s awareness that he is incomplete arises through his 
being aware that he lacks knowledge and power. Menn argues, however, 
that at this stage of the meditation power reduces to knowledge since 
the power of a thinking thing consists in the ability to know. 
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substance, if the distinction between a “true” substance 
and a “false” one is merely a matter of God possessing more 
knowledge or power than we do, then the significance of the 
argument from doubt is thrown into question. This is so 
because the standard of substance according to which we see 
ourselves falling short would appear to be something we 
could generate by modifying ideas of our own properties. 
For example, one might arbitrarily designate a “real” apple 
as that which possesses a high degree of sweetness and 
crispness. One might then view a less sweet or crisp one as 
thus failing to be an apple in this strict sense.
72
 Yet 
since the distinction between being an apple and failing to 
be one is thus a difference of degree of shared properties 
(sweetness, crispness), there is no reason to think that 
the standard itself is something we could not have created 
by modifying our ideas of the fruit that fell short. 
Likewise, if the standard of true substance (God) diverges 
from our own nature merely by degree, then it would appear 
                                                          
72 We do something similar in everyday speech. However, rather than 
using ‘perfect’ as a synonym for ‘real’ or ‘true’ we will use ‘real’ or 
‘true’ as a synonym for ‘perfect,’ and hence without really implying 
that the imperfect instance would thereby fail to really be a thing of 
the same sort. So, for example, I may point to an exceptionally 
impressive automobile and exclaim, “now that’s a real car,” but in 
doing so I am not saying that less impressive instances fail to be 
cars. In the above example, however, the claim that only really sweet 
and crisp apples are truly apples does imply that less sweet and crisp 
ones are not apples. 
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to be something we could create by amplifying ideas of our 
own attributes.   
Yet Descartes will explicitly deny that any attribute 
can be predicated univocally of creatures and God. When 
comparing creaturely freedom to God’s freedom, for example, 
he asserts that “no essence [attribute] can belong 
univocally to both God and his creatures” (CSMII 292). In 
fact, the existence of a qualitative distinction between 
divine attributes and creaturely ones is a crucial premise 
in his arguments against the claim that we can derive ideas 
of divine attributes by amplifying our ideas of creaturely 
ones. I cannot, for example, arrive at a concept of divine 
power or knowledge by simply modifying my notion of my own 
power and knowledge because God’s power and knowledge 
(which are true power and knowledge) differs in kind from 
my own. Given God’s simplicity, every one of his attributes 
is a primary attribute and hence identical with his 
essence. Descartes will concede that we normally become 
aware of these qualitatively distinct attributes through a 
process of amplifying ideas of creaturely attributes, yet 
he will deny the claim that this process of amplification 
generates these concepts. Rather, we are able to arrive at 
concepts of divine attributes in this way only because an 
implicit awareness of them was already guiding the process 
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from the beginning.  Amplification merely helps us make 
these latent notions explicit.   
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Ch. II. CPP and the Amplification Argument 
It should at this point be clear how CPP works as a 
response to the claim that the notion of God is a mere 
negation of our notion of creaturely imperfection. Since 
the judgment that something is imperfect insofar as it 
falls short of being presupposes a notion of being, the 
argument from negation can’t even get off the ground. 
Descartes’ critics, at least those found in the Objections 
and Replies appended to the Meditations, give little 
indication that they understood, much less accepted, this 
argument.
73
 In their responses to Descartes, however, they 
introduce a different argument against the claim that the 
idea of God is innate: we generate our idea of God by 
amplifying our notions of creaturely attributes. In the 
Second Set of Objections compiled by Marin Mersenne, the 
argument is presented that we can “find within ourselves a 
sufficient basis” for constructing an idea of God: “for 
surely I can see that, in so far as I think, I have some 
degree of perfection, and hence that others besides myself 
                                                          
73 Gassendi, for example, takes Descartes’ argument from doubt to be 
claiming that our awareness of imperfection is relative to the object, 
rather than the fact, of desire. Using the example of bread, he 
objects, “when you desire some bread, the bread is not in any sense 
more perfect than you or your body; it is merely more perfect than the 
emptiness of your stomach.” Descartes responds that “the fact that 
someone desires some bread does not imply that the bread is more 
perfect than he is, but merely that someone who needs bread is in a 
more imperfect state than when he does not need it” (CSMII 254). 
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have a similar degree of perfection. And this gives me the 
basis for thinking of an indefinite number of degrees and 
thus positing higher and higher degrees of perfection up to 
infinity” (CSMII 88). 74 Gassendi provides a similar 
argument in the Fifth Set of Objections: “Although every 
supreme perfection is normally attributed to God, it seems 
that such perfections are all taken from things which we 
commonly admire in ourselves, such as longevity, power, 
knowledge, goodness, blessedness and so on. By amplifying 
these things as much as we can, we assert that God is 
eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good, supremely 
blessed and so on” (CSMII 200). 
If the amplification argument assumes that we begin by 
apprehending a creaturely attribute as imperfect in the 
absolute sense of failing to be the same kind as the 
perfect, then the argument has no more force than the 
argument from negation. This is so because we obviously 
need to have an idea of the kind the creaturely attribute 
falls short of if we are to apprehend it as imperfect in 
this sense. In their own analyses, Adams and Carriero 
suggest that CPP is intended to address the argument from 
amplification in precisely this way.
75
 Menn too argues that 
                                                          
74 It is suspected, however, that most of these objections were written 
by Mersenne himself. See editor’s comments (CSMII 64). 
75 Adams 1996, 96; Carriero 2009, 192-4. 
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the argument against amplification is the same as the 
argument against negation: “I cannot reach the idea of an 
infinite being by negating the idea of limits or amplifying 
the idea of a finite being, since I conceive of a finite 
being by adding the idea of limits to the idea of being as 
such, and being as such is infinite.”76   
Yet one wonders why our idea of God couldn’t be 
constructed by amplifying concepts of creaturely attributes 
that are not judged to be imperfect in the sense of failing 
to be the same kinds as the perfect.
77
 To use Descartes’ 
triangle example, we might grant that in order to judge 
that something is an imperfect triangle I must possess the 
idea of a (perfect) triangle, but why couldn’t I conceive 
of the drawing as the figure it is and then modify this 
idea so as to reach the idea of a triangle? That perceiving 
the drawing happened to be the occasion for my conceiving a 
perfect triangle suggests that it in some sense resembles a 
triangle; and if it resembles a triangle close enough to 
reliably trigger the idea of one, rather than the idea of a 
square or a circle, why couldn’t modifying this idea of it, 
                                                          
76 1998, 284. 
77 Broughton argues that it is not enough for Descartes to show “that 
his idea of God is implicit in his explicit recognition of his 
imperfections” (2002, 151). Granted that we can’t conceive of ourselves 
as imperfect in the sense of falling short of God without an idea of 
God, it may nevertheless be the case that this presupposed idea of God 
was itself constructed from our ideas of creatures in a way that did 
not involve any such awareness of imperfection.  
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or viewing this idea in comparison to other similar ideas, 
enable me to produce the idea of a triangle? Similarly, 
even though apprehending a particular instance of 
creaturely goodness as failing to constitute true goodness 
presupposes a notion of goodness as such, what if we 
apprehend creaturely goodness without reference to goodness 
as such? Why couldn’t we form the concept of (perfect) 
goodness by manipulating this notion?
78
 
The amplification argument does appear to assume that 
we apprehend a creaturely property as imperfect in some 
sense, for otherwise there is no rationale guiding the 
process of amplification itself. Boyle, for example, may 
indeed be right when she argues that “unless we had noticed 
that our own qualities are limited, we would not see that 
they can be extended and amplified.”79 Yet it does not 
follow that an awareness of limitation would presuppose a 
notion of God, for we need only be aware of a more perfect 
creature to see that we are limited in some respect. In the 
version of the argument provided by Mersenne, it is implied 
that we apprehend a given property as imperfect relative to 
others that differ by “degree.” Thus one could argue that 
                                                          
78 The same sort of argument would not work for the argument from 
negation. Negating features of properties that are finite, but not 
apprehended as finite, could yield concepts of only diminished 
creaturely properties.  
79 2009, 74. 
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we can generate an idea of God by amplifying our ideas of 
creaturely perfections that are judged to be imperfect 
relative to other creaturely attributes of the same kind. 
For example, we may notice that one creature is less 
powerful than another creature, and then hypothesize that 
this latter creature’s power may be similarly imperfect 
relative to some other creature, and so on. Or from the 
idea of my own power I could derive the idea of a being 
with less power, and from a comparison between these I 
could derive the idea of “twice as powerful” (or whatever 
the given ratio may be).  It seems I could then generate an 
idea of a being twice as powerful as myself, and so on. The 
idea of divine power would then be what is yielded by our 
amplifying our idea of creaturely power as far as we can. 
This sort of amplification argument has also been put 
forward by modern critics such as Broughton and Rovane.
80
 
The amplification arguments provided by Mersenne and 
Gassendi are more complicated, however, than they first 
appear. This is because both the anonymous author in 
Mersenne’s objection as well as Gassendi deny that we 
possess ideas truly representing the infinite in the first 
                                                          
80 Rovane asks, for example, whether “the idea of perfect knowledge, in 
contrast with which Descartes’ idea of his own epistemic imperfection 
can be made intelligible, be construed as the (negative) idea of 
indefinitely perfected knowledge, and could this idea be derived from 
Descartes’s ideas of his actual states of knowledge and their relative 
perfection?” (1994, 97-8).  See also Broughton 2002, 146-153.  
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place. Their amplification arguments are not intended to 
assume the explanatory burden of demonstrating how we 
generate the notion of God Descartes claims we have (i.e., 
an idea representing God’s essence), but rather intended to 
show how we create the comparatively impoverished idea of 
God that, according to these critics, we actually have.
81
 
Given God’s greatness in comparison to us as well as our 
own intellectual limitations, Gassendi suggests that the 
idea produced through amplification doesn’t really capture 
God’s nature: “We have no basis for claiming that we have 
any authentic idea which represents God; and it is more 
than enough if, on the analogy of our human attributes, we 
can derive and construct an idea of some sort for our own 
use—an idea which does not transcend our human grasp and 
which contains no reality except what we perceive in other 
things” (CSMII 200). Hobbes asserts something similar in 
his own series of objections. He mistakenly assumes that 
Descartes equates having an idea of God with having a 
                                                          
81 The version of the amplification argument provided by Mersenne is 
difficult to interpret on this score. It is only after the argument is 
provided that the author claims that “you do not have the idea of God, 
just as you do not have the idea of an infinite number or an infinite 
line” (CSMII 89). It is therefore not clear whether the anonymous 
author takes the argument to show that Descartes’ idea of God can be 
constructed by such amplification, or if it is merely intended to show 
how some lesser idea is or could be constructed. Redefining the content 
of the idea in question is a standard empiricist response to purported 
candidates for innate ideas. Showing how a supposedly innate idea could 
be derived from sense experience becomes much easier if it assumed that 
the idea does not have the unique or rich content the rationalist 
thinks it has.  
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mental image of God, and then goes on to explain how such 
an image can be constructed by ideas (images) of things we 
have sensed.  
The issue is further complicated by the fact that 
Descartes appears to agree that the idea of God is, in a 
sense, reached through a process of amplification. In a 
letter to Regius, for example, he responds to the claim 
that “it is because we have in ourselves some degree of 
quantity [of wisdom, power, goodness and the other 
perfections which we attribute to God] that we form the 
idea of an infinite quantity” with the surprising statement 
that “I entirely agree, and am quite convinced that we have 
no idea of God except the one formed in this manner” (CSMK 
147). In response to Hobbes’ question as to where we obtain 
the idea of God’s understanding, Descartes argues that, 
since everyone is aware that there are things he 
understands, “everyone has the form or idea of 
understanding; and by indefinitely extending this he can 
form the idea of God’s understanding. And a similar 
procedure applies to the other attributes of God” (CSMII 
132). Indeed, as we shall see in his replies to Mersenne 
and Gassendi, Descartes will apparently concede that we 
conceive of the divine attributes through a process of 
amplification. 
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 At first glance, therefore, one could take Descartes 
to be agreeing with his critics that our idea of God is 
wholly constructed out of our ideas of creaturely 
properties. Indeed, his primary concern often seems to be 
showing that the amplification procedure is nevertheless 
compatible with his Third Meditation “Trademark” argument 
for the existence of God. In a letter to Hyperaspistes, for 
example, he asserts that even though we have the ability to 
reach notions of divine attributes by amplifying ideas of 
our own, God himself must have given us this ability or 
“power”: “I did not deny that there is a power in the mind 
of amplifying the ideas of things; but I frequently 
insisted that the ideas thus amplified, or the power of so 
amplifying them, could not be in the mind unless the mind 
itself came from God, in whom there really exist all the 
perfections which can be reached by such amplification. I 
proved this from the principle that there can be nothing in 
an effect which was not previously present in the cause” 
(CSMK 192). He makes similar claims about the necessary 
causal origin of this “power” in most of his responses to 
the various amplification arguments.
82
 If this sort of 
response were taken to represent the whole of Descartes’ 
reaction to the amplification argument, it would seem that 
                                                          
82 He does this in response to Mersenne’s anonymous author (CSM II 100) 
and in response to Gassendi (CSM II 255). 
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only a certain faculty, and not an idea of God, is 
presupposed by our ability to amplify our way to ideas of 
divine attributes.  
 
I. Amplification and Innateness 
 Anyone familiar with Descartes’ critique of scholastic 
pseudo-explanation in natural philosophy, however, would 
notice that this conclusion presents us with an 
incongruity. One of the reasons Descartes rejected the 
scholastic theory of forms was his belief that appeal to 
such forms lacked explanatory force.  His basic objection, 
as Desmond Clarke puts it, is that “one cannot explain any 
phenomenon merely by attributing a quality or form to it 
which is named after the effect to be explained.”83 It would 
be odd, however, if Descartes were to deny that a sleeping 
pill’s effectiveness could be adequately explained by 
citing its dormative power, while at the same time 
accepting that our ability to modify ideas of creaturely 
attributes so as to arrive at ideas of divine ones is 
sufficiently explained by citing a “power” of 
amplification.
84
  
                                                          
83 2003, 19. 
84Nicholas Jolley provides a clear statement of the dilemma as it 
appeared to Malebranche: “[W]hen the defender of innate ideas resorts 
to talk of faculties, his claim must be empty unless such faculties can 
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In fact, Descartes does not always treat this faculty 
as explanatorily sufficient, for in one place he explicitly 
states that the “power” of amplification is to be explained 
by the existence of an innate idea.
85
 In his response to 
Gassendi’s claim that the idea of God does not have more 
objective reality than the (amplified) ideas of finite 
things taken together, Descartes asserts that  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
be grounded in non-dispositional properties of the mind. In the case of 
physical objects it is possible to see how such a grounding requirement 
for faculties or dispositions can be satisfied; the non-dispositional 
properties will typically be persistent structural modifications of the 
kind discovered by science. But no such solution seems readily 
available to the de-fender of innate ideas, for it is not clear how one 
can speak of persistent structural modifications in the case of 
immaterial minds. Thus the hypothesis of innate ideas is in danger of 
being explanatorily empty” (78, 1988).  As I will argue below, the 
innate idea of God could be such a “persistent structural modification” 
of the mind. David Rosenthal has addressed the incongruity of 
Descartes’ appeal to faculties in his account of mind, yet he argues 
that appeal to the faculty of thought, the faculty of judgment, or the 
faculty of will is not intended to be explanatory but are “reductive in 
spirit” and hence a “handy way to talk about the abilities a thinking 
thing must have” (Rorty 1986, 422). This may be true for the broader 
faculties Rosenthal cites, but it seems to me that Descartes does 
invoke the “power” of amplification as part of an explanation for our 
ability to reach concepts of divine attributes by modifying creaturely 
ones. That Descartes goes on to identify this power with possession of 
an innate idea suggests that he indeed recognizes that such a power 
needs to be explanatorily grounded by reference to, in this case, the 
existence of an innate idea of God.  
85 Menn 1998, 285; Adams 2007, 95-6; Boyle 2009, 73; Carriero 2009, 193-
4; and Beyssade 1996, 180, have all noted that Descartes’ considered 
response to the amplification argument is the claim that we must 
possess an idea of God (or at least the perfect attribute in question) 
in order to reach an idea of a divine attribute by amplifying an idea 
of a creaturely one. They do not, however, appeal to the qualitative 
difference between creatures and God to explain why such an innate idea 
is required. Rather, these thinkers usually just cite Descartes’ letter 
to Cleselier in which he asserts that the idea of being is the idea of 
infinite being. The problem with this response, as I have indicated, is 
that it does not address the possibility that we might amplify ideas of 
creaturely perfections that are not apprehended as finite/imperfect.  
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you yourself admit that these perfections must be 
amplified by our intellect if they are to be 
attributed to God. So do you think that the 
perfections which are amplified in this way are not, 
as a result, greater than they would be if they were 
not amplified? And how could we have a faculty for 
amplifying all created perfections (i.e. conceiving of 
something greater or more ample than they are) were it 
not for the fact that there is in us an idea of 
something greater, namely God? (Italics mine) (CSMII 
252) 
 
That our ability to conceive of something “greater or more 
ample” than created attributes is to be explained by our 
actually possessing an idea of this greater and more ample 
thing is entirely consistent with Descartes’ account of 
innate ideas. Notice, however, that the “faculty” or 
“power” is not simply identified with the idea but is 
explained by it. Descartes’ account of innateness is often 
mistakenly read as claiming that an innate idea is nothing 
more than a disposition (or “power”) for having an 
occurrent idea. Yet such a reading fails to distinguish the 
act of perception (the idea’s formal reality as a mode of 
the mind) from the content of the perception (the idea 
considered in terms of its objective or representational 
reality).  A given thought with a given representational 
content can be characterized as “innate” insofar as we 
always had “within ourselves” the faculty for “summoning it 
up.” Yet this faculty itself is explained by our possessing 
innately the idea as an objective reality. We have within 
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ourselves the power for having a given thought with a given 
content because we quite literally already possess the 
objective content featured within the occurrent thought.
86
 
                                                          
86 I agree with Boyle in her recent (2009) effort to provide a single, 
coherent account of Descartes’ theory of innate ideas. She suggests 
that ideas are innate insofar as we possess ideas understood as 
objective content (ideaO), and it is these (ideasO) that enable us to 
have certain occurrent thoughts (ideasM). Yet the problem with Boyle’s 
account is that she never explains in what sense ideasO could be said 
to ‘reside’ in the mind without being the object of an act of thought 
(ideaM), for Descartes is usually interpreted as holding that every act 
of thought (ideaM) takes an object (ideaO) and every objective content 
(ideaO) is the object of an act of thought (ideaM). It is difficult to 
understand how conceptual content (ideaO) could ‘exist’ without being 
an object of thought. I would argue, however, that Boyle’s position can 
be reconciled with this doctrine if we can show that the ideaO of God 
is an implicit object in every act of thought (ideaM). Such an account 
would draw on Descartes’ occasional portrayal of ideas as innate in the 
sense of being logical entailed by, i.e., ‘contained’ within, occurent 
ideas (see McRae 1972). Descartes states that there are “certain 
primitive notions which are as it were the patterns on the basis of 
which we form all our other conceptions. There are very few such 
notions. First, there are the most general—those of being, number, 
duration, etc.—which apply to everything we can conceive” (CSMK 218). 
So we might argue that everything is conceived, at least implicitly, in 
light of a notion of infinite being. Thus the ideaO of infinite being 
could be said to be implicitly contained in every act of thought 
(ideaM). And not only would our possessing this ideaO explain the 
capacity to have an occurent ideaM of God, but by virtue of containing 
the reality of creatures, the ideaO of God could explain the faculty of 
summing up any innate idea—with, perhaps, the exception of the idea of 
extension since this is not a formal feature of God. If this is 
Descartes’ actual position, it would be somewhat similar to Leibniz’s 
account in which dispositions for ideas are explained in terms of, or 
grounded by, an infinity of unconscious experiences, i.e., ‘petites 
perceptions’–though in Descartes’ case, the ‘infinite’ content would be 
the reality contained within the ideaO of God. For Leibniz, says Jolly, 
“when we ascribe a dispositional property to an object, there must be 
some non-dispositional property in virtue of which it is ascribed; this 
non-dispositional property will typically be a persistent structural 
modification. Thus, in what Mates calls the paradigmatic example, the 
sugar is soluble in virtue of its crystalline structure; the structural 
description of the sugar, together with an appropriate law of nature, 
jointly entail that the sugar is soluble in certain conditions. In 
Leibniz's view, just the same basic principles apply when we ascribe a 
dispositional property to the mind; for example, when we say that an 
infant's mind has an innate idea of a triangle. There is the same basic 
need for a persistent structural modification, but in this case it must 
be a purely mental one” (1988, 86 emphasis mine). For Descartes, the 
innate ideaO of God, implicitly contained in every act of thought 
(ideaM) would, to use Jolly’s phrase, be a “persistent structural 
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Thus we have Descartes’ frequent reference to innate ideas 
as present but somehow submerged, waiting within the 
“treasurehouse” of the mind to be brought to 
consciousness.
87
  
Why would we need to appeal to an innate idea of God to 
explain our ability to amplify a given creaturely 
perfection? In the account provided above, Descartes seems 
to be arguing that any process of amplification presupposes 
an innate idea. Yet is he really arguing that I could not 
even amplify the idea of my own intelligence to arrive at 
the idea of a slightly more intelligent creature unless I 
possessed a corresponding innate idea?
88
 It may seem that 
such a conclusion is required by Descartes’ claim that an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
modification” of the mind, playing the same role of Leibniz’s petites 
perceptions. On Leibniz’s distinction between mental dispositions 
(which are always grounded by the properties of substances) and bare, 
i.e., ungrounded, faculties (which he deemed absurd) see Jolley 1988, 
86.  
87 Those who interpret his account as identifying innate ideas with 
dispositions are thus at a loss to explain why Descartes then refers, 
in passages such as the following, to ideas as present but somehow 
submerged: “a mind newly united to an infant’s body is wholly occupied 
in perceiving in a confused way or feeling the ideas of pain, pleasure, 
heat, cold and other similar ideas which arise from its union and, as 
it were, intermingling with the body. None the less, it has in itself 
the ideas of God, of itself and of all such truths as are called self-
evident, in the same way as adult human beings have these ideas when 
they are not attending to them; for it does not acquire these ideas 
later on, as it grows older” (CSMK 190). Moreover, as the earlier 
quotation from Jolley indicates, identifying ideas with dispositions 
threatens to make a theory of innate ideas practically 
indistinguishable from empiricist accounts, for surely the empiricist 
will allow that we all have dispositions to form certain ideas given 
certain stimuli.  
88 Presumably, the innate idea would here be either the idea of such 
creaturely intelligence or the idea of something more intelligent 
(another creature or God).  
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idea of that which has more reality cannot be derived from 
an idea of that which has less. Yet our earlier analysis of 
this principle shows that it does not force him to accept 
such an implausible conclusion, for the idea of a more 
intelligent creature is not the idea of something 
possessing more reality than the idea of a less intelligent 
one; as finite beings, each possesses exactly the same 
degree of formal reality (or thinghood) as the other. 
Indeed, Descartes’ actual claim is far more restricted than 
an outright rejection of amplification as a means of 
producing ideas. In his reply to Gassendi, he suggests that 
the power of amplification calls for an innate idea of God 
because of the nature of the difference between the 
creaturely attribute amplified and the divine attribute 
reached: 
 
You agree that I can gradually augment, in varying 
degrees, all the perfections that I observe in people, 
until I see that they have become the kind of 
perfections that cannot possibly belong to human 
nature; and this is quite sufficient to enable me to 
demonstrate the existence of God. For it is the very 
power of amplifying all human perfections up to the 
point where they are recognized as more than human 
which, I maintain and insist, would not have been in 
us unless we had been created by God. (italics mine) 
(CSMII 255) 
 
The explanandum is not merely the power to reach through 
amplification ideas of greater human perfections, but the 
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ability to reach ideas of perfections that are “recognized 
as more than human.” It is our ability to reach through 
amplification only these sorts of perfections that calls 
for an innate idea of God. The question, then, is what does 
Descartes mean by “the kind of perfections that cannot 
possibly belong to human nature”?  
 
II. Divine Perfections as Indefinite 
It may initially seem that it is only the 
quantitatively indefinite nature of our ideas of God that 
precludes their being constructed from concepts of 
creatures and hence presupposes innate resources. After 
all, Descartes had agreed with his critics that we arrive 
at ideas truly representing the divine perfections by 
“indefinitely extending” the ideas we have of our own. 
Throughout his works, he defines the indefinite as that in 
which we perceive no limits. He portrays it as an 
inherently negative notion in the sense that it merely 
involves the recognition that we are unable to grasp the 
limits of a thing.
89
 For example, he argues that we conceive 
of bodies as “indefinitely divisible […] because it is not 
possible to divide any body into such parts, that we do not 
                                                          
89 In the Principles, Descartes asserts that we conceive of a thing as 
indefinite when we “negatively admit that their limits, if they have 
them, cannot be found by us” (CSMI 202). 
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understand each of these parts still to be divisible” (CSMI 
202). He thinks a similar analysis applies to the 
“extension of the world” and “the number of stars” that God 
could create (CSMI 201). Descartes’ critics, however, had 
taken the indefinite nature of our ideas of the divine 
perfections to constitute evidence that these ideas are 
wholly constructed from our ideas of creaturely perfections 
and hopelessly incapable of representing their actually 
infinite natures. Mersenne tells Descartes that “you do not 
have the idea of God, just as you do not have the idea of 
an [actually] infinite number or an [actually] infinite 
line” because these ideas are merely concepts of creaturely 
perfections extended indefinitely (CSMII 89).
90
 
Descartes claims that there is more to our idea of the 
indefinite than his critics seem to realize. Such ideas are 
not objects “pictured in the imagination” but “perceive[d] 
with the intellect, when the intellect apprehends, or 
judges, or reasons” (CSMII 99). In this way, the idea of 
the indefinite involves an intellectual apprehension of 
                                                          
90“For surely I can see that, in so far as I think I have some degree of 
perfection, and hence that others besides myself have a similar degree 
of perfection. And this gives me the basis for thinking of an 
indefinite number of degrees and thus positing higher and higher 
degrees of perfection up to infinity. In the same way, I can surely 
take a given degree of being, which I perceive within myself, and add 
on a further degree, and thus construct the idea of a perfect being 
from all the degrees which are capable of being added on” (CSM II 88). 
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something that lies beyond our power of conception.
91
 Citing 
the example of an “indefinitely large number,” he suggests 
that this intellectual recognition presupposes innate 
resources:  
 
Now in my thought or intellect I can somehow come upon 
a perfection that is above me; thus I notice that, 
when I count, I cannot reach a largest number, and 
hence I recognize that there is something in the 
process of counting which exceeds my powers. And I 
contend that from this alone it necessarily follows, 
not that an infinite number exists, nor indeed that it 
is a contradictory notion, as you say, but that I have 
the power of conceiving that there is a thinkable 
number which is larger than any number than I can ever 
think of, and hence that this power is something which 
I have received not from myself but from some other 
being which is more perfect than I am. (CSMII 99-100) 
 
In addition to the apprehension that “when I count, I 
cannot reach a largest number” there is the intellectual 
recognition of “a perfection that is above me,” viz., “that 
there is a thinkable number which is larger than any number 
than I can ever think of.” Descartes goes on to assert that 
when we consider what “power” could be responsible not only 
for this idea of an “indefinitely large number” but for 
“other attributes which can exist in the being that is the 
source of the idea […] we shall find that it can only be 
                                                          
91 As I will later describe, Descartes distinguishes conceiving from 
understanding.  
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God” (CSMII 100).92 Thus the crucial feature distinguishing 
our ideas of the divine perfections from our ideas of 
creaturely ones—the feature that precludes the construction 
of the former from the resources of the latter and hence 
calls for an innate idea of God—would appear to be their 
indefinite nature. 
Aside from the question of why an idea of the 
indefinite would presuppose innate resources, the above 
account raises two significant issues. First, if the 
distinction between divine and creaturely perfections were 
merely quantitative, it would seem that creatures and God 
could nevertheless be said to possess different degrees of 
the same property. Just as an indefinitely large number is 
still a number and an indefinitely long line still a line, 
so it would appear that infinite power or infinite 
knowledge would still be power and knowledge in the same 
sense of the term. Such a conclusion would clearly 
contradict Descartes’ denials of univocity elsewhere (e.g, 
                                                          
92 In the Conversation with Burman, however, Descartes asserts that this 
argument is not intended to demonstrate the existence of God: “This 
argument could not have any force for an atheist, who would not allow 
himself to be convinced by it. Indeed, it is not suitable for this 
purpose, and the author does not wish it to be understood in this way. 
It must rather be conjoined with other arguments concerning God, since 
it presupposes such arguments, and takes God’s existence as already 
proved by them” (CSMK 340). The more perfect being established by the 
argument is simply that which possesses the formal reality necessary to 
confer upon us the innate idea that provides us with the power of 
indefinite amplification. This notion of such a being is to ‘thin’ to 
count as an idea of God, which is why the argument could not be 
compelling for the atheist.  
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“no essence can belong univocally to both God and his 
creatures”).  Though Descartes believes that some 
properties (e.g. such as the attribute of extension) cannot 
be literally predicated of God since they are contained in 
Him only “eminently” (i.e., they are part of God’s nature 
only in the sense that he has the power to produce them), 
those properties that are literally predicable of him, 
i.e., contained in God “formally” (the pure perfections and 
transcendentals), must be qualitatively distinct from their 
creaturely instances.
93
 Yet if God’s perfections are in 
reality qualitatively distinct from creaturely ones, then 
this would seem to entail that Descartes’ critics are right 
and that we do not, in fact, possess ideas truly 
representing the divine attributes.  
                                                          
93 In scholastic thought, the transcendentals are those properties that 
are coextensive with being and hence common to all beings (thereby 
“transcending” the traditional Aristotelian categories). Though there 
was debate concerning which properties constitute transcendentals, they 
often included unity, truth and goodness. Scotus later modified the 
doctrine somewhat by defining transcendentals as those properties that 
are not limited to a finite being or category. Following Bonaventure, 
he introduced the disjunctive transcendental finite/infinite being —a 
transcendental that Descartes appears to incorporate into his own 
system. A pure perfection is, to use Scotus’ definition, any property 
that is better than anything incompatible with it. Thus wisdom is 
preferable both to its opposite (foolishness) as well as to being a dog 
or a rock. All transcendentals are pure perfections, but not all pure 
perfections are transcendentals (since wisdom, for example, is not 
common to every being). See Seifert 1991, 909-11. For Scotus’ account 
of pure perfections and transcendentals, see Wolter 1946. Though 
Descartes clearly endorses a theory of pure perfections in his account 
of God, his stance on the transcendentals is less clear. For his 
treatment of transcendentals, see Clayton 2000, 170-171; Carriero 2009, 
230-231; and Chappell 1997, 114. 
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It was a commonplace in scholastic thought to deny 
univocal predication on the basis of divine simplicity. Yet 
since most scholastics were Aristotelian empiricists, they 
believed that our conceptual resources were limited to what 
could be derived from experience. Like Descartes’ own 
critics, they consequently denied that we possess 
quidditative knowledge of God’s essence or his 
qualitatively unique perfections.
94
 Descartes, however, 
boldly asserts that our (innate) idea of God “contains the 
essence of God” (CSMII 78) and furthermore that God’s 
“perfections are known to us more clearly than any other 
thing” (CSMI 199).95 While he does not think that our 
cognitive access to God’s nature is anything like the 
complete or comprehensive understanding found in the 
beatific vision, his philosophical theology, particularly 
                                                          
94 For Aquinas, possessing quidditative knowledge of something is to 
have a definition of its essence. See Rocca 1993, 646.  
95 Descartes does, however, qualify the first claim: “[T]his idea 
contains the essence of God, at least in so far as I am capable of 
understanding it.” As I shall argue later in this chapter, this 
qualification is less significant than it may seem, for he believes 
that such ideas really contain everything entailed by those features 
necessary and sufficient for possessing the idea in the first place. In 
itself, our idea of God is comprehensive insofar as it ‘contains’ the 
entirety of the divine essence. Yet given our cognitive limitations, we 
cannot achieve an explicit understanding of everything it entails. One 
could interpret the second assertion—that God’s “perfections are known 
to us more clearly than any other thing” —as the relatively 
uncontroversial claim that  what is known “more clearly than any other 
thing” is merely that God has certain perfections, even though we don’t 
really understand how they differ from our own. As I hope to make 
clear, however, Descartes does believe that our innate ideas of these 
perfections provide us with some insight into how God’s perfections are 
qualitatively distinct from our own, and hence enable us to apprehend 
our own perfections as imperfect in the absolute sense.  
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his arguments for God’s existence, presuppose that we have 
some understanding of the divine essence. Regarding the 
ontological argument, for example, he asserts that  
 
even if we conceive of God only in an inadequate or, 
if you like, ‘utterly inadequate’ way, this does not 
prevent its being certain that his nature is possible, 
or not self-contradictory. Nor does it prevent our 
being able truly to assert that we have examined his 
nature with sufficient clarity (that is, with as much 
clarity as is necessary to know that his nature is 
possible and also to know that necessary existence 
belongs to this same divine nature). […] In the case 
of the few attributes of God which we do perceive, it 
is enough that we understand them clearly and 
distinctly, even though our understanding is in no way 
adequate. (CSMII 108) 
 
Moreover, as we will describe in detail in chapter VI, 
Descartes holds that we can achieve insight into many 
features that render God’s perfections qualitatively 
distinct from their creaturely correlates. For example, he 
thinks that we can understand that divine power would not 
require pre-existing material on which to work and that 
divine existence would exhibit not merely a very low degree 
of contingency but absolutely no contingency at all. Though 
he will argue that we can think of divine existence in 
terms of God acting as his own efficient cause, he will 
maintain that we can understand how the divine property of 
deriving existence from oneself is only analogous to, and 
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hence qualitatively distinct from, the property of deriving 
existence from another.
96
 
A second problem with viewing the indefinite nature of 
the divine perfections as the sole feature precluding 
construction of ideas of these perfections from ideas of 
creaturely ones is the fact that, in numerous places 
throughout his works, Descartes distinguishes our 
apprehension of God’s essence and individual perfections 
from our ideas of the merely indefinite. God’s essence and 
attributes alone merit the designation “infinite,” for in 
these cases, he says, “not only do we recognize no limits, 
but also we understand positively that there are none” 
(CSMI 202, italics mine).
97
 In the Third Meditation, the 
narrator explicitly asserts that it is his apprehension of 
God’s perfections (in this case, knowledge) as actually 
                                                          
96 Carriero provides a good general discussion of how Descartes’ 
approach to philosophical theology differs from Aquinas’ insofar as 
Descartes assumes that we “start out with some cognitive purchase on 
God’s essence or nature, that is, some positive knowledge of what God 
is, as opposed to a merely negative and relative knowledge (e.g., as 
the first mover unmoved of the motion we see in the world)” (2009, 8). 
See especially 168-222.  
97 Descartes provides two criteria distinguishing his use of “infinite” 
from “indefinite,” only one of which is mentioned here. In addition to 
our understanding that God cannot be limited, we also recognize that 
God lacks limits in every respect, whereas, in the case of an 
indefinite quantity, we are unable to recognize a limit in only some 
respect. This latter criterion, which Margaret Wilson has dubbed the 
“metaphysical criterion” (Rorty 1986, 340) appears to apply only to 
Descartes’ use of “infinite” to describe God’s substance, which is 
unlimitied in every respect in the sense that it includes every 
perfection. It does not appear to apply to those cases where Descartes 
describes God’s individual perfections as “infinite.” Since it is this 
latter usage that is of primary interest in this chapter, I do not 
address the metaphysical criterion in what follows.     
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infinite, rather than indefinite ( “potentially” infinite), 
that precludes the possibility that, by virtue of being 
aware of a “gradual increase in my knowledge,” he might be 
able to construct the idea of divine knowledge by 
amplifying the idea of his own: “[E]ven if my knowledge 
always increases more and more, I recognize that it will 
never actually be infinite, since it will never reach the 
point where it is not capable of a further increase; God, 
on the other hand, I take to be actually infinite, so that 
nothing can be added to his perfection” (CSMII 32). 
It is not immediately clear what Descartes means by 
this “positive” understanding distinguishing ideas of the 
infinite from those of mere indefinite quantities.
 98
 In the 
passage from the Principles where he distinguishes the two, 
he argues that, in the case of indefinite things, “our 
understanding does not in the same way positively tell us 
that they lack limits in some respect; we merely 
acknowledge in a negative way that any limits which they 
may have cannot be discovered by us” (CSMI 202).99  The 
numerical example suggests that it is in the nature of the 
                                                          
98 For an assessment of Descartes’ distinction between the actual 
infinite and the indefinite in the context of the late scholastic 
distinction between the categorematic and syncategorematic infinite, 
see Ariew 1999, 166-71. 
99 Henry More had suggested that Descartes was needlessly confusing 
things: If a thing that appears infinite to us is not, in reality, 
infinite, then it must be finite (Rorty 1986, 346). Some contemporary 
scholars have likewise understood the category “indefinite” to be 
merely an epistemological one.  
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indefinite that we cannot conceive its limits, and it is 
the recognition of this nature—the awareness of a 
“perfection that is above me”—that ostensibly precludes our 
constructing such ideas on our own. In the case of the 
infinite, however, we also have what Cottingham calls a 
“conclusive reason” to believe that the nature in question 
cannot have any limits. Similarly, Margaret Wilson suggests 
that our understanding of the divine essence and the divine 
properties is positive insofar as we see it “includes or 
entails unlimitedness.”100 We understand that it is in the 
nature of God that we not only cannot conceive of him 
having limits, but that he cannot, in fact, have any. But 
why does an absence of limits follow from God’s nature? 
What is this conclusive reason? 
The answer can be found in Descartes’ response to 
Mersenne’s amplification argument. There he begins with 
what initially appears to be an admission that our idea of 
God’s intellect differs from our own merely by degree, 
insofar as it is amplified indefinitely: “the idea which we 
have of the divine intellect, for example, does not differ 
from that which we have of our own intellect, except in so 
far as the idea of an infinite number differs from the idea 
of a number raised to the second or fourth power. And the 
                                                          
100 1986, 353. Emphasis mine.  
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same applies to the individual attributes of God of which 
we recognize some trace in ourselves.” Since Descartes 
consistently distinguishes our ideas of God’s perfections 
from ideas of creaturely perfections extended indefinitely, 
one would expect him to immediately qualify this assertion, 
and he does so. Yet instead of saying that our ideas of 
God’s perfections are distinct (and not constructible from 
our own) by virtue of being “actually infinite,” he appeals 
to the qualitative distinction that follows from divine 
simplicity:  
 
But in addition to this, our understanding tells us 
that there is in God an absolute immensity, simplicity 
and unity which embraces all other attributes and has 
no copy in us, but is, as I have said before, ‘like 
the mark of the craftsman stamped on his work.’ In 
virtue of this we recognize that, of all the 
individual attributes which, by a defect of our 
intellect, we assign to God in a piecemeal fashion, 
corresponding to the way in which we perceive them in 
ourselves, none belong to God and to ourselves in the 
same sense.” (italics mine) (CSMII 98)101 
 
Descartes is here repeating the narrator’s insight, in the 
Third Meditation, that “the unity, the simplicity, or the 
inseparability of all the attributes of God is one of the 
most important of the perfections which I understand him to 
                                                          
101 Though we will discuss this in further detail in a later chapter, 
this puts him at odds with the Scotists who believed that divine 
simplicity was, in fact, compatible with univocity.  
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have” (CSMII 34). 102  Since God’s properties are identical 
with his essence and so with each other, there must be a 
qualitative distinction between, for example, the Goodness 
that God is and the property of goodness that creatures 
have. The distinction between our idea of an indefinite 
magnitude (“the idea of an infinite number”) and our ideas 
of God’s perfections is here the recognition that the 
latter are qualitatively distinct from creaturely 
perfections. One might initially view this qualitative 
distinction as a second feature of divine perfections that, 
in addition to their actual infinity, distinguishes ideas 
of them from ideas of their creaturely correlates. Yet we 
shall argue that our awareness of how God’s perfections 
differ qualitatively from our own constitutes the 
conclusive reason for apprehending God as unlimited. God’s 
understanding, for example, is apprehended as infinite or 
unlimited insofar as it is perceived to be true 
understanding (a faculty of the understanding in the 
                                                          
102 The narrator is responding to the imagined objection that even if his 
possessing ideas of the perfections presupposes that they are “found 
somewhere in the universe,” it does not follow that they must be 
“joined together in a single being.” He responds: “[T]he unity, the 
simplicity, or the inseparability of all the attributes of God is one 
of the most important of the perfections which I understand him to 
have. And surely the idea of the unity of all his perfections could not 
have been placed in me by any cause which did not also provide me with 
the ideas of the other perfections; for no cause could have made me 
understand the interconnection and inseparability of the perfections 
without at the same time making me recognize what they were” (CSMII 
34). 
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absolute or full sense, i.e., without qualification), 
whereas creaturely understanding is apprehended as finite 
or limited insofar as it is seen to fall short of this 
kind.  
 
III. The Infinite as the Absolute 
The sense of “infinite” employed within CPP provides 
us with a way of understanding Descartes’ distinction 
between the indefinite and the infinite that captures a 
qualitative difference between the two. We argued that when 
Descartes uses “infinite” in the context of CPP, it has the 
same significance “perfect” does when we say a circle is 
“perfect” insofar as it is a true or real one. Just as we 
can be said to conceive of a perfect circle by virtue of 
conceiving of a circle, so Descartes asserts that “by the 
mere fact that I conceive being, without thinking whether 
it is finite or infinite, what I conceive is infinite 
being” (CSMK 377). Here it is the idea of being as such, 
not the notion of a greatest or most perfect being (in an 
evaluative sense), that is equivalent to an idea of 
infinite being. Like circularity, being is the sort of 
perfection that cannot be had in greater or lesser degrees. 
To possess it at all is to possess it in an unqualified 
95 
 
 
 
fashion, i.e., fully, absolutely, or infinitely. A perfect 
circle is in this sense “infinitely” circular insofar as it 
cannot become “more perfect” qua circle and could thus be 
said to possess the perfection of circularity absolutely or 
without “limits.” Anything that possesses the perfection of 
circularity in a limited or qualified fashion must, by 
virtue of being a non-circle, fall short absolutely of the 
perfection of circularity.
103
  
That this sense of “infinite” is the “positive” 
understanding to which Descartes alludes appears to be 
confirmed by the distinction he draws between the 
indefinite and the infinite in the very same letter to 
Cleselier in which he equates the idea of being with that 
of infinite being. He states that when “infinite” is used 
to describe the divine substance (being), it signifies not 
“the mere lack of limits” but a “real thing”: 
 
By ‘infinite substance’ I mean a substance which has 
actually infinite and immense, true and real 
perfections. This is not an accident added to the 
notion of substance, but the very essence of substance 
taken absolutely and bounded by no defects; these 
defects, in respect of substance, are accidents; but 
infinity or infinitude is not. It should be observed 
that I never use the word ‘infinite’ to signify the 
                                                          
103 This is, perhaps, the notion of infinity that Malebranche uses when 
he characterizes such ideas as ‘infinite.’ That Descartes, however, 
does not seem to use the term “infinite” (in the sense of actually 
infinite) to describe anything other than God (with the exception of 
the will) might be due to the fact that he prefers to use the term in 
its traditional (theological) sense.  
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mere lack of limits (which is something negative, for 
which I have used the term ‘indefinite’) but to 
signify a real thing, which is incomparably greater 
than all those which are in some way limited. (CSMK 
377) (emphasis mine) 
 
When Descartes describes God’s essence as “infinite,” the 
term signifies more than that we cannot conceive of God as 
limited in number or degree of perfections. Rather, it also 
signifies that we know that he cannot be limited in this 
way because he is a “real thing,” i.e., a substance in the 
full or absolute sense. As we indicated in the previous 
chapter, the term “infinite” functions here as “the 
negation of a negation” in the same way that terms “real” 
or “true” do. To conceive of a substance is to conceive of 
an infinite substance, in the same way that to conceive of 
a thing is to conceive of a “real thing.” Substance as such 
is therefore “incomparably greater” than finite substance 
because finite substance is not true or genuine substance. 
Since comparisons of degree or quantity can be made between 
members of the same kind, no such comparison can be made 
between something that is a substance in a true or 
unqualified sense (i.e., infinitely) and something that 
falls short of the kind.  
A similar case can be made for the individual divine 
perfections. They are infinite in essence insofar as they 
are the “true and real” instances of the perfections in 
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question.
104
 Though Descartes usually reserves this sense of 
“infinite” (i.e., in the sense of “absolute”) for 
descriptions of God’s perfections, he makes an exception 
for the human will on account of its apparent resemblance 
to the divine property. In a letter to Mersenne, he states 
that “the desire that everyone has to possess every 
perfection he can conceive of, and consequently all the 
perfections which we believe to be in God, is due to the 
fact that God has given us a will which has no limits. It 
is principally because of this infinite will within us that 
we can say we are created in his image” (CSMK 141-2). One 
might initially assume that Descartes here describes the 
will as “infinite” solely because the number of its 
potential objects, i.e., its scope, appears unlimited. His 
assertion that it is “principally because of the infinite 
will within us that we can say we are created in his image” 
should presumably be taken to say that it is the infinite 
scope of our will that makes it like God’s. Naaman-Zauderer 
initially suggests this in her own analysis, asserting that 
                                                          
104 In the Conversation with Burman, Descartes uses the term “absolute” 
instead of “infinite” to describe God’s perfections: “Since I know from 
my idea of God that he is the most perfect being and that all absolute 
perfections belong to him, I must attribute to him only what I know is 
absolutely perfect. Now take any attribute that I can form an idea of 
as meeting this requirement –anything I can think of as absolutely 
perfect perfection: from the very fact that I can form an idea of it, I 
know that it belongs to the nature of God” (Cottingham 1976, 20). 
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we “experience our will as infinite in scope and, in this 
respect, created in God’s image.”105  
Yet, as Zauderer later acknowledges, Descartes does 
not assert that the human will has the same scope as God’s, 
for in the Meditations he asserts that one of the features 
that distinguish the two is that God’s will “ranges over a 
greater number of items.”106 In the above quotation from the 
letter to Mersenne, our desire to possess “every perfection 
[we] can conceive of” is not to be explained by the will’s 
actually infinite scope, for in fact the number of 
perfections that we can conceive of is proscribed by the 
limits of the human intellect.
107
 The unlimited scope of the 
will is more appropriately described as infinite in the 
negative sense, i.e. as indefinite, insofar as we see that 
it can apply itself to everything of which we can conceive. 
That the will is “infinite” only in the sense of being 
applicable to an indefinite range of objects appears to be 
confirmed by Descartes’ admission, in the Principles, that 
                                                          
105 2010, 138. 
106 Zauderer: “Descartes does not endorse the view that our will extends 
to every possible object, including all the objects of the divine will. 
Rather, he argues that he cannot think of a faculty of choice greater 
than the one he experiences within himself” (2010, 137). 
107 Which is not to say that we cannot will things we do not understand 
clearly and distinctly, for it is in this sense that the will’s reach 
extends beyond the intellect. Yet, as Petrik argues, “when [Descartes] 
says that the will extends beyond the intellect, he does not mean that 
we have a contentless volition; rather he means that the content of the 
volition is not clearly and distinctly perceived. It is a confused 
perception, but a perception nonetheless” (1992, 126-7).  
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the will’s scope entitles us to call it “infinite” only “in 
a certain sense” (CSMI 204). In fact, Descartes explicitly 
asserts that the principal feature that makes the human 
will like God’s is not its scope but its nature or essence: 
 
For although God’s will is incomparably greater than 
mine, both in virtue of the knowledge and power that 
accompany it and make it more firm and efficacious, 
and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges 
over a greater number of items, nevertheless it does 
not seem any greater than mine when considered as will 
in the essential and strict sense [in se formaliter & 
praecise spectata]. This is because the will simply 
consists in our ability to do or not do something 
(that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid). 
(CSMII 40) (emphasis mine) 
 
In the same way that any apple, however mushy and bland, 
possesses the perfection of being an apple in the full or 
absolute sense, so the human will, though limited in terms 
of the knowledge and power accompanying it, appears to 
possess the perfection of being a faculty of the will in 
the full or absolute sense. And just as a crisp and sweet 
apple is not more of an apple than a mushy and bland one, 
so the narrator says that God’s will “does not seem any 
greater than mine when considered as will in the essential 
and strict sense.” Zauderer, as well as other scholars, 
therefore suggest that “infinite” has a dual significance 
for Descartes when applied to the will. It refers not only 
to the will’s unlimited scope (in which case the term 
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“infinite” is being used loosely and is synonymous with 
“indefinite”) but also to the fact that the human will is 
infinite in essence.
108
 Gueroult agrees, characterizing this 
sense of the term “infinite” as “absoluteness.” He argues 
that “it is not through its capacity of indefinite 
extension that will can be said to resemble God, but only 
through its absolute faculty of deciding.”109Just as God is 
“infinite” being or “infinite” substance because he has 
that which is the “very essence of substance taken 
absolutely and bounded by no defects”—viz., “infinite and 
immense, true and real perfections”—so we appear to have an 
infinite will because we have that which is the very 
essence of the faculty taken absolutely and bounded by no 
defects—viz., the ability “to affirm or deny, pursue or 
avoid.” Like the circle, which is perfectly or infinitely 
circular in the sense that it cannot be more perfect qua 
circle, the human will, at least as it appears to our 
finite minds, is “perfect and absolute,” a faculty of the 
                                                          
108 Zauderer: “Descartes alludes to another sense in which the human will 
may be taken to be infinite and, as such, to bear a likeness to the 
infinite will of God. He states that the divine will does not appear 
any greater than the human will when considered as will ‘in the 
essential and strict sense’” (80). Commenting on the above quotation 
from Descartes, James Petrik asserts that “the will’s infinity does not 
depend upon its having an infinite scope in actuality. […] No, the 
will’s infinity or perfection consists in its simple essence, viz., 
choice” (1992, 128). See also Gueroult who, in addition to quantitative 
infinity and infinity as absoluteness, identifies a third sense of the 
term as “infinity in extension as infinite aspiration toward something 
else that man does not have” (1984, 232). 
109 Gueroult 1984, 232-3. 
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will in the full or unqualified sense (CSMK 342).
110
   The 
idea of a more perfect will, says the narrator, is “beyond 
my grasp” (CSMII 40).  
And just as something that possesses the perfection of 
circularity in only a qualified or limited way cannot be a 
true circle, the narrator asserts that a faculty cannot 
really be a faculty of the will absent the perfection in 
question, “for since the will consists simply of one thing 
which is, as it were, indivisible, it seems that its nature 
rules out the possibility of anything being taken away from 
it” (CSMII 42). Thus the idea of the will is indivisible in 
the very same sense that Descartes believes the idea of God 
is, for “if anything is added to or taken away from the 
essence, then the idea [of God] automatically becomes the 
idea of something else.”111 In order to form a correct 
                                                          
110 The sense of “infinite” as absolute was also employed by Descartes’ 
rationalist successors. Leibniz, consistently distinguishes the idea of 
infinite quantities from the idea of the “absolute” which expresses a 
positive quality existing without qualification or limitation: “The 
true infinite, strictly speaking, is only in the absolute, which 
precedes all composition and is not formed by that addition of parts” 
1981, 157-60. See Adams 1994, 115-19. Similarly, Spinoza  
differentiates the idea of that which is infinite “as a consequence of 
its own nature, or by the force of its definition” and consequently 
“cannot be conceived to be finite” from both the infinite that “can be 
divided into parts and regarded as finite” as well as the indefinite 
(“that which is called infinite because it has no limits and that whose 
parts we cannot explain or equate with any number, though we know its 
maximum and minimum”) (1985, 200-2). Malebranche too appears to invoke 
the infinite as absolute in his description of God as “the being 
without individual restriction, the infinite being, being in general” 
(1997, 240). 
111 This is part of Descartes’ response to Gassendi’s objection to his 
principle that “nothing can be added to or taken away from the idea of 
God.” The full quotation: “it seems you have paid no attention to the 
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conception of a will, I have to conceive of the power “to 
affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid,” and if I do not 
include this within my conception, then I cannot be said to 
conceive of a faculty of the will. The priority relation 
described by CPP would therefore apply to the idea of the 
will just as it does to the idea of being or the idea of a 
circle. I conceive of an infinite or perfect will merely by 
conceiving of a will because every genuine will is and must 
be a perfect instance of the faculty, just as every genuine 
circle is and must be a perfect instance of circularity. 
But in order to conceive of something as imperfect in the 
sense of falling short of the faculty, I must possess an 
idea of the faculty in question.  
It is nevertheless true that God’s will must be 
qualitatively distinct from our own insofar as it is, in 
reality, identical with every other divine perfection and 
the divine essence. Descartes argues that “there is always 
a single identical and perfectly simple act by means of 
which [God] simultaneously understands, wills, and 
accomplishes everything” (CSMI 201).112 Yet even though we 
                                                                                                                                                                             
common philosophical maxim that the essences of things are indivisible. 
An idea represents the essence of a thing, and if anything is added to 
or taken away from the essence, then the idea automatically becomes the 
idea of something else. This is how the ideas of Pandora and of all 
false Gods are formed by those who do not have a correct conception of 
the true God” (CSMII 255-6) 
112 See his May 27th 1630 correspondence with Mersenne: “[i]n God, 
willing, understanding and creating are all the same thing without one 
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understand that God’s will must differ qualitatively from 
our own for this reason, the divine faculty does not appear 
qualitatively distinct from our own when we consider it in 
isolation from the other divine perfections.  
However, when we conceive of the other divine 
perfections as distinct properties, we do apprehend them as 
differing qualitatively from our own. It is this implicit 
awareness of qualitative difference that enables the 
narrator to apprehend his own understanding as imperfect 
qua faculty of the understanding [i.e., “considered […] in 
the essential and strict sense”]. In the Fourth Meditation, 
the narrator observes that, other than the will, 
 
there is nothing else in me which is so perfect and so 
great that the possibility of a further increase in 
its perfection or greatness is beyond my 
understanding. If, for example, I consider the faculty 
of understanding, I immediately recognize that in my 
case it is extremely slight and very finite, and I at 
once form the idea of an understanding which is much 
greater—indeed supremely great and infinite; and form 
the very fact that I can form an idea of it, I 
perceive that it belongs to the nature of God. 
Similarly, if I examine the faculties of memory or 
imagination, or any others, I discover that in my case 
each one of these faculties is weak and limited, while 
in the case of God it is immeasurable. It is only the 
will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within 
                                                                                                                                                                             
being prior to the other even conceptually” (CSMK 25-6); see also his 
May 2nd 1644 letter to Mesland: “[N]or should we conceive any precedence 
or priority between his intellect and his will; for the idea which we 
have of God teaches us that there is in him only a single activity, 
entirely simple and entirely pure” (CSMK 235). 
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me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty 
is beyond my grasp. (CSMII 40)
113
 
 
In the above passage, the human faculty of understanding is 
apprehended as “extremely slight and very finite” because 
it is seen to fall short of true understanding.  Burman had 
objected that “considered in this abstract way [i.e., in 
the essential and strict sense], understanding is 
understanding, and so our understanding too is not going to 
differ from that of God, even though God’s understanding 
ranges over a greater number of objects.” Yet Descartes 
responds that we apprehend how human understanding falls 
short absolutely, i.e., qualitatively, of the divine sort: 
“But understanding depends on its object and cannot be 
separated from it; so it is not the case that 
‘understanding is understanding.’ Moreover, it is not just 
that our understanding ranges over fewer objects than that 
of God: rather, it is extremely imperfect in itself, being 
                                                          
113 Notice that the order of apprehension regarding the faculty of 
understanding is precisely that which Descartes had described in his 
statement of the priority of the perfect in this discussion with 
Burman. There he had argued that, while our explicit awareness of 
imperfection precedes the explicit apprehension of divine perfection, 
the former insight presupposes an (implicit) awareness of the standard 
in question (CSMK 338). Even though, in the order of explicit 
awareness, we apprehend our faculty of understanding as imperfect 
before we “form an idea of understanding which is […] supremely great 
and infinite,” CPP indicates that we can apprehend our own faculty as 
imperfect (in the essential and strict sense) because we already 
possess a concept of true (infinite) understanding.  
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obscure, mingled with ignorance, and so on” (CSMK 341).114 
It is because divine understanding appears greater than our 
own when “considered […] in the essential and strict sense” 
that we are able to apprehend human understanding as 
absolutely imperfect.
115
  Though we may ‘approach’ an idea 
of such understanding by amplifying elements of our own, we 
cannot thereby construct an idea of the divine property in 
this way.  
For Descartes, therefore, the faculty of the will is 
the one respect in which we find ourselves incapable of 
apprehending ourselves as absolutely imperfect with respect 
to God. Our apprehension of our will’s absolute perfection 
(or infinity) is thus a good model for how we understand 
                                                          
114 In what sense does understanding depend on its object? Petrik 
suggests the following: “Descartes seems to be drawing upon the view 
that there is no faculty of the understanding and that the 
understanding is simply the sum total of all our perceptions. Thus, to 
say that our understanding is finite [in this respect] is to say that 
the number of our possible perceptions is finite. To say that our 
understanding is limited is to say that our perceptions are limited 
(1992, 130).  
115 It is true that the narrator believes that each of his faculties, 
including understanding, is “perfect of its kind” (CSMII 38). But this 
does not mean that these faculties, when considered in the essential 
and strict sense, do not fall short of God’s. Rather, they are perfect 
of their kind insofar they don’t lack anything which they “ought to 
have” (ibid.) given their function and place within “the whole 
universe” (Ibid, 39). The faculty of the understanding, for example, is 
perfect of its kind insofar as it, if used properly, does not lead to 
error. Thus the narrator states that, even though God could have given 
him a greater faculty of the understanding “I have no cause for 
complaint on the grounds that the power of understanding or the natural 
light which God gave me is no greater than it is; for it is the nature 
of a finite intellect to lack understanding of many things, and is the 
nature of a created intellect to be finite” (CSMII 42).  
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the divine perfections generally.
116
 To apprehend a 
perfection as actually infinite is to see that it is a 
complete or absolute (i.e. true) instance of this 
perfection considered “in the essential and strict sense.” 
Thus we apprehend God as actually infinite goodness, 
wisdom, love, etc. because he alone has (or more properly, 
is) the genuine or true instance(s) of these perfections. 
We “understand positively” that these perfections are 
unlimited in the same way that we see that a perfect circle 
is unlimited with respect to the perfection of circularity. 
With the exception of the will, the human analogues of 
divine perfections are apprehended as “finite” or 
“imperfect” insofar as they are seen as failing to be 
instances of these perfections considered “in the essential 
and strict sense.” We do not have lesser degrees of these 
perfections—we do not have them at all.117  
                                                          
116 But as I will argue in the following section, though Descartes thinks 
we understand God’s perfections, we cannot conceive of them (or 
represent them to ourselves) except by using our own (amplified 
indefinitely) as approximations. No such amplification is possible in 
the case of the will, however, since the human will already appears 
perfect in the absolute sense.  
117 My interpretation of the term “infinite” is similar to a popular, 
though not uncontroversial, interpretation of Spinoza’s use of the term 
when he describes God as possessing “infinite attributes.” According to 
thinkers such as Abraham Wolf (1972, 24-7) and Jonathan Bennett (1984, 
75-8), this claim does not merely entail but is synonymous with the 
claim that God possesses all attributes, i.e. every attribute that can 
be instantiated. The claim is therefore compatible with God's 
possessing a finite number of attributes (thought and extension), 
assuming these are all the attributes that can be instantiated. Wolf 
argues that “it is a sheer blunder to translate Spinoza’s infinite by 
innumerable. And it is this mistranslation that is at the root of the 
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IV. Amplification and Qualitative Difference 
If Descartes believes that there is an absolute or 
qualitative distinction between divine properties and 
creaturely ones, why would he endorse amplification? If 
human understanding is qualitatively distinct from divine 
understanding, in what sense could the indefinite extension 
of the former enable us to ‘reach’ an apprehension of the 
latter? In the Conversation with Burman, Descartes 
distinguishes the way in which we conceive of God’s 
perfections—as indefinite—from the intellectual 
apprehension of these perfections that we do indeed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
trouble. By infinite Spinoza means complete or all. Again and again 
Spinoza insists on his positive use of the term infinite; and again and 
again he uses perfect (i.e., complete) or all as the equivalent of 
infinite” (26). Similarly, Bennett argues that “It is on that reading 
of ‘infinite attributes’ that Spinoza’s definition of ‘God’ is least 
arbitrary, because best supported by the theological doctrine which he 
was trying to capture. There was a strong tradition making God the ens 
realissimum, the entity with the most possible reality, and Spinoza 
hints that he has that in mind when he pauses to say in 1p9—which is 
not mentioned anywhere else in the Ethics—that the more real a thing is 
the more attributes it has […]. The concept of the ens realissimum 
involves totality or supremacy , but not cardinality” (1984, 76-7) 
Since Descartes sometimes uses the term “infinite” in a quantitative 
sense, I am undecided as to whether he believes that God’s perfections 
are infinite in number or merely in the way Bennett suggests. When it 
comes to the infinity of the perfections themselves, however, I believe 
that the significance of the term is that of absoluteness or totality. 
Divine understanding is infinite in the sense that it is a perfection 
of understanding in the fullest or most complete way, in the same way 
that a circle is infinite insofar as it possesses the perfection of 
circularity absolutely or without qualification, i.e., perfectly. 
Though God may indeed know a quantitatively infinite number of things, 
characterizing divine understanding as “infinite” in this sense does 
not entail a quantitative infinity, but rather that God has the 
perfection of understanding fully and hence that he knows everything 
there is to know (which may or may not be an infinite number of 
things). For a detailed analysis of the various senses of “infinite” in 
Spinoza’s work, an analysis consistent with Wolf and Bennett’s 
interpretation, see Kline (1977, 333-52). 
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possess. The only way we can “represent [God’s perfections] 
to ourselves” is by indefinitely extending their creaturely 
correlates: 
 
Take for example the perfections of God. We do not 
imagine these, or conceive of them, but we understand 
them: the way in which God understands all things in a 
single mental act, or the way in which his decrees are 
identical with himself, are things which we 
understand, but we do not conceive of, since we 
cannot, so to speak, represent them to ourselves. 
Thus, we understand the perfections and attributes of 
God, but we do not conceive of them—or, rather, in 
order to conceive of them, we conceive of them as 
indefinite. (CSMK 339) 
 
Taken as a pure object of the understanding, Descartes 
believes that an idea can be said to actually contain all 
the content that is logically entailed by those features 
that are necessary for that idea to be the object of one’s 
thought in the first place, even if the person possessing 
the idea does not or cannot distinctly perceive everything 
it contains. Using the example of a triangle, Descartes 
asserts that we would not deny that a “novice at geometry 
has an idea of a whole triangle when he understands that it 
is a figure bounded by three lines” merely because the 
novice is unaware of further features entailed by the ones 
of which he is aware. Likewise, “just as it suffices for 
the possession of an idea of the whole triangle to 
understand that it is a figure contained within three 
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lines, so it suffices for the possession of a true and 
complete idea of the infinite in its entirety if we 
understand that it is a thing which is bounded by no 
limits” (CSMII 254). 118 From the fact that we may 
nevertheless be unaware of many of the attributes such a 
being must accordingly possess, it does not follow that 
these features are not contained within our idea, so long 
as this idea truly represents God’s nature.119 In this way, 
says Carriero, “my idea of God makes available to me God’s 
essence in more or less the same way that my idea of a 
triangle makes available to me its essence.”120 
In his commentary on the above passage, Cottingham 
argues that Descartes’ distinction between 
                                                          
118 The same claim in response to Mersenne: “No one can possibly go wrong 
when he tries to form a correct conception of the idea of God, provided 
he is willing to attend to the nature of a supremely perfect being.” 
(CSMII 99) And in the Principles: “We can also have a clear and 
distinct idea of uncreated and independent thinking substance, that is 
of God. Here we must simply avoid supposing that the idea adequately 
represents everything which is to be found in God; and we must not 
invent any additional features, but concentrate only on what is really 
contained in the idea and on what we clearly perceive to belong to the 
nature of a supremely perfect being. And certainly no one can deny that 
we possess such an idea of God, unless he reckons that there is 
absolutely no knowledge of God to be found in the minds of men” (CSM 
211). Descartes recognizes that there is, at least among non-experts, a 
diversity of opinion about the nature of God. Yet he believes that this 
can be explained as simply a failure to understand what is contained in 
the idea. Using the triangle example, he notes that “although everyone 
is aware of the idea of a triangle not everyone notices equally many 
properties in it and some people may draw false conclusions about it” 
(CSMII 257). 
119 Nor is the idea of God or the idea of a triangle “augmented” or 
changed as we discover further features entailed by their essences.  
Rather, we are thereby only making our idea “more distinct and 
explicit, since, so long as we suppose that our original idea was a 
true one, it must have contained all these perfections” (CSMII 256). 
120 2009, 172.  
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“understand[ing]” and “conceiv[ing]” is the distinction 
between having a concept and grasping or comprehending 
(through a “kind of internal representation”) everything it 
involves or contains.
 121
 As an illustration, he cites the 
idea of a million pigs: “This is a notion which I can 
clearly understand—I am perfectly aware of what is meant. 
On the other hand, I cannot imagine or picture such a vast 
number of pigs except in a very vague and confused way; 
such are the limitations of the human brain.” In support of 
this reading, he cites Descartes’ 1630 letter to Mersenne 
in which he defends his claim that we understand God to be 
the creator of the eternal truths: “I say that I know this, 
not that I conceive it or grasp it; because it is possible 
to know that God is infinite and all powerful although our 
soul, being finite, cannot grasp or conceive him […] To 
grasp something is to embrace it in one’s thought; to know 
something, it is sufficient to touch it with one’s thought” 
(CSMK 25).  
Yet Cottingham’s example suggests that the reason why 
we can’t conceive of God’s perfections—as well as the 
reason why conceiving of the indefinite amplification of 
our own could constitute an imperfect substitute for these 
conceptions—is the quantitatively infinite nature of divine 
                                                          
121 1976, 75. In this sense, conceiving would fall somewhere between pure 
understanding and imagination.  
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perfections. Though we cannot conceive of a million pigs, 
Cottingham argues that 
 
[w]hat I can do, however, is to try to grasp, or ‘get 
my mind round’ the bafflingly large number, so that my 
conception of what is involved is rather more vivid 
than the pure and simple understanding of what is 
meant. One way of going about this might be to think 
of ten groups of one hundred pigs; then think of this 
number put together in a field; then think of a 
thousand such fields. This seems to be the sort of 
process which Descartes has in mind [in the passage 
above] apropos of conceiving of the infinite 
perfections of God: e.g. to grasp what is involved in 
the concept of infinite knowledge, one has to think of 
possessing a little more knowledge than one has at 
present, and then a little more again than this new 
amount, and so on.
122
 
 
However, in the passage (above) from the Conversation with 
Burman, the perfection at issue is not merely the uniquely 
large scope of divine knowledge (which perhaps includes a 
quantitatively infinite number of things), but “the way” 
God knows these things “in a single mental act.” Menn 
suggests that the single act by which God knows all things 
is the apprehension of his own will. In this, he explains, 
Descartes would be following scholastic tradition: “God 
knows things outside himself because he knows his own will, 
and because he knows the necessary truth (entailed by God’s 
essence) that whatever God wills is as he wills it to be. 
So God does not have to ‘look at’ or ‘make contact with’ 
                                                          
122 1976, 76. 
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things outside him, and his success in knowing does not 
depend on anything outside his own essence: he ‘looks’ only 
at himself (and from eternity, before there is anything but 
God to look at), and his ability to know his creatures 
depends only on his power to produce them as he wills.” 123 
How could amplification, which is a purely quantitative 
modification, give us cognitive purchase on such a 
qualitatively distinct perfection? 
Descartes’ explicit use of analogy in his account of 
divine necessary existence will here prove to be especially 
illuminating, for he uses a geometrical example to 
illustrate the heuristic utility of conceptual 
amplification in the context of qualitative distinction. 
This example suggests that our cognitive access to the 
divine perfections by way of creaturely ones is similar to 
the cognitive access we have of certain geometrical figures 
by virtue of the indefinite amplification of others. In his 
reply to Caterus’ objection to characterizing God as self-
caused, Descartes argues that even though God is his own 
cause only in the sense that his “inexhaustible power […] 
is the cause or reason for his not needing an [efficient] 
cause” we are nevertheless “entitled to think that in a 
sense he stands in the same relation to himself as an 
                                                          
123 1998, 339. 
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efficient cause does to its effect” (CSMII 80). In his 
effort to justify the use of efficient causality as a model 
for divine self-causation, he appeals to the “way in 
geometry the concept of the arc of an indefinitely large 
circle is customarily extended to the concept of a straight 
line; or the concept of a rectilinear polygon with an 
indefinite number of sides is extended to that of a circle” 
(emphasis mine). Similarly, we conceive of divine self-
causation by amplifying our concept of efficient causal 
power up to the point at which it includes the power to 
preserve oneself in existence. This procedure, says 
Descartes, is 
 
necessary for guiding the natural light in such a way 
as to enable us to have a clear awareness of these 
matters. It is exactly the same sort of comparison 
between a sphere (or other curvilinear figure) and a 
rectilinear figure that enables Archimedes to 
demonstrate various properties of the sphere which 
could scarcely be understood otherwise. And just as no 
one criticizes these proofs, although they involve 
regarding a sphere as similar to a polyhedron, so it 
seems to me that I am not open to criticism in this 
context for using the analogy of an efficient cause to 
explain features which in fact belong to a formal 
cause, that is, to the very essence of God. (CSMII 
168)   
 
Though the details of the analogy Descartes proposes 
between efficient and formal causes of existence will have 
to be left to a later chapter, the geometrical example 
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illustrates important features of Descartes’ understanding 
of amplification as a tool for philosophical theology. In 
the same way that an idea of a true circle cannot be 
gradually formed by amplifying features of a polygon but is 
attained when we ‘reach’ in thought the idea of a figure 
that has the approximated perfection in the fullest way 
possible (i.e., infinitely), so “the idea of God is not 
gradually formed by us when we amplify the perfections of 
his creatures; it is formed all at once and in its entirety 
as soon as our mind reaches an infinite being which is 
incapable of any amplification” (CSMII 256). Just as the 
indefinite amplification of the number of sides of a 
polyhedron does not enable us to construct an idea of a 
sphere, so we cannot construct ideas of divine perfections, 
or the divine essence, by amplifying ideas of ourselves 
because amplification could never overcome the qualitative 
gulf that separates the natures.
124
Nevertheless, as in the 
geometrical example, we recognize that we can approach 
(asymptotically) the notion of God by amplifying features 
of ourselves. This procedure enables us to represent to 
                                                          
124 Leibniz (1981, 157) makes a similar claim in his response to Lockean 
amplification arguments intended to show that our ideas of God are 
nothing more than our ideas of creaturely attributes amplified 
indefinitely, He argues that “The true infinite, strictly speaking, is 
only in the absolute, which precedes all composition and is not formed 
by that addition of parts.” 
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ourselves certain aspects of the approximated figure that, 
he says, “could scarcely be understood otherwise.” 
We can use this geometrical analogy to understand 
Descartes’ somewhat perplexing statements regarding the use 
and value of amplification. Consider the perfection of 
understanding. Descartes had agreed with his critics that 
“everyone has the form or idea of understanding; and by 
indefinitely extending this he can form the idea of God’s 
understanding. And a similar procedure applies to the other 
attributes of God.” This sort of statement seemed 
incompatible with other remarks disparaging the value of 
amplification for cognizing this perfection. In the Third 
Meditation, for example, the narrator had argued that I 
cannot generate an idea of God’s knowledge merely by 
noticing a “gradual increase in my knowledge” since “this 
is all quite irrelevant to the idea of God, which contains 
absolutely nothing that is potential {but only what is 
actual and real}” (CSMII 32) (emphasis mine).125 Yet if 
God’s understanding alone is actual understanding, how can 
the amplification of the false (human) perfection give us 
any cognitive access to the genuine (divine) one? 
If we take the geometrical example seriously, however, 
the first thing we notice is that the indefinite 
                                                          
125 The parenthetical insertion “but only what is actual and real” was 
added by Descartes to the French version of the Meditations.  
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amplification of our idea of human understanding would be 
the indefinite approximation of the perfection of God’s 
understanding in the same way that the indefinite 
amplification of our idea of a rectilinear polygon is the 
indefinite approximation of the perfection of circularity. 
Just as a rectilinear polygon is not a circle, and cannot 
become one through the indefinite amplification of the 
number of its sides, so human understanding is not true 
(infinite) understanding, and cannot become such 
understanding merely by indefinitely increasing its scope 
or degree of certitude. Thus if Descartes’ critics were 
right that our idea of God’s understanding is nothing more 
than the idea of human understanding amplified 
indefinitely, then we could no more be said to thereby 
possess an idea of God’s understanding than we could be 
said to possess the idea of a circle by virtue of 
conceiving of a rectilinear polygon with an indefinite 
number of sides. 
 Yet in the geometrical example, the process of 
amplification is guided by an imperfect though real 
understanding of the qualitatively distinct nature 
approximated. Descartes argues that the reason we accept 
the Archimedean analogy is because we already recognize 
that a rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number of 
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sides resembles, but is not the same as, a circle.
 126
 Though 
we recognize that only the circle possesses the perfection 
of circularity in an infinite or unlimited fashion (i.e., 
truly) we understand that we can approximate infinite 
(true) circularity by amplifying a rectilinear polygon. The 
goal of the proof is not to ‘give’ us an idea of a circle, 
for we already possess an understanding (albeit an 
imperfect one) of this nature. Rather, the aim is to unpack 
(or render explicit) elements of our idea of a circle that 
we cannot represent to ourselves. Presumably, part of the 
understanding amplification can confer in the proof we are 
considering is an understanding of the approximate area of 
a circle.  If we possess the concept of a circle with a 
given set of dimensions, Descartes would hold that this 
feature—the circle’s area—would already be contained within 
our idea. Yet if we do not understand how to ‘unpack’ our 
idea so as to represent to ourselves this feature—the exact 
area of the figure—we can use analogous figures whose areas 
                                                          
126 As I will argue in the chapter on top-down derivation, Descartes 
explicitly argues that the analogy at play here is one in which we 
derive an analogous ‘common’ concept from concepts of analogous 
entities. The analogy is not one of using the concept of one figure to 
indeterminately represent another of which we have no positive 
knowledge. Archimedes’ proofs presuppose a prior apprehension of the 
similarity between the figures and thus a prior possession of both the 
concepts of a polygon and a circle. Descartes imagines Archimedes 
making this very point: “If I thought that a sphere could not be taken 
to be a rectilinear or quasi-recitlinear figure with an infinite number 
of sides, I should attach no force to my proof, since the proof does 
not strictly apply to a sphere as a curvilinear figure but applies to 
it only as a rectilinear figure with infinitely many sides.” 
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we do know to represent to ourselves (conceive or grasp) an 
approximation of this feature. Specifically, if we already 
understand how to conceive (or represent to ourselves) the 
area of a rectilinear polygon, inscribing a circle within 
two such polygons whose sides are indefinitely extended 
could give us an approximation of this circle’s area. This 
procedure, however, already assumes that we recognize that 
there is a fundamental resemblance between the figures. 
 Similarly, Descartes has argued that we already see 
how divine understanding differs qualitatively from our 
own. Even though we cannot conceive (represent to 
ourselves) everything such a perfection entails—e.g., “the 
way in which God understands all things in a single mental 
act”—these features are really contained within our concept 
of infinite (true) understanding. Yet because we can 
represent to ourselves the (discrete) way in which humans 
understand things, and we further recognize that this 
faculty resembles the divine one, we can use ideas of this 
kind of understanding to represent to ourselves 
approximations of the divine perfection. We can, for 
example, amplify indefinitely the scope and degree of 
certainty of human knowledge, and then use this idea to 
approximate the perfection of divine understanding, a 
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reality that we can otherwise only ‘touch’ with our 
minds.
127
  
According to Descartes, the fundamental mistake that 
his critics make regarding our cognition of God is not the 
assumption that we conceive of the divine perfections by 
conceiving of amplified versions of creaturely ones. He had 
agreed, in his letter to Regius, that our idea of God is 
“formed in this manner.” Rather, what his critics fail to 
realize is that such amplification presupposes, and is 
guided by, an innate understanding of the approximated 
                                                          
127 Or consider the example of eternity. The traditional view of divine 
eternity is that God exists ‘outside’ of or ‘apart’ from time (see Helm 
2014). We may conceive of eternity by extending the duration of a 
thing’s existence indefinitely into the future, but this sort of 
amplification does not provide one with a concept of eternity, but 
merely sempiternity. Though Descartes doesn’t use this example, Leibniz 
does in his New Essays on Human Understanding (1998). In response to 
Philalethes’ objection that “we have no positive idea of an infinite 
duration, i.e. of eternity,” Theophilus (the character espousing the 
Leibnizian position) argues that we do have such a positive idea, 
“provided that it is conceived not as an infinite whole but rather as 
an absolute, i.e. as an attribute with no limits. In the case of 
eternity, it lies in the necessity of God’s existence: there is no 
dependence on parts, nor is the notion of it formed by adding times” 
159. Philalethes retorts: ““Again we are apt to think we have a 
positive comprehensive idea of eternity, which is as much as to say 
that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly known in 
our idea. But however great a duration someone represents to himself, 
since what is in question is a boundless extent there must always 
remain a part of his idea which his still beyond what he represents to 
himself and which is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, 
that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity, or any other 
infinite, we are very apt to tangle our selves in manifest 
absurdities.” Theophilus responds by emphasizing, as Descartes does, 
that the idea of the infinite is an object of understanding, not 
something we can imagine: “[W]e have a ‘comprehensive’, i.e. accurate, 
idea of eternity, since we have the definition of it, although we have 
no image of it at all. But ideas of infinites are not formed by the 
assembling of ‘parts’; and the mistakes people make when reasoning 
about the infinite do not arise from their having no image of it” 
(158). 
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(qualitatively distinct) perfections in question.  We 
recognize that we can ‘approach’ the nature of the divine 
intellect by amplifying features of our own only because we 
already grasp an underlying similarity between the two 
faculties. In this way, amplification presupposes an innate 
intellectual idea of the approximated nature. We do not 
need to possess an idea of a circle in order to amplify the 
number of sides of a rectilinear polygon; we do need such 
an idea if the amplification includes the recognition or 
insight that we can thereby approximate, but never reach, 
the nature approximated. Similarly, we do not need to 
possess an idea of divine power or knowledge in order to 
use amplification to produce the idea of a more powerful or 
knowledgeable creature; yet we do need to possess such 
ideas if we are to amplify these human perfections “up to 
the point where they are recognized as more than human,” 
for this is to use and regard the amplified perfection as 
an approximate representation of the qualitatively distinct 
divine perfections.
128
  
                                                          
128Emphasis mine. Though Jacques Maritain (1944) also takes these 
mathematical examples to illustrate how Descartes viewed the role of 
amplification for understanding God, he misunderstands their 
significance. According to Maritain, the examples show “how Cartesian 
thought is riveted to univocity [and hence to anthropormophism] and 
confuses the metaphysical analogy of the creature to the creator with 
an entirely different type of analogy—that of the passage to the 
geometrical limit, which causes mathematically to pass from one 
specific type to the other simply by increasing to infinity in the same 
line” (125). On the contrary, the mathematical examples are used to 
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Understanding “infinite” as expressing a qualitative 
difference also explains why Descartes would hold that we 
are always and necessarily in the position of novices when 
it comes to representing to ourselves what is contained in 
our ideas of God’s essence and perfections. In the Third 
Meditation, the narrator asserts that we could never grasp 
the nature of those perfections that we know are contained 
formally in God, nor could we hope to understand, much less 
grasp, the “countless” others that are undoubtedly in him 
that have no creaturely correlates (CSMII 32). To this, 
Gassendi objects that the narrator would forever lack a 
“true” (complete) idea of the infinite. Yet Descartes 
argues that the very fact that we can never represent to 
ourselves everything contained within the idea is one of 
the features contained within the notion of an infinite 
being:  
 
For the idea of the infinite, if it is to be a true 
idea, cannot be grasped at all, since the 
impossibility of being grasped is contained in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
illustrate the value of amplification in light of the recognition of 
qualitative difference. Descartes never suggests that the indefinite 
amplification of the number of sides of a polyhedron could enable us to 
“pass” from the idea of this figure to the idea of a sphere. In these 
examples, we already possess concepts of both, and amplification is 
merely a heuristic tool for representing to ourselves features of one 
by likening it to the other. The examples should not therefore be taken 
to show that Descartes thought that our ideas of the divine perfections 
are nothing more than ideas of creaturely perfections extended 
indefinitely (which is a form of natural theology that critics such as 
Gassendi had endorsed, and that Descartes, as I have shown, has 
denied).  
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formal definition of the infinite. Nonetheless, it is 
evident that the idea which we have of the infinite 
does not merely represent one part of it, but really 
does represent the infinite in its entirety. The 
manner of representation, however, is the manner 
appropriate to a human idea.” (CSMII 253)129  
 
Finite minds can grasp only finite natures. In other words, 
since our faculty of understanding is radically imperfect, 
we can represent to ourselves (conceive) only creaturely 
being and creaturely perfections. As the narrator asserts 
in the Fourth Meditation, “it is the nature of a created 
intellect to be finite” and “it is in the nature of a 
finite intellect to lack understanding of many things” 
(CSMII 42). Even though God really is an object of our 
understanding, his qualitatively distinct nature entails 
that we cannot represent him to ourselves except in “the 
manner appropriate to a human idea,” i.e., in terms of what 
are qualitatively distinct creaturely perfections. The best 
we can do is approach, or approximate, the divine 
properties by indefinitely amplifying our own.  
 Adams and others are therefore right, in a sense, that 
Descartes’ argument against amplification is the same as 
the argument against negation. Yet this is not, as these 
                                                          
129 The fact of its incomprehensibility is, in this sense, a necessary 
component of its intelligibility. Descartes uses the metaphor of a king 
who discloses his majesty to his subjects by keeping his distance from 
them. As Beysssade explains, “distance is a mark of majesty, and to 
decrease familiarity is not to decrease knowledge, but to disclose to a 
subject the true knowledge of his unequal relation to his king” (1992, 
88). 
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interpreters suggest, because we can’t conceive of 
creaturely perfections without comparing them to standards 
of divine perfection. Rather, it is due to amplification’s 
inability to overcome the qualitative divide separating 
infinite (true) perfections from finite (false) ones. A 
polygon with an indefinite number of sides is still just a 
polygon, and unless such a figure is apprehended as an 
approximation of a circle, it could never represent the 
nature in question (circularity). In other words, we must 
conceive of the polygon as, or judge it to be, an imperfect 
circle. And in order to do this, we must already possess, 
however obliquely, a concept of a perfect (true) one. 
Likewise, to apprehend indefinitely amplified creaturely 
perfections as approximations of divine ones is to conceive 
of them as, or judge them to be, absolutely imperfect 
instances of divine perfections. As CPP indicates, we can 
do this only if we already possess concepts of the perfect 
attributes in question.  
 
V. The Nature of the Qualitative Difference 
The absolute or qualitative distinction between divine 
and creaturely properties presupposed by CPP shows why we 
cannot construct ideas of the former by amplifying those of 
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the latter even in cases where we do not judge creatures to 
be imperfect in the absolute sense. An idea of that which 
has ‘more reality’ cannot be derived from an idea of that 
which ‘has less’ for this apparent distinction in degree is 
actually a distinction in kind.
130
 Descartes cannot, 
however, be committed to the general view that, if two 
properties are qualitatively distinct, an idea of one can 
never be used to construct an idea of the other. That this 
must be so is clear from the fact that he obviously thinks 
that ideas of some creaturely perfections are derived (by 
partial negation) from ideas of qualitatively distinct 
divine ones.
131
 As we have mentioned in the first chapter, 
the qualitative distinction at issue is a unique one: 
                                                          
130 David Cunning has also observed that “most commentators argue that 
Descartes’ argument for the view that we do not compose an idea of 
infinitude is that we would not have an idea of finitude unless we 
first had an idea of infinitude” (2010, 116f). He argues, as I have, 
that “Descartes is also offering the argument that we notice that our 
idea of an infinite substance is an idea of more reality than is 
represented by a composite of finite ideas.” Cunning does not, however, 
explain what it means for infinite substance to have “more reality” in 
this way and does not suggest, as I do, that it signals an absolute or 
qualitative divide.  
131 Does Descartes believe we can derive the idea of a creaturely 
property from the idea of another qualitatively distinct creaturely 
one? He does not seem to think that we can derive the idea of the 
attribute of extension from the idea of the attribute of thought. In 
fact, when he wants to emphasize the distinction between his ideas of 
mental and extended created substance—which is clearly a qualitative 
one—he notes that the difference between the two ideas is surpassed 
only by that obtaining between our idea of God and creatures. If I 
cannot generate an idea of mind by modifying an idea of body (or vice 
versa), surely the idea of my own mind cannot enable me to construct a 
concept of God’s. The supreme difficulty, however, will be in 
explaining how I can nevertheless derive an idea of a finite mind from 
that of God’s. Malebranche accepts a similar distinction between God’s 
mind and our own, arguing that the term “mind” cannot be used 
univocally of the two since “God is higher above created minds than 
created minds are above bodies.” (1997, 250) 
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creaturely attributes are qualitatively distinct by virtue 
of being imitations of divine attributes. Descartes accepts 
what may appear to be contradictory theses: 1) God 
possesses all the reality or perfection found in creatures 
and 2) nothing can be predicated univocally of God and 
creatures since none of the pure perfections and 
transcendentals exist in them with the same nature. This is 
a paradox that we will address at length in the next few 
chapters. For the moment, however, it is enough to note 
that Descartes’ considered view must be that an idea of a 
property can be derived from an idea of a qualitatively 
distinct one only if the latter is a divine property. 
Indeed, ideas of creaturely attributes, not divine 
ones, are actually created through the process of 
amplification. We do not need to possess an idea of a 
divine attribute to apprehend a given creaturely attribute 
as imperfect relative to another creature’s.132 Yet insofar 
as the process of amplification requires us to view 
creaturely attribute as absolutely imperfect, i.e., 
imperfect in the sense of failing to be the same kind as 
the perfect, we thereby come to possess, for the first 
time, the notion of this creaturely attribute as a thing 
                                                          
132 Which is not to say that we do not, as a consequence of possessing 
concepts of divine attributes, thereby view one creaturely attribute as 
more perfect (by degree) than another given the fact that it resembles 
the divine attribute more closely.  
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that resembles, but fall short of, a certain perfection. 
Descartes’ triangle example can be used to illustrate how 
the apprehension of imperfection constitutes the creation 
of a novel idea.
133
 Prior to attaining the insight that the 
drawn figure is an imperfect triangle, Descartes claims we 
apprehended it simply as a triangle. Though grasping its 
imperfection enabled us to then see that this original 
notion of a geometrical triangle was in fact the notion of 
a perfect one, we did not thereby augment this latter 
notion. We do, however, emerge with a new idea—that of a 
thing that resembles, but falls short of, a triangle. This 
is an idea that is distinct from both the notion of a 
triangle and the figure apprehend as a mere assembly of 
lines. This new idea of an imperfect triangle is created 
via what Descartes here calls a “negation,” though 
elsewhere he clarifies that this is really a partial 
negation, a matter of “taking something away” from the idea 
of being in general. The idea that would be produced by a 
complete negation would simply be the idea of a thing that 
is not a triangle. There is obviously more, however, to our 
notion of an imperfect triangle, for we grasp the imperfect 
                                                          
133 Though Descartes seems to hold that we become aware of creaturely 
imperfection via the amplification process, he never suggests that a 
similar process must hold for geometrical cases, for example. Burman 
doesn’t specifically suggest that we derive the concept of a true 
triangle by amplifying the attributes of imperfect ones, but that we 
“deduce the perfect triangle from the imperfect.” 
127 
 
 
 
as in some sense resembling the perfect. Though the drawn 
figure is not a triangle, it is nevertheless like a 
triangle. The nature of this positive relation between the 
perfect and imperfect will be the subject of the next few 
chapters.  
 
Conclusion: The Recognition of Imperfection 
 That the achievement of philosophical reflection is 
not an awareness of the perfect thing as such but the 
recognition of its perfection presents us with one more 
parallel between Descartes and the Platonic tradition. 
Plato is most often interpreted as holding that, prior to 
an explicit awareness of the Forms, some knowledge of them 
is already involved in everyday concept acquisition.
134
 
Recollection provides us with the ability to classify 
particulars under concepts that we otherwise would have no 
way of acquiring. As Lee Franklin argues, 
 
Most people have no idea that the items of the 
sensible world are images of Forms. This is an 
awareness granted only by philosophical reflection. 
Nevertheless, what all people can do is classify 
sensible particulars by reference, in most cases 
unknowing reference, to the Forms. According to Plato, 
                                                          
134 Dominic Scott, however, has argued in his Recollection and Experience 
(1995) that Plato held recollection involves only the explicit 
awareness of the Forms and hence that ordinary concept acquisition is 
to be explained in empiricist terms.  
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our ability to do this requires that we are acquainted 
with the Form itself, and that we have it in mind 
whenever we predicate it. In this way, Forms play a 
role akin to that of concepts. Just as children and 
non-philosophers can possess a concept without giving 
any thought to concepts as such, so Plato thinks we 
can have a Form in mind without knowing it.
135
 
 
Similarly, Descartes seems to hold that, prior to 
philosophical reflection, we nevertheless draw on our 
innate knowledge in our everyday cognitive activities. 
Before we ever distinguish a true triangle from an 
imperfect or finite (false) instance, we implicitly employ 
the concept of a perfect or infinite (true) triangle when 
we classify various sensible instances as triangles. An 
unreflective awareness of the divine nature seems to play a 
similar role, enabling us to classify, for example, various 
human properties as instances of knowledge, power, goodness 
or beauty. Only subsequently do we recognize that these 
creaturely instances fall short absolutely of the standards 
we had unknowingly employed, and hence that these standards 
constitute the true instances of these attributes. Indeed, 
Menn suggests that, in the Second Meditation, the 
narrator’s notion of intellectual attributes are, 
unbeknownst to the narrator, really notions proper to God’s 
                                                          
135 2005, 298. 
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intellect.
136
 Descartes appears to say as much when he 
claims that the idea of “intellectual nature in general […] 
is the idea which, if considered without limitation, 
represents God, and if limited, is the idea of an angel or 
a human soul” (CSMK 55).137 If this is the case, however, 
the notions must not yet be clear and distinct, since the 
narrator does not apprehend his intellectual properties as, 
for example, intrinsically incomprehensible. Such confusion 
is, perhaps, to be expected at the beginning stages of the 
narrator’s meditation. After he has established that he is 
a thinking thing, he can then achieve the insight that “I 
am not myself the supreme being and am lacking in countless 
respects” (CSMII 38). This apparent disambiguation of the 
ideas of self and God is, if Menn is correct, the 
derivation of the idea of the imperfect from the notion of 
the perfect.  
The arguments from amplification were intended to 
undermine the claim that the idea of God is innate by 
                                                          
136 “When we learn in the second Meditation that the soul thinks (knows, 
judges, doubts, desires to know more), we are already implicitly 
conceiving an ideal standard of thought, a being which possess of 
itself the intellectual perfections we can only gradually acquire[…]” 
(288). 
137 Descartes’ use of the phrase “in general” here appears to be 
equivalent to the sense of “infinite” or “perfect” in CPP. This is the 
sense of the phrase that Malebranche appears to employ in the Search 
After Truth when he describes God as “the being without individual 
restriction, the infinite being, being in general” (240), and the idea 
of God as an idea “of being in general, of being without limit, of 
infinite being” (318). He likewise describes our desire for infinite 
goodness, or the good as such, as an “impulse towards the good in 
general” (267, and 268-9). 
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showing how we could construct ideas of divine perfections 
(and, indeed, the idea of God himself) by merely amplifying 
our ideas of creaturely perfections. The principle of CPP—
namely, the claim that I could not apprehend something as 
falling short of the perfection definitive of a thing 
without already possessing a notion of the thing in 
question—shows why none of these amplification arguments 
can indeed provide us with an authentic idea of God (i.e., 
an idea representing God’s nature). First, if amplification 
presupposes an awareness of the creaturely attribute’s 
absolute imperfection, we must already possess a notion of 
the perfect kind the creature falls short of. Second, if 
such an apprehension of absolute imperfection is not 
assumed, and we apprehend creaturely attributes as either 
the things they are or imperfect relative to other 
creaturely attributes, there is no way we could arrive at 
notions of the divine perfections by modifying the 
creaturely ones by degree; this is so because of the 
qualitative distinction described by CPP—the imperfect is 
seen to fall short of the perfect absolutely, i.e., insofar 
as it fails to be the same kind as the perfect. Though we 
cannot therefore construct ideas truly representing God’s 
attributes by amplifying ideas of our own, we can use such 
amplification to represent to ourselves (conceive) 
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approximations of those perfections that we can otherwise 
only “reach” in thought (i.e., understand imperfectly). 
Just as the fact that we know that we can ‘approach,’ but 
cannot construct, a concept of a circle (or calculate its 
exact area) by amplifying the number of sides of a regular 
polygon betrays knowledge of the approximated nature (a 
circle), so our awareness that the amplification of our 
ideas of creaturely properties can gives us only 
approximations of the divine perfections demonstrates a 
similar implicit understanding of these natures.  
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Ch. III. The Positive Relation Between the Perfect and the 
Imperfect 
 
The notion of imperfection at issue within CPP is that 
of an absolute or qualitative difference; the imperfect is 
imperfect insofar as it fails to be the same kind as the 
perfect. The concept of the perfect is thus prior to the 
concept of the imperfect in the sense that apprehending 
something as not-x presupposes a notion of x. When applied 
to the case of creatures and God, the qualitative 
difference does not consist in creatures possessing 
features that God lacks. Rather, human beings fall short of 
God by virtue of 1) failing to possess correlates of all 
the divine properties 2) possessing correlates of that 
which exists in God eminently (e.g. extension); and 3) 
possessing correlates that are mere imitations of divine 
properties. Since they are qualitatively distinct from the 
divine attributes, the creaturely correlates in (3) are 
also imperfect in the sense indicated by CPP. Yet 
qualitative difference is obviously not a sufficient 
condition for one thing, or one property, to be an 
imperfect instance of another; a square, a cantaloupe and 
the Magna Carta all fall short of being triangles, but it 
doesn’t follow that they can be correctly described as 
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“imperfect triangles.” As the image-model metaphor 
suggests, there must be a resemblance relation between the 
imperfect and the perfect; an imperfect x is apprehended as 
not-x, but also as somehow like x. The third sense of 
creaturely imperfection—their possessing imitations of 
divine perfections—is also the source of some form of 
resemblance between the perfect and imperfect. The task for 
this chapter will be to explore various ways of making 
sense of this positive relation.  
 
I. The Modal Relation and Resemblance 
 Robert Rubin has recently argued that a modal 
relation ought to be our model for understanding the 
conceptual and ontological relationship between finite and 
infinite substance.
138
 Appealing to Descartes’ efforts to 
define substantiality in terms of criteria of ontological 
and conceptual (in)dependence, he suggests that creatures 
and God are not “really distinct” but, like modes in 
comparison to finite substances, only “semidistinct.”139 For 
Descartes, claims Rubin, A and B are really distinct if 
each can exist without the other, while A is merely 
semidistinct from B if B can exist without A but not vice 
                                                          
138 2008, 62-88. 
139 2008, 62. 
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versa. Interpreting the relation as one of semidistinctness 
has many advantages, claims Rubin. First, if the 
relationship between creatures and God resembles that which 
obtains between creatures and modes, then there is a 
“single axis running through [Descartes’] hierarchy.”140 
Further, we can take Descartes’ use of the term “substance” 
for both creatures and God as an invitation “to view God as 
standing to His ontological dependents (at least in some 
respects) as created substances stand to their properties 
or modes.”141 And most importantly, we can see how the 
conceptual dependence isomorphic with the ontological 
dependence of semidistinctness may have “led [Descartes] to 
the conclusion that we cannot conceive of ourselves without 
conceiving of a primary substance from which we are 
semidistinct.”142  
Understanding the relationship between finite and 
infinite substance in terms of the modal one of 
semidistinctnes seems to provide a relatively simple 
account of the positive (resemblance) relation between 
them. If we consider the attribute of a created substance 
(e.g., extension) in isolation from its modes, Rubin 
suggests that this is simply the idea of boundless 
                                                          
140 2008, 67. 
141 2008,67. 
142 2008, 70. 
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extension. When we predicate a mode of a created substance, 
however, we are introducing limits or bounds to this 
attribute—what Descartes will at one time describe as a 
“defect or limitation of perfection” (CSMII 114). Thus, for 
example, “to say of a table that it has the mode of being 
three feet long is to say it falls short of infinite 
extension in a certain way.” To conceive of a mode is thus 
to think of an attribute as being limited or determined in 
some way.  In his own analysis of CPP, Stephen Menn has 
also suggested that this priority can best be understood 
through the analogy of spatial limitation insofar as we 
“conceive of a limited space by adding the ideas of limits 
to the idea of space as such, and space as such is 
infinite.”143  
Yet it seems that the modal relation of 
semidistinctness is able to secure the resemblance of the 
imperfect to the perfect only at the cost of eliding the 
qualitative distinction between the two. For Rubin, the 
table’s imperfection qua modified thing does not consist in 
its failing to be extended but in its failing to possess 
the attribute in a quantitatively unlimited fashion. 
Similarly, the finite space in Menn’s example still appears 
to be an instance of space. Notice also that the 
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distinction between infinite and finite space consists in 
the fact that finite space is a part of space. It is clear 
that we cannot conceive of something as being a part of x 
without possessing the concept of x. Yet this is not the 
priority relation that Descartes describes holding between 
our concepts of God (infinite being) and creatures (finite 
being), for the perfection of creatures does not fall short 
of God’s perfection by virtue of being a limited part of 
that perfection. Or to turn to the triangle example, an 
imperfect triangle is not imperfect by virtue of 
constituting a part of a perfect one, but by falling short 
of a numerically distinct perfection. Menn and Rubin’s 
examples are in this sense better suited to Spinoza’s 
pantheistic version of CPP, in which finite things are 
modes of infinite substance in something like the sense of 
parts.
144
 For Spinoza, the modal distinction would seem to 
entail univocity, as creaturely properties are for him 
merely quantitatively distinct from God’s.145 
                                                          
144 Some scholars have, however, questioned whether Spinoza’s 
substance/mode relation is really an endorsement of pantheism (as the 
whole/part analogy would indicate). Edwin Curley, for example, argued 
that the relation is simply that of causal dependence (1969, 4-28). 
Others such as Yitzhak Melamed have countered that Spinoza is indeed a 
pantheist, but that it is a mistake to treat the substance/mode 
relation as a whole/part relation (2013, 49-60). 
145 Adams argues that, for Spinoza, “thought and extension are predicated 
univocally of finite things and God. What they are is the same in 
finite things as it is in God, or at least in the infinite and eternal 
modes of God. The difference is just that the thought or the extension 
that is in a finite thing does not contain the complete system of 
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In contrast to Rubin’s claim that creatures and God 
are not, for Descartes, really distinct, recent analyses of 
Descartes’ theory of distinctions in the context of late 
scholastic thought give us good reason to believe that he 
viewed the separability of one thing from another (and, 
consequently, the ability to clearly and distinctly 
conceive of one thing apart from another) as merely a sign 
(sufficient condition) of the former’s real distinction 
from the latter.
146
 When Descartes, in the Principles, 
asserts that “we can perceive that two substances are 
really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly 
and distinctly understand one apart from the other” (CSMI 
213), it does not follow that the conceivability of two 
things apart from one another is a necessary condition of 
their being really distinct. That creatures cannot exist 
                                                                                                                                                                             
thinking or extended being that is in God.” In a footnote, however, 
Adams notes that, Spinoza denies univocity when we conceive of God’s 
intellect as constituting the divine essence. In the Ethics, for 
example, he states that “God’s intellect, in so far as it is conceived 
to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both as to 
its essence and as to its existence, and cannot agree with it in 
anything except in name” (IP17S). A further complication is the fact 
that Spinoza does not apply the part/whole mode/substance analysis to 
divine attributes other than thought and extension. As Adams observes, 
divine attributes such as immutability or eternality are propria of 
God, “and Spinoza is not committed to finite things’ having properties 
of the same nature with them” (101).  
146 As Marleen Rozemone (2011, 243) has argued, Eustachius of Saint Paul, 
as well as other scholastics, held that separability is not a necessary 
condition for a real distinction. One of the examples he gives is the 
distinction between God and creatures –there is no separability 
(creatures cannot exist without God) and yet there is a real 
distinction. Paul Hoffman (2002, 68) also argues that Both Suarez and 
Descartes recognize the capacity to exist apart as a ‘sign’ of a real 
distinction, not a necessary feature of it. See also Gonzalo Rodríguez 
Pereyra, 2008. 
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apart from God does not entail they are not really distinct 
from him, for one thing could be really distinct from 
another so long as the ontological dependence relation is 
merely causal. In the Correspondence, for example, 
Descartes can say that “when we call a created substance 
self-subsistent we do not rule out the divine concurrence 
which it needs in order to subsist” (CSMK 193). As Suarez 
would put it, creatures are really distinct from God not 
because they can exist apart from him (for they cannot), 
but because they can exist without being in a “real union” 
with him. Shape, on the other hand, fails to be really 
distinct from extended substance not because it merely 
cannot exist without it, but because it cannot exist 
without existing in the substance (as a mode of extension). 
Indeed, the need to account for the relationship between 
creatures and God seems to have been a primary motivation 
for the scholastic effort to show that a real distinction 
is compatible with ontological and conceptual dependence. 
Many thinkers affirmed that creatures could neither be nor 
be conceived (at least properly) apart from God; few would 
have done so, however, if the consequences were inevitably 
pantheistic.  
The advantages Rubin claims of viewing the relation as 
one of semidistinctness are similarly questionable. It is 
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doubtful that Descartes would have taken the asymmetry of 
the ontological relations (God/creature; substance/mode) as 
a cause for concern, since he repeatedly emphasizes the 
ontological and conceptual distance between creatures and 
God. Indeed, given God’s nature in comparison to our own, 
it would be odd if it were to turn out that the relation 
between the two were not sui generis. Nor should we take 
Descartes’ willingness to call both creatures and God 
“substances” an indication that creatures stand to God as 
modes do to substances. God is a substance in the primary 
sense, and it is the extension of this designation to 
creatures that requires the explanation. We should 
therefore take it as evidence for the very opposite 
conclusion: namely, that Descartes is willing to extend the 
term “substance” to creatures because he does not want his 
readers to think that creatures stand to God as modes do to 
creaturely substances. Here his concern was probably less 
for the independence and identity of creatures than with 
the threat such modification would pose to the sovereignty 
of God.
147
 God cannot be modified, for this would entail a 
                                                          
147 Being a bearer of properties is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for being a substance since 1) God is identical with his 
attributes and 2) modes can have modifications of their own. Descartes’ 
description of substance in terms of this traditional Aristotelian 
conception ought not to be taken as a definition of substance, but 
merely a statement of a necessary condition for created substance. See 
Rozemond, 245. 
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complexity, mutability, and limitation inconsistent with 
his absolute perfection.
148
 In other words, applying the 
modal relation to creatures and God is inappropriate not 
because it would reduce creatures to mere modes, but 
because it would reduce God to a modifiable thing. 
Descartes is able to preserve the ontological dependence of 
creatures on God without jeopardizing God’s transcendence 
because a real distinction between creatures and God is 
fully compatible with such ontological dependence. His 
designating creatures “substances” should therefore be 
taken to express the view that such a real distinction does 
indeed obtain, despite creatures’ ontological dependence on 
God.  
Nor, finally, is Rubin correct in arguing that the 
conceptual dependence of the idea of the finite on the 
infinite is sufficiently similar to that obtaining between 
the idea of a mode and a created substance. The conceptual 
independence of the idea of a created substance (with 
respect to mode) does not resemble the conceptual 
independence of the idea of infinite substance (with 
                                                          
148In the Principles, Descartes argues “we do not, strictly speaking, say 
that there are modes or qualities in God, but simply attributes, since 
in the case of God any variation is unintelligible” (CSM 211). The 
classic early-modern expression of such a critique can be found in 
Pierre Bayle’s objections to Spinoza’s thesis that created things are 
modes of God. Bayle, however, also focuses on the alleged consequence 
that God would possess contradictory properties and would be 
responsible for evil.  
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respect to finite substance).  Rubin is right that we can 
conceive of a created substance without conceiving of any 
particular mode, just as we conceive of infinite substance 
without conceiving of any particular finite substance. In 
the Rules, for example, after Descartes asserts the 
conceptual dependence of modes,
149
 he argues that, “though 
most people count them as contingent,” the idea of my own 
existence presupposes that of God’s. Yet he immediately 
qualifies this statement, noting that “very many necessary 
propositions, when converted, are contingent. Thus from the 
fact that I exist I may conclude with certainty that God 
exists, but form the fact that God exists I cannot 
legitimately assert that I too exist” (CSM 46). 
Propositions concerning the existence of a particular mode 
are similarly inconvertible: from the fact that a given 
substance exists, I cannot infer that a certain mode 
exists. 
Yet while we can conceive of a created substance 
without conceiving of any particular mode, we cannot 
clearly and distinctly conceive of a created substance 
without conceiving of it as being modified in some way. 
This dependence is an ontological feature of created 
substance—it cannot exist without being modified in some 
                                                          
149 “[W]e cannot conceive of a shape which is completely lacking in 
extension, or a motion wholly lacking in duration” (CSM 46). 
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way. As Secada argues, the conceptual relation between a 
mode and a created substance is that of a determinate to 
its determinable: Determinable essences cannot exist 
without being determined in some way.
150
  Just as I cannot 
conceive of something having figure without also having 
some kind of determinate shape, so I cannot conceive of the 
essential attribute of a created substance (extension or 
thought) as existing without existing in some determinate 
way (e.g., as having modes of thought or extension).
151
 
Rubin cites the example of the idea of wax in the Second 
Meditation, noting that it is there conceived apart from 
everything semidistinct from it: “[The narrator] finds that 
it does not per se have any bounds to its extension; 
boundaries imply modes, which he has conceptually set 
aside.” Yet what the narrator has set aside here are the 
particular modes inhering in this wax. In the Fifth 
Replies, Descartes clarifies that “I did not abstract the 
concept of the wax from the concept of its accidents 
                                                          
150 “Descartes understood inherence as determination, and accidents or 
modes as ways of being of the one essential attribute of the substance 
to which they belong. He conceived substances as existing determinable 
essences, and he took their non-essential real properties to be 
determinates of these essences: the idea of a mode of a substance 
involves the idea of its essence as the idea of a determinate involves 
the idea of its determinable (e.g., as the idea of square involves the 
idea of figure)” (2000, 14).  As Eric Funkhouser argues, “An object 
instantiating a determinable must also instantiate some determinate 
under that determinable. Colored objects must be red or yellow or blue, 
etc. No object is merely colored simpliciter” (2006, 2).  
151 Rodríguez Pereyra too notes that “substance needs modes to exist, but 
it does not need any particular modes” (2008, 81). See also Bernard 
Williams 1978, 125. 
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[modes]” (CSMII 248). As he argues in his Conversation with 
Burman, though he “conceded and stated that these 
accidents, such as hardness , cold, and so on, leave the 
wax, he also stated and expressly remarked that others 
always replace them, so that the wax is never without 
accidents.”152  However, the idea of infinite substance is 
the idea of something that is unmodified and unmodifiable, 
and does not presuppose in any way the existence of finite 
substances. This conceptual independence reflects the 
traditional theistic belief that God could exist without 
creation; created substances, however, cannot exist without 
modes.  
Rubin seems to be equating the infinity of 
(creaturely) attributes understood as generality with the 
infinity of (divine) attributes understood as absolute 
perfection (or reality). When we conceive of the created 
attribute of extension in general, we are conceiving of it 
with respect to the (infinite) range of its potential 
modifications. As Secada puts it, “the distinct and 
complete conception of a [finite] substance, which is just 
the conception of its essence, contains its possible modes 
or properties, in the same way in which a determinable 
                                                          
152 Cottingham 1976, 10. 
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contains its determinates.”153  Thus the process of 
conceiving of a particular created substance with a certain 
modification is an act of limitation in the sense of 
specification, not in the sense of limiting perfection. 
This is not similar to the process by which we derive a 
concept of created substance from the concept of divine 
substance. True, in his Correspondence, Descartes will 
argue that the “notion of intellectual nature in general [… 
is] the idea which, if considered without limitation, 
represents God, and if limited, is the idea of an angel or 
a human soul” (CSMK 55). But “general” here is not 
equivalent to “unspecified” in the sense of a determinable, 
and the act of limitation is not that of conceiving of it 
as determined. Rather, “general” should here be read as 
“absolute,” the limitation of which is not specification 
but qualification. God’s attributes are not and cannot be 
determinables, for they already exist ‘in’ him in a 
determinate fashion. The act of partial negation is not a 
process of determining a determinable, i.e., specifying 
which of the range of potential determinations actually 
apply, but of deriving, from the concept of one (divine) 
determinate property, the concept of a (creaturely) 
                                                          
153 2000, 193. 
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determinable one—a process, as we shall later propose, of 
analogical derivation. 
 
II. The Image-Model Metaphor and Resemblance 
We have seen that the image-model metaphor is 
particularly suited to capturing the negative relation 
between the perfect and the imperfect.  Since images, qua 
images, fail to be the same kinds of things as their 
models, this metaphor suggests that the imperfect resembles 
the perfect while remaining qualitatively distinct from 
it.
154
 But can the image-model metaphor tell us something 
about the positive (resemblance) relation between the 
perfect and imperfect? When Descartes, in his Conversation 
with Burman, defends his use of the “image and likeness” 
analogy, he argues that creatures must in some sense 
resemble God since he created them. Whereas a house need 
not resemble its builder since the builder’s activity is 
merely applying “active forces to what is passive”—and 
hence is one of many necessary causal antecedents—God is 
the  
 
                                                          
154 However, some images can be the same kind as their models: the 
drawing of another drawing would be a member of the same kind (i.e., 
drawings). 
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total cause, the cause of being itself. Anything 
produced by this cause must necessarily be like it. 
For since the cause is itself being and substance, and 
it brings something into being, i.e. out of nothing (a 
method of production which is the prerogative of God), 
what is produced must at the very least be being and 
substance. To this extent at least, it will be like 
God and bear his image.
155
 
 
Descartes subsequently states that the term “image” should 
not be taken in the “ordinary sense of an effigy or picture 
of something, but in the broader sense of something having 
some resemblance with something else.” Yet what is the 
nature of this resemblance? On this point Descartes is 
silent.  
In his own effort to explain the relationship between 
Forms and particulars in light of the image-model analogy, 
Patterson provides an interesting (though ultimately 
unsatisfying) way of understanding how a grasp of divine 
perfections is necessary for the comprehension and 
evaluation of creaturely perfections. Knowledge of a Form, 
he claims, enables us to identify its participant and gauge 
its relative excellence in the same sense that knowledge of 
                                                          
155 Cottingham 1976: 16. Though Descartes seems to attribute the status 
of “total cause” to God alone, there is perhaps a sense in which a 
finite substance could be considered the total cause of its modes. An 
idea, considered as an act of the mind (ideaM), derives its existence 
and reality (what little formal reality it has) from the substance of 
which it is a mode (a thinking thing). Just as God contains, formally 
or eminently, everything found in creatures and moreover acts as a 
preserving cause of them, so perhaps a finite intellect could be said 
to contain all the formal reality of its modes and acts a as a 
preserving cause of them. The crucial difference, however, would 
remain: modes inhere in substances (via a real union) while creatures 
remain really distinct from God.   
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a painting’s model or subject enables us to recognize the 
painting as being of that subject as well as the excellence 
(understood here as accuracy or correctness) of the 
painting.
156
 Patterson, however, fails to provide an 
adequate explanation of the positive relationship 
(likeness) between a participant and its Form that makes 
this evaluation possible. A given particular is what it is 
by virtue of its participation in a given Form, just as a 
given image is what it is (a picture of a horse) by virtue 
of what it is an image of (a horse). But what justifies our 
description of something as a “horse” and thus a 
participant in the Form of horse? How would knowledge of 
the Form of horse enable us to correctly identify two 
things as horses and correctly exclude a third thing as not 
a horse? Patterson notes that there is a sense in which an 
image can correctly be said to be of a given model by 
reference to something extraneous to features of both the 
image and model. It is in this sense that a child’s finger 
painting of Napoleon could be said to be an image of 
Napoleon even though it looks nothing like him, for here 
the criterion might be artistic intention. A similar 
extraneous criterion could be cited in cases of photographs 
and reflections—there a given thing is an image of a given 
                                                          
156 1985, 110-14 
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model insofar as it bears a certain causal relation to it. 
Patterson finds that such criteria are, however, 
inapplicable to particulars and Forms.
157
 
A more promising sense in which an image can be said 
to be of a given model is one that appeals to some sort of 
qualitative resemblance. A given image is an image of a 
particular model by virtue of resembling that model’s 
qualities. In this sense the child’s finger painting could 
be said to be an image of a clown if it (whatever the 
child’s intentions) indeed resembles such a thing. Yet an 
image and its model cannot resemble one another by virtue 
of sharing the quality definitive of the model. An image 
possessing 60% of the features of a horse, Patterson 
explains, is not a 60% horse—it is not a horse at all.158 
Referring to Austin’s example of a decoy duck, however, 
Patterson introduces an alternative form of resemblance 
according to which “imaging—and by analogy, participation—
must involve resemblance in some respects other than F 
being image and model. A decoy duck must be similar to real 
ducks in some relevant respects if it is to be a decoy 
duck; imitation leather must have something in common with 
real leather, and so on. Likewise, one might argue, there 
                                                          
157 Inapplicable because Forms are causally inert and do not possess 
intentions.  
158 1985, 59. 
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must be some relevant similarity between sensible and 
intelligible F.”159 According to this sense of resemblance, 
a decoy duck could be said to resemble a real duck insofar 
as it shares with it qualities such as shape and color. Yet 
Patterson dismisses this form of resemblance too: “One 
finds no evidence whatever that sensible Fs are in general 
supposed to resemble the Form of F in (relevant) respects 
other than F.” The principal barrier to this 
interpretation, he explains, is that Forms do not possess 
phenomenal properties.  
Patterson ultimately concludes that the relevant model 
for the positive relation of images to their models lies 
not in their qualitative resemblance but in a resemblance 
defined as accuracy or truthfulness, i.e., “the quality of 
the information conveyed by the image.”160 This notion of 
correctness, he says, has a “liberating effect on the study 
of representation, freeing it from unreflective servitude 
to similarity.” But how does an image, qua image, convey 
information? Signs can convey information by virtue of 
convention; and perhaps various psychological regularities 
could explain why a given image inspires, in the minds of 
viewers, thought of something qualitatively distinct from 
the image. Yet it is difficult to understand how images 
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could convey information by virtue of something intrinsic 
to their nature without in some way resembling that which 
they represent. Indeed, it is the model of a symbol, rather 
than a sign, that seems to be better suited to Patterson’s 
criterion. Unlike a sign, a symbol conveys information 
about its model by participating in that which it 
represents, i.e., by resembling it. So, for example, the 
spoken word “buzz” actually imitates the very sound to 
which it refers. If it is as symbols that particulars 
convey information about the Forms in which they 
participate, then it is indeed the qualitative resemblance 
of these particulars to their Forms that determines their 
accuracy.  
Patterson’s suggestion that Forms are like models in 
the sense that they are used to determine the existence and 
accuracy of their participants is, however, applicable to 
Descartes’ account. Carol Rovane, for example, argues that 
the ideas of perfection or infinitude “are not simply 
standards against which we can make sense of their complete 
absence or negation—they are standards against which we can 
make comparative judgments concerning one thing being more 
perfect or greater than another.”161 Yet it doesn’t seem 
that extraneous criteria such as divine intention and 
                                                          
161 1994, 96. 
151 
 
 
 
divine causality could explain these abilities. We do not, 
obviously, have direct knowledge of God’s intentions, and 
so it cannot be by reference to these that we justify our 
description of a given attribute as, for example, imperfect 
goodness. Nor is knowing merely that God is the cause of 
these attributes sufficient for distinguishing them and 
gauging their relative perfection.  
Yet there is a deeper problem with such extrinsic 
criteria, for even if they could explain our ability to 
identify and measure various instances of the imperfect, 
they seem to establish only an equivocal relation between 
terms. Urine with certain characteristics might be 
designated “healthy” because it is a unique effect, and 
hence a sign, of a healthy physiology, but there is no 
sense in which the characteristics of healthy urine 
resemble those of a healthy body. Likewise, if a creature 
is called “good” merely because it is caused by something 
good (God), it doesn’t follow that there is anything in the 
creature resembling those characteristics that make God 
good. The same goes for intention. A portrait intended to 
depict Napoleon may look nothing like the man himself. Of 
course, God’s perfection entails that none of his 
intentions will be frustrated, but we wouldn’t want to say 
that creatures are “good” merely because He caused or 
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intended it. Indeed, such a reading would be inconsistent 
with Descartes’ claim that certain creaturely attributes 
are contained formally within God. Moreover, this reading 
would attribute to Descartes a radical position quite at 
odds with traditional theism. Though he is perfectly 
willing to say that creaturely reality and goodness falls 
short of God’s absolutely, there is little indication that 
he believed creation is not intrinsically real or good in 
some sense—after all, God created it. 
Though Patterson dismissed the option of resemblance 
by partial qualitative identity for the relation of Forms 
and particulars, perhaps this form of resemblance could 
apply to Descartes’ account. According to this reading, a 
decoy duck could be like a duck insofar as its general 
shape and color (or aspects thereof) are qualitatively 
identical to the shape and color of the real thing. 
Similarly, one might argue that the imperfect resembles the 
perfect by virtue of sharing a constituent part of the 
property possessed by (and definitive of) the perfect 
thing. So, the argument continues, while a thing possessing 
the imperfect property can’t be said to possess a limited 
degree of the perfect property, it could be said to possess 
(either completely or by degree) a more basic constituent 
feature of the perfect property. 
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 Yet such partial qualitative identity cannot explain 
the resemblance relation entailed by Cartesian CPP. First, 
such an account would entail that creatures and God 
actually share some qualities, but nowhere does Descartes 
suggest that this might be so. Indeed, his claim that “no 
essence can belong univocally to both God and his 
creatures” is unqualified, and would lose much of its force 
if it were. Further, we have seen that Descartes, in 
clarifying his own use of the image-model metaphor, does 
not say that images imitate a model by virtue of being 
identical with them in some respect(s). Such a claim would 
leave him open to the very anthropomorphism critique to 
which he was responding. Rather, he states that images 
resemble a model because they “imitate it in some 
respects.” This is not the response one would expect if 
Descartes believed that imitation were reducible to 
qualitative identity in some (more basic) respect(s).  
It is true that, despite God’s metaphysical 
simplicity, we must, due to the limitations of our own 
minds in comparison to his immensity, conceive of him in 
terms of multiple perfections. God is powerful and good and 
loving etc. Each of these attributes is taken as a primary 
attribute and hence as expressing his essence. One might 
then argue that if we can conceive of the divine essence in 
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terms of a diversity of attributes, perhaps we can also 
conceive of each attribute in terms of diverse parts. One 
might then look to these constituents as a basis for 
univocity. But if Descartes rejected the univocity of 
perfections on the basis of their real identity with God’s 
essence (and the other attributes), the same reasoning 
would seem to apply to any conceptual constituents of these 
perfections. So even if we could conceive of God’s 
attributes as though they were complex, the conceptual 
constituents could not provide a basis for univocal 
predication. Nor are Descartes’ claims about God’s 
incomprehensibility consistent with the view that while 
God’s perfections are globally incomprehensible, some of 
their constituents are perfectly comprehensible. Since only 
the finite is comprehensible, such a view would entail that 
God is, in some respects, finite.  So if we assume, as 
Patterson does, that qualitative resemblance requires some 
form of qualitative identity, then it is impossible to 
treat Descartes’ account of the positive relation between 
the perfect and the imperfect as one of qualitative 
resemblance.  
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III. Adams on Leibniz and Resemblance by Comparative 
Properties 
 
We have seen that the chief problem for understanding 
the positive relation between the perfect and imperfect in 
Descartes’ account is that of explaining how creaturely 
properties could be said to resemble divine ones without 
presupposing some form of univocity. In his analysis of the 
priority of the perfect in continental rationalism, Adams 
addresses a related problem in explaining how creaturely 
predicates could be derived from divine ones in Leibniz’s 
metaphysics. 
162
 He chooses to focus on Leibniz rather than 
Descartes because the latter’s system does not allow for a 
comprehensive “top-down” account of the derivation of 
creaturely perfections from divine ones: unlike Spinoza and 
Leibniz, Descartes did not hold that all creaturely 
attributes are contained formally within God. Extension, at 
least in its creaturely form, is incompatible with divine 
perfection. Since Leibniz denied the reality of extension, 
and Spinoza was willing to predicate it of God provided it 
be understood as indivisible, both thinkers could provide a 
comprehensive derivation. Though Spinoza’s version is the 
simplest, it is idiosyncratic since he substitutes for what 
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Adams calls the Cartesian “exemplar/imitation relation” the 
relation of substance to mode. For Spinoza, says Adams, 
thought and extension can be predicated univocally of 
finite creatures and God since “the difference is just that 
the thought or the extension that is in a finite thing does 
not contain the complete system of thinking or extended 
being that is in God.”163 This sort of derivation, however, 
will not do for either Leibniz or Descartes.  
Adams explains that, like Descartes, Leibniz believed 
that divine perfections must be qualitatively distinct from 
creaturely ones. Leibniz claims that God, as the “subject 
of all perfections,” contains “every simple quality” that 
is “positive and absolute” insofar as it “expresses without 
any limits whatever it expresses.”164 Leibniz’s notion of 
the divine perfections is thus similar to Descartes’ 
account of actually infinite properties.
165
 For both 
thinkers, concepts of the divine properties are prior to 
creaturely ones because creaturely perfections are 
limitations or partial-negations of divine attributes that 
                                                          
163 2007, 100-01. 
164 Ibid., 105. 
165 See, for example, in the New Essays, Theophilus, speaking for 
Leibniz: “The true infinite, strictly speaking, is only in the 
absolute, which precedes all composition and is not formed by that 
addition of parts” (1989, 157).  
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possess their reality “without any limits.”166 Further, 
according to Adams, Leibniz held that “all properties or 
concepts are either simple or constructed from simple 
predicates by logical operations such as conjunction and 
negation”167 and that “all the simple predicates […] are 
among the attributes of God.” Thus the concepts of 
creaturely perfections “must all be composed, by logical 
operations including various degrees of limitation or 
partial negation, from the simple perfections of God.”168 
Adams observes that the primary obstacle to explaining how 
concepts of creaturely perfections could be thus derived 
from divine ones is that the conceptual simplicity of 
divine perfections seems to forestall any partial negation 
of them: 
  
On a Leibnizian account the perfection of power [for 
example] should be partly denied and partly affirmed 
of finite things. But how can an absolutely simple 
property be partly denied of anything. What part of it 
is to be denied, and what part affirmed, given that it 
has no parts at all? If a simple property is to be 
                                                          
166 “[T]he genuine infinite is not a ‘modification’: it is the absolute; 
and indeed it is precisely by modifying it that one limits oneself and 
forms a finite.” 
167 Though Adams does not mention it, Leibniz’s account of deriving 
composite ideas from simple ones resembles Descartes methodological 
analysis in the Rules, where he argues that all of our concepts are 
composed from ideas of “simple natures” (CSMI 22).  Of course, for 
Descartes, these simple natures will include non-divine properties such 
as extension.  
168 “The idea of the absolute is internal to us, as is that of being: 
these absolutes are nothing but the attributes of God; and they may be 
said to be as much the source of ideas as God himself is the principle 
of beings.” 
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affirmed or denied of something, it would seem that it 
must be affirmed or denied as a whole. But can a 
property be partly affirmed or denied as a whole?
169
 
 
The Cartesian account seems to run into a similar problem. 
Descartes invokes partial negation to explain how we can 
derive a creaturely property that is neither the same, nor 
simply a negation of, a divine one. Finite being, for 
example, is neither being itself, nor the negation of being 
(non-being). Yet if a creaturely perfection cannot resemble 
a divine one by virtue of partial qualitative identity, it 
is difficult to understand how such partial negation is 
supposed to work. Since neither Leibniz nor Descartes ever 
provide an explanation, one might suspect it was a mystery 
to them as well.  
 Adams does, however, provide an interesting, though 
ultimately inadequate, account of how a simple property 
could be partially negated. In response to the above 
question as to whether a property can be partly affirmed or 
denied as a whole, he suggests that we regularly do this 
with respect to comparative properties. So, for example, “I 
can and do say that bananas are less sweet than pineapples 
without presupposing any analysis of sweetness into parts. 
‘Less sweet’ functions here as a partial negation, one 
which implies ‘not as sweet as the comparison case’ but 
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does not imply ‘not sweet at all.’” He explains that if God 
has the simple perfection of power (P), a complex concept 
of a creaturely perfection could be derived by adding “the 
limiting or partly negative property-forming operator the 
one billionth degree of.”170 He is quick to note, however, 
that the creature cannot be said to possess P. Such a 
conclusion would obviously violate Leibniz’s denial of 
univocity. Instead of speaking of creatures having 
“degrees” of P, therefore, he suggests we should “speak 
only of degrees of approximation to P.”171 Such an account, 
it appears, could work for Descartes as well.  
 Adams acknowledges, however, that this analysis of 
“partial negation” will hold only so long as the property 
in question is a “scalar magnitude”, i.e., a property “that 
varies primitively, in intensity or strength.”172 One shade 
of a color, he notes, can differ from another without 
supervening on more basic qualitative differences. If the 
comparative property is not such a scalar magnitude, it 
must supervene on non-comparative properties. For Leibniz, 
however, “there is no provision for a positive, non-
comparative property to be possessed by the creature as 
part of the basis for its possessing the positive 
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comparative property.”173 Thus Adams’ account requires us to 
assume that the property in question cannot be analyzed in 
terms of non-comparative properties.  
Yet he thinks there are three problems with such a 
premise: First, it is difficult to understand how the 
concept of a given quality could be derived from the purely 
quantitative notion of a given degree of approximation. 
Knowing that a given shade of purplish-red is “217 
thousandths” of the way from pure red to pure purple, will 
not enable us to understand its phenomenal quality. Such a 
derivation “involves substituting largely structural 
content for purely qualitative content, and the positive, 
purely qualitative content cannot be given in that way.”174 
Second, Adams does not think it is plausible that 
creaturely attributes such as knowledge or power could be 
understood as degrees of a scalar magnitude, for “it seems 
that degrees of knowledge and power do supervene on facts—
quite complex and not obviously comparative facts—about 
what their possessor knows and can do, and how.”175 Third, 
even Leibniz himself acknowledges that we don’t fully 
understand the simple perfections of God or how we derive 
creaturely properties from them. Yet how can we then 
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174 Ibid., 110. 
175 Ibid., 111. 
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maintain that creaturely properties could be constructed 
from divine ones if we “don’t know how, nor from what 
properties?”176  
 Adams suggests that if we wish to preserve a top-down 
account of at least some of the properties of creatures, we 
should do away with the condition that the qualities be 
simple and opt for an “account in which the key 
relationship is the more or less holistic one of 
resembling, rather than the more analytical one of being 
constructed out of”—a relationship that he thinks is more 
in line with the Platonic tradition.
177
 Divine knowledge, 
for example, would then be viewed not as “a constituent 
from which less perfect cases are constructed” but rather 
“an archetype which they imperfectly resemble.” Human 
knowledge could still be seen as supervening on more basic 
properties that creatures possess fully. Adams argues that 
we do something like this when we attribute cognitive 
states such as belief or purpose to dogs by using human 
beliefs and purposes as models. Doing so enables us to 
understand dog cognition better than “if (per impossibile) 
we allowed in our minds only the sort of beliefs and 
purposes that dogs have.”178 Similarly, even though we don’t 
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177 Ibid., 115. 
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understand what perfect knowledge is like, “the one who had 
divinely perfect knowledge would understand it, and would 
understand better than we do in what ways we do and do not 
know.”179 
 The problem with Adams’ proposal, however, is that it 
fails to explain the nature of this “holistic” sense of 
resembling. As we have argued above, explaining how a given 
divine property could be partly denied and partly affirmed 
of a creature is a problem not only for the assumption that 
divine attributes are simple, but equally so for the 
premise that nothing can be predicated univocally of 
creatures and God. Even if we jettison the assumption of 
simplicity, we still have to explain in what sense human 
knowledge could be said to resemble its divine correlate 
without in any way sharing features of it. The notion of a 
dog’s purpose, for example, surely resembles that of a 
human’s by virtue of partial univocity: though a human 
action, unlike a dog’s, is usually deemed purposeful only 
if the end in question is something the person has 
cognitive access to as a goal or reason for action, this 
sort of purpose shares with the canine version the fact 
that the intelligibility of each requires reference to a 
certain end. As I will argue in later chapters, the notion 
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of a primitive form of resemblance is as crucial for making 
sense of likeness in the absence of univocity as it is for 
explaining how a simple property could be partially 
negated.  
  
IV. Denial of Univocity Does Not Entail Equivocity 
 In the conclusion of his analysis of Descartes’ 
account of the priority of the perfect, Adams wonders how 
the “denial of univocity is supposed to be consistent (as 
Descartes must have supposed it to be) with the claim that 
some attributes of finite things are contained formally 
(though without their limits) in the idea of God.”180 If 
denying univocity entails endorsing equivocity, then it is 
indeed difficult to understand how Descartes could assume 
that creatures resemble God. It is doubtful that Descartes 
would have viewed this claim as paradoxical on its face, 
however, for one of the purported achievements of the 
scholastic tradition in which he was educated was the 
explanation of how the absence of univocity could be 
consistent with the claim that creatures are in some sense 
images of God. We are referring, of course, to the so-
called doctrine of analogy—“so-called” because, as we will 
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see in the next chapter, it was less a single cohesive 
doctrine than a general schema that scholastic thinkers 
adapted in a variety of ways for a variety of purposes. 
 Generally speaking, analogy was viewed as a mean 
between univocity and equivocity in that it ostensibly 
showed how a term could have different, though related, 
senses. While “animal” is predicated univocally of both a 
dog and a man because it has the same meaning in both uses, 
the term “bank” is used equivocally when it is predicated 
of both the shore of a river and a lending institution 
since the meanings of the two uses are completely distinct. 
Drawing on Aristotle and commentaries on his work, however, 
many medieval and scholastic thinkers sought to carve out 
space between univocation and equivocation. A classic 
example, derived from Aristotle, is the related 
significance of the term “healthy” when predicated of, for 
example, the body and things that are conducive to the 
body’s health (e.g. diet). Though the term “healthy” does 
not have the same significance when it is used to describe 
both an organism’s physiology and a dietary regimen, the 
meanings of the two uses were considered to be related in 
way that distinguished their usage from pure equivocation. 
In this case, a healthy diet is one that is conducive to a 
healthy body.  
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 This example and similar ones illustrated a broad 
notion of analogy that was inapplicable, however, to cases 
where the desired relation was one of ontological 
resemblance. Though a healthy diet might be conducive to a 
healthy body, and although one cannot really understand why 
a given diet would be healthy without knowledge of bodily 
health, the features of such a diet in no way resemble the 
features of a healthy body. When perfections such as 
“goodness” or “power” are predicated of God, however, the 
claim is not that God merely bears some relation (e.g., 
causal) to creaturely goodness or power or vice versa 
(though this could be part of its meaning); rather, it was 
held that there is something intrinsic to God’s nature that 
the qualities of creaturely goodness and power can be said 
to resemble. Aquinas, as well as later scholastics, 
grounded this resemblance in terms of the ontological 
relation of participation: creatures are like God to the 
extent that they participate in him.  
A crucial presupposition of such analogical 
resemblance is that it cannot be reduced to or explained in 
terms of any form of qualitative identity that would allow 
for univocal predication. From a theological perspective, 
many philosophers and theologians held that any form of 
real community between creatures and God enabling univocal 
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predication would threaten God’s transcendence and was 
incompatible with divine simplicity. From a strictly 
metaphysical perspective, the special case of the predicate 
“being” seemed to require a theory of irreducible or 
primitive analogical resemblance. Aristotle had argued that 
being cannot be a genus since the differentiae restricting 
being to various species would also have to be instances of 
being. Since we cannot isolate a univocal core of the 
meaning of “being” predicated of qualities and substances, 
the features that distinguish the being of qualities from 
the being of substances must be the same as those that 
ground their resemblance.
181
  
Though Descartes never endorses a theory of analogy, 
we noted that he does explicitly employ analogy in the 
Objections and Replies to explain the sense in which God 
can be said to be self-caused. He argues, for example, that 
“God stands toward himself in a relation analogous to that 
of an efficient cause” (CSMII 170). It is natural that 
Descartes would invoke analogy in his account of God’s 
self-sustaining (i.e. independent) existence, for he had 
originally denied that the term “substance” applies 
univocally to creatures and God (in part) because of the 
self-sustaining nature of divine existence. In this case, 
                                                          
181 See Aersten 2012, 61-2. For a detailed analysis see Wilson 2000, 136-
43. 
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at least, it is clear that the denial of univocity is meant 
to entail analogy, not equivocity. When, in a later 
chapter, we explore Descartes’ use of analogy in detail, we 
will find that he argues that an equivocal notion of 
existence would be inconsistent with his second causal 
proof for God. 
Despite the fact that Descartes explicitly relies upon 
a theory of analogy in his account of divine existence, 
there are a number of reasons why he may have decided to 
forego providing an account and defense of analogy in 
general. First, he was notoriously cagey about his 
philosophical influences, and he may have wished to avoid 
linking his own metaphysical ontology to such a hoary 
scholastic doctrine; alternatively, he may have viewed an 
implicit assumption of analogical resemblance to be 
relatively uncontroversial and avoided invoking it simply 
because he didn’t think it needed to be explained or 
defended;
182
 on the other hand, since he was undoubtedly 
acquainted with the endless scholastic disputes concerning 
the nature and validity of analogy, perhaps he simply felt 
his energies would be better spent elsewhere. It is of 
                                                          
182 There is some evidence of this view in the Fourth Replies. After 
Descartes explains how we derive an analogically common notion of cause 
“common to both an efficient and a formal cause” of existence, he adds 
that he did not “explain this point in my Meditations, but left it out, 
assuming it was self-evident” (CSMII 167). 
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course true that Descartes presented his philosophy as a 
repudiation and correction of much of scholastic thought. 
Yet as his causal principle suggests, he was not averse to 
drawing from scholastic thought when it served his broader 
critical purposes.  
Perhaps, however, Descartes avoids discussion of 
analogy because he saw that his system would require a 
version of analogy strikingly different from scholastic 
ones. The traditional account, which we might (following 
Adams) call a “bottom-up” approach to transcendental 
analogy, begins with concepts of creaturely attributes and 
then derives concepts of analogous divine attributes by 
modifying (e.g., qualifying or amplifying) the former. Yet 
as we saw in the previous chapter, this is precisely the 
sort of process that Descartes argued against in his 
replies to Gassendi and others.
183
 We may represent to 
ourselves (conceive) divine perfections by amplifying 
creaturely ones, but Descartes believes that this 
amplification is guided by an implicit awareness of the 
perfection approximated. Instead, Descartes would have to 
endorse a “top-down” approach to analogy, one that begins 
                                                          
183 Gassendi had proposed such a bottom-up account of analogy in the 
Fifth Objections, where he asserts that “it is more than enough if, on 
the analogy of our human attributes, we can derive and construct an 
idea of some sort for our own use—an idea which does not transcend our 
human grasp and which contains no reality except what we perceive in 
other things” (CSMII 200-01). 
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with concepts of divine attributes and derives concepts of 
analogous creaturely ones by modifying (i.e., via partial 
negation) the former. Analogy is not here used to explain 
how we conceive of God’s attributes but how we conceive of 
those creaturely attributes that imitate the divine ones 
(i.e., the pure perfections and transcendentals). Since 
this approach to analogy appears to have been without 
precedent in scholastic thought, perhaps Descartes chose 
not to call attention to it out of fear that it would draw 
controversy. Indeed, in his defense of the analogy of self-
causation, he affirms that he is “extremely anxious to 
prevent anything at all being found in [his] writings which 
could justifiably give offence to theologians” (CSMII 171). 
Descartes may have therefore believed that he would have 
had little to gain—and much to lose—if he were to provide 
an explicit account and defense of the particular theory of 
analogy that his system entails.  
Nor is there reason to believe that Descartes’ 
ontological innovations are somehow incompatible with a 
theory of theological analogy. Marjorie Grene famously 
wrote that, in transforming the medieval many-leveled 
hierarchy of degrees of reality into an austere three-
leveled universe of infinite substance, finite substance 
and modes, Descartes thereby “cleaned out the lumber room 
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of scholastic thought so thoroughly as to leave what seems 
a barely habitable shelter.”184 Yet it is curious that the 
structure left standing corresponds to the basic framework 
of scholastic predicational (or “categorical”) and 
transcendental (or “theological”) analogy. While 
transcendental analogy had traditionally been invoked to 
explain the relationship between our concepts of created 
substances and God, predicational analogy was used to 
explain the same with respect to accidents and created 
substances. For Descartes, however, what had traditionally 
been the field of predicational analogy is altered: he 
reduced accidents to modes of mental and physical 
substance, and since modes—as even the scholastics held—are 
not truly res, he consequently denied the conceptual and 
ontological separability of those qualities traditionally 
designated accidents.
185
 It is not clear whether Descartes 
could use the same model of analogy to explain, on the one 
hand, the relations between the meanings of “being” as it 
is predicated of both finite and infinite substances and, 
on other hand, the relation of the meanings of “being” as 
it is predicated of finite substances and their modes. 
Since modes can exist only by virtue of a real union with 
                                                          
184 1985, 104. 
185 Accidents are modes of the principal attribute (extension or 
thought), which is itself really identical with substance. Though modes 
are not res, they are not nothing (they have some ‘degree’ of reality).  
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the substance of which they are modes, one could argue that 
they have no being that is properly their own.
186
 To speak 
of the being of a given substance’s mode is, perhaps, to 
speak elliptically of the being of the substance in which 
it inheres.
187
  
 Yet Descartes did not, like Spinoza after him, 
similarly transform the relationship between creatures and 
God. Despite Rubin’s claims otherwise, he never suggests 
that the ontological and conceptual dependence of created 
substances on God resembles that of modes on created 
substances.
188
 Kenny expresses the distinction as that of 
“logical” versus causal dependence: 
 
The way in which modes depend on substance is not the 
same as that in which finite substances depend on the 
infinite substance. Modes are logically dependent on 
substance; they ‘inhere in it as subject.’ Statements 
with modes for their subjects must be translatable 
into statements with substances for their subjects, as 
statements about the Cheshire Cat’s smile must be 
                                                          
186 The ontological situation is, perhaps, a bit more complicated than 
this. Given the narrator’s assertion that “the mode of being by which a 
thing exists objectively or representatively in the intellect by way of 
an idea, imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so 
it cannot come from nothing” (CSM II, 29; AT VII, 41), it appears that 
Descartes would also need to explain the sense in which “being” could 
be predicated of ideas considered in terms of their objective 
existence.  
187 As we shall see in the next chapter, perhaps he could use an analogy 
of attribution for predicational analogy, for it does not presuppose an 
ontological resemblance between discrete entities but merely a 
definitional priority of the primary usage to a secondary one. “Being” 
is predicated of modes only by extrinsic denomination since they, 
unlike accidents, have no inherent being.  
188Woolhouse agrees: “There is no evidence that he confusedly thought 
that the dependence of created substances on God was of the same kind 
as that of modes on substances” (1993, 17). 
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translatable into statements about the Cheshire Cat. 
Created substances are not logically, but causally, 
dependent on God. They do not inhere in God as 
subject, but are effects of God as creator.
189
 
 
Since the ontological relation between creatures and God is 
causal, statements about creatures are not translatable 
into statements about God. As we stressed earlier, it is 
likely that Descartes viewed a real distinction between 
creatures and God as a necessary condition for securing 
divine perfection. Since in this sense Descartes’ account 
does not differ from the traditional scholastic position 
that creatures are really distinct from God, there is no 
obvious reason why a traditional theory of transcendental 
analogy could not apply.  
If Descartes did implicitly endorse a version of 
transcendental analogy, he could be understood to hold that 
a creaturely property can be said to exist “formally” in 
God insofar as an analogically similar correlate does.
190
 As 
he suggests in his response to Mersenne’s amplification 
                                                          
189 1968, 134. 
190 A theory of analogical resemblance may provide Descartes with a way 
to answer Spinoza’s argument for substance monism. Descartes can agree 
that, in a sense, God really does possess every attribute. Granted, he 
does not possess the creaturely imitations of these attributes, but he 
possesses all of the positive reality they do (and more). What 
differentiates creaturely attributes from God’s is not a positive 
reality but nothingness or non-being. Thus Descartes can assert that 
creatures do not share God’s attributes (since they possess only 
imperfect versions of them) but maintain that it does not follow that 
God thereby lacks some reality or perfection since there is nothing 
‘in’ these creaturely versions that cannot be found in God’s more 
perfect qualitatively distinct attributes.  
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argument, we “recognize” that certain “indefinite 
particulars of which we have an idea” are “contained 
formally in the idea of God” because we apprehend their 
analogical resemblance to the infinite (true) versions of 
these properties (CSMII 99). Beyssade, for example, seems 
to support this reading. While Descartes concludes that 
God’s simplicity precludes any univocity, Beyssade notes 
that the divine perfections “are nonetheless conceivable, 
for their relation to our own perfections precludes our 
speaking of a simple equivocity. What we have here is 
analogy in the most traditional sense.”191  
Such a reading also seems to enable us to understand 
how Descartes’ reference to “degrees” of reality and being 
could be compatible with his explicit rejection of 
univocity. Though Aristotle, as we will see in the next 
chapter, suggested that comparisons of “more and less” are 
quantitative and hence involve univocal predication, 
Aquinas detailed two other modes of comparison according to 
“more and less” that are qualitative and hence analogical 
in nature. In The Power of God, Aquinas states the 
objection that “more and less do not differentiate species” 
and hence when we say that God is better than creatures, we 
are assuming that “we can univocally predicate good of God 
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and a creature.”192 To this he responds that comparisons of 
“more and less” can also be analogical insofar as “one 
thing is shared, and another thing expressed essentially, 
as we might say that goodness is better than good” and 
“insofar as something the same belongs to one in a more 
eminent way than to another, as heat belongs to the sun in 
a more eminent way than to fire, and these two ways prevent 
the unity of a species and univocal predication. And we 
accordingly predicate something more and less of God and a 
creature [...].”193   
Thus to say that God is better (or possesses “more” 
goodness) than creatures, need not entail that God merely 
has a higher degree of a quality (goodness) that he shares 
with creatures. Similarly, for Descartes, the reality of 
things can “admit of more and less” without presupposing 
that “real” or “being” can be predicated of things 
univocally. To use Adams’ language, lesser “degrees” of 
being or reality are, in truth, approximations to being or 
reality, not lesser instances of them. Descartes’ 1641 
letter to Hyperaspitstes, which Broughton had dismissed as 
expressing merely an “abstract and contentious metaphysical 
doctrine,” emphasizes this very point: “What makes the 
infinite different from the finite is something real and 
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positive; but the limitation which makes the finite 
different from the infinite is non-being or the negation of 
being.” Created being is not being that is imperfect, but 
imperfectly being.
194
 “Being” is partially affirmed and 
partially denied as a whole of creatures insofar as they 
are said to be neither being (infinite being) nor the 
complete absence of being (nothingness), but something 
“intermediate between God and nothingness” (CSMII 38). In 
this way, the new paradox of partial negation is the old 
paradox of analogical resemblance. Only God is truly real, 
truly being—everything else can be said to be “real” or a 
“being” in some related yet qualitatively distinct way, 
i.e., analogically.   
Yet some scholars have resisted attributing a doctrine 
of analogy to Descartes. Robert Ariew notes that since 
Descartes sided with the Scotists on a number of issues, 
“it could be argued that Descartes agrees […] that the 
                                                          
194 Simon provides an eloquent description of this paradoxical notion: 
“Take the division of being into infinite and finite: to obtain the 
differentiating factor of the infinite, nothing is needed except an 
unqualified assertion of being—an assertion that is not held in check 
by any negation. But in order to obtain the differential factor of the 
finite, being has to elicit a limitation of itself. It cannot be said 
that being is indifferent to infinity and limitation as triangle is 
indifferent to the particularities of its species. Infinite being, 
never-ending being, expresses being infinitely more genuinely and 
faithfully than being limited, and circumscribed by an area of 
nonbeing. In comparison with the infinite being, things finite disclose 
mostly their kinship with nothingness. That the limitation of being is 
itself a way of being, derived from being and from nothing else, is a 
paradox indeed. But let us be aware that a similar paradox is involved, 
more or less noticeably, in every analogy of proper proportionality” 
(1999, 151) (emphasis mine). 
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concept of being may hold univocally between God and 
creatures.”195 In a note to this suggestion, however, he 
backtracks, adding that “as much as I would like to push 
Descartes into the Scotist camp on this issue […] Descartes 
officially denies univocal predication with respect to 
substance.” Other scholars have argued that Descartes must 
have embraced some form of equivocity. Jorge Secada, for 
example, argues that since Descartes never states that the 
term “substance” is applied analogically, “he must, then, 
be read as stating that it is applied equivocally to God 
and creatures.”196 Secada therefore thinks that Descartes’ 
denial of univocity is at odds with his “insistence that 
God is properly substance, while creatures are so only 
imperfectly and qualifiedly.”197 The same logic would 
suggest that Descartes thinks other attributes can be 
predicated only equivocally of creatures and God.
198
  
                                                          
195 Ariew 1999: 55.  
196 The same argument could also be used against Secada’s reading: 
because Descartes never says the term “substance” is used equivocally, 
it must therefore be used analogically. Oddly enough, Secada seems to 
think that Descartes, in denying univocity and thereby implicitly 
endorsing equivocity, “is explicitly invoking scholastic doctrine” 
(Gaukroger 2006, 77). This would be true only if we identify scholastic 
doctrine with Scotistic accounts that assume that the only alternative 
to (logical) univocity is equivocity—but this, of course, was in direct 
opposition to the prevailing Thomistic view that analogy was also 
consistent with the absence of univocity.  
197 Secada 2000, 85. Yet Secada himself notes that if Descartes did 
endorse equivocity, then it would be “directly, even if covertly, at 
odds with Suarez’s [analogical] account.” 
198 Schectman too seems to think that equivocity follows from Descartes’ 
denial of univocity. See 2011, 27-33.  
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Attributing equivocity to Descartes, however, leaves 
us saddled with the problems Adams noted: it renders 
vacuous all the “image and likeness” language; it fails to 
do justice to the distinction between God’s formal versus 
his eminent containment of creaturely properties; it cannot 
explain how apprehension of creaturely perfections would 
trigger innate concepts of divine correlates nor why 
possessing an idea of a divine perfection could enable us 
to amplify a creaturely  one; it cannot explain Descartes’ 
endorsement of partial negation, i.e.,  his claim that, in 
order to form the idea of a finite being, he need only 
“take something away” from the idea of infinite being; and 
it is inconsistent with Descartes’ explicit appeals to 
analogy in his account of divine independence. Further, the 
equivocity reading is historically unmotivated. In 
Descartes’ own day, and for centuries prior, philosophers 
and theologians had appealed to analogy to find a middle 
way between univocal and equivocal predication. Tad 
Schmaltz, who attributes a doctrine of analogy to 
Descartes, appeals to the historical context as well, 
noting that “most scholastics who denied univocal 
predication followed Thomas Aquinas in affirming an 
analogical predication of terms that apply primarily to God 
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and only derivatively to creatures.”199 With the exception 
of Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (who advocated a theory of 
univocity), the scholastic authors Descartes had studied at 
La Flèche (the Coimbrans, Toletus, and Rubius) espoused 
broadly Thomistic views.
200
 In the absence of direct 
evidence to the contrary, both the historical context and 
the coherence of his own philosophical system suggest that 
Descartes’ denials of univocity should be read as an 
endorsement of some form of analogy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
199 2000, 90. 
200 Ariew 1999, 26. 
179 
 
 
 
Ch. IV. CPP and Analogy 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief 
account of the theory of analogy as it appears in Aristotle 
and Aquinas. This will allow us, in later chapters, to 
determine what a top-down account of analogy would look 
like, to gauge the strength and weaknesses of the top-down 
account in comparison with the traditional bottom-up 
approach (especially with regard to criticisms leveled by 
advocates of univocity such as Scotus), and determine how 
analogy can invoke a primitive form of qualitative 
resemblance. Though we are not completely done discussing 
Descartes, the concern now is not Descartes as such but how 
the relationship between the perfect and imperfect within 
CPP can be analyzed in terms of analogy. This more general 
approach will enable us, in the final chapters, to assess 
the broader significance of CPP within contemporary 
philosophy of religion.  
Analogy was invoked to address a variety of problems 
in medieval and scholastic thought.
201
 Logicians sought to 
distinguish and clarify the general usage of terms, 
especially in cases such as “healthy” (above) where the 
terms appear to have related yet distinct meanings. 
                                                          
201 I am here paraphrasing Ashworth 2013.  
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Metaphysicians used analogy to explain the meanings of 
terms predicated across the Aristotelian categories (the 
transcendental terms “being” “one” “true” and “good”). They 
were concerned to show, for example, how the meaning of 
“being” predicated of substance is related to the meaning 
of “being” predicated of accidents. And theologians used 
analogy to explain how terms expressing pure perfections 
(e.g. “wise”) could be justifiably predicated of both God 
and creatures. It is this latter application of analogy 
that is of interest to us. 
 Further, in addition to terms, concepts and things 
were also described as “analogous.” This reflected a 
traditional assumption about the relationship between 
language, concepts, and reality. As James Ross explains, in 
the classical theory of analogy, “the meaning of a word was 
thought to be a concept derived by abstraction from 
perceptual experience of things (including oneself), so 
that conceptual differences, and therefore word-meaning 
differences (for example ‘sees’ applied to a ship’s lookout 
and to a bird), were thought to track the real difference 
between intelligent sight and animal perception.”202 Analogy 
among terms could thus be expressed in terms of an analogy 
among concepts that, in turn, reflect an analogy in things. 
                                                          
202 Ross 1998, 119.  
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Indeed, after the 14
th
 century, discussions of analogy 
chiefly concerned the relationships between concepts. One 
of Ross’s criticisms of the traditional theory is its 
assumption that the meanings of terms are concepts and 
hence private or subjective, and he has thus offered an 
alternative account that avoids reference to them.
203
 
However, since CPP is a theory about the relationship 
between concepts (particularly, their order of derivation 
and resemblance), we are interested in the traditional 
theory of analogy primarily to the extent that it applies 
to concepts and, to a lesser extent, the ontological 
relationship between things. The pertinent question is not 
“What does the term ‘good’ mean when applied to God” but 
“How are we conceiving of God when we describe him as 
‘good’”? While the former may indeed be a question of the 
extramental meaning of the term “good,” the latter concerns 
the concept of goodness we employ when using the term.  
The distinction between the public, extramental 
meanings of terms and the concepts we employ in using and 
understanding language will be especially relevant in our 
discussion of Aquinas’s theory of analogy. He argues that, 
even though our concepts of divine attributes are derived 
from concepts of creaturely ones, creaturely perfections 
                                                          
203 See Ross 1981. 
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nevertheless must be defined in terms of divine ones since 
creatures possess in a limited fashion the perfections that 
God possesses absolutely. The meaning of terms is to be 
cashed out not in terms of our concepts of things but in 
terms of those things themselves. “Good” is primarily used 
of God and derivatively of creatures because God possesses 
this perfection by identity and fully whereas creatures 
merely participate in it. Since Aquinas describes both the 
conceptual and the definitional order in terms of semantic 
priority, his account has led to some confusion. However, 
since the form of semantic priority that concerns us is 
that involving the derivation of concepts rather than the 
definition of terms, Aquinas’s account of semantic priority 
in terms of definitional priority will be largely 
irrelevant.  
  As the earlier example of “healthy” suggests, while 
analogy does not presuppose a theory of ontological 
resemblance, transcendental analogy does. The traditional 
problem of religious language concerns the legitimacy of 
extending terms that originally designated creaturely 
attributes to an infinite and simple being of whom we have 
no direct experience. Using these terms literally of God is 
legitimate only if there is some ontological resemblance 
between the creaturely attribute the standard use of the 
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term designates and the divine nature to which it is 
extended. When we describe urine or a diet as literally 
“healthy,” we are not claiming that there is something in 
the urine or the food that resembles those characteristics 
definitive of bodily health. Yet when we make literal 
claims about the nature of God—e.g., that God is “good” or 
“wise”—we are affirming that there is something in God that 
the creaturely qualities of goodness and wisdom originally 
designated by these terms resemble. Many theologians held 
that the status of theology as a science would be in 
jeopardy if such predications of God were not literally 
true. After all, inferences made from the nature of 
creatures to the nature of God—e.g., every being is good; 
God is a being; therefore God is good—would be invalid if 
the predicates were used equivocally. That such ascriptions 
could be literally true without presupposing the sort of 
qualitative identity required by univocal predication is 
the promise and challenge of transcendental analogy.  
 
I. Aristotle and Analogy 
Given the indebtedness of scholastic thought to 
Aristotle, it is unsurprising that the two most popular 
forms of transcendental analogy in the scholastic era—
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analogy of proportionality and analogy of attribution—can 
be found in his works.
204
 In his biology, Aristotle used the 
term “analogy” to describe the indirect comparison of 
similarities across kinds, a version of the analogy of 
proportionality. There he distinguishes similarity by 
comparative degree (differing “by the more and the less”) 
from analogical similarity. Things that differ by the more 
and the less belong to a similar species or genus and their 
features can be distinguished solely by comparatives. A 
given bird’s beak, for example, can be distinguished from 
another bird’s by citing its length or sharpness. Or, to 
use an example with which we are already familiar, an 
imperfect apple could be distinguished from a perfect one 
by citing its relative lack of sweetness or crispness.  
Yet Aristotle also wanted to be able to make 
comparisons in cases of non-generic or remote likeness, 
cases where there were no obvious morphological 
similarities. These comparisons were made by employing a 
four-part formula first developed by Presocratic thinkers 
for use in mathematics and later applied to non-
mathematical topics by Plato, roughly expressed as “A is to 
B as C is to D.” Aristotle explains that such a four-part 
formula describing a similarity of relations is called for 
                                                          
204 See Hesse 1965; Wilson 2000; White 2010, 27-72; Hochschild 2010, 4-
10. 
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when “we may have to do with animals whose parts are 
neither identical in form nor yet identical apart from 
differing by the more or the less: but they are the same 
only by analogy, as, for instance, bone is only analogous 
to fish-bone, nail to hoof, hand to claw, and scale to 
feather; for what the feather is in a bird, the scale is in 
a fish.”205 While the resemblance between feathers and 
scales is too slight to be captured in terms of 
comparatives alone, their similarity can be expressed by 
noting the relations they bare to their respective 
subjects. Just as feathers protect a bird’s body and aid in 
its characteristic locomotion (flight), so scales protect a 
fish’s body and aid in its characteristic locomotion 
(swimming).
206
  
Though transcendental analogy was occasionally 
expressed in terms of proportionality in the scholastic 
                                                          
205 Quotation from White 2010, 31. 
206 Sometimes Aristotle uses the analogy of proportionality to express 
what appears to be a direct (non-relational) similarity between two 
things. He says, for example, that both bone and fish-bone share an 
“osseous nature.”  And though he describes a proportional resemblance 
between windlessness in the air and calm in the sea, he nevertheless 
affirms they are both forms of rest. This has given some scholars the 
impression that the four-part formula identifying a relational 
similarity is but a roundabout way of identifying a direct similarity 
in nature between two things. Perhaps the Aristotelian notion of 
“function” in biology can explain why this might be so, for he 
identified the nature of a faculty with its function and the function 
with the faculty’s relation to the subject (more specifically its 
telos). If the nature of a faculty is its function and its function is 
its relation to the subject, identifying a relational similarity seems 
to be an indirect way of expressing a similarity in nature. The extent 
to which analogy of proportionality is able to express direct 
similarity is a matter of both scholastic and contemporary debate.  
186 
 
 
 
era, it was not the most popular form of analogy. Rather, 
analogy of attribution was the preferred model for 
religious language. 
207
Like proportionality, it too can be 
traced back to Aristotelian philosophy, but in this case to 
Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics. While Aristotle does 
not use the term “analogy” in these contexts, later 
thinkers would incorporate his analysis into the medieval 
and scholastic doctrine. In his metaphysics, Aristotle 
attempted to explain in what sense it was legitimate to 
apply the same terms to entities that belonged to distinct 
metaphysical categories and hence lacked any qualitative 
identity. The problem is, as we have noted, particularly 
acute in the case of “being” since he held that it cannot 
designate a genus capturing various specific ways of being. 
Aristotle’s solution is what is known as pros hen 
equivocation or “focal meaning,” a model in which a variety 
of secondary uses of a term are explained in terms of a 
single primary use.
208
 The classic example is the various 
applications of the term “healthy” and their relation to 
bodily health. He argues that “just as everything which is 
‘healthy’ has reference to health, one thing in that it 
preserves health, another in that it produces it, another 
                                                          
207 Ashworth 2013. 
208 The term “focal meaning” was coined by G.E.L. Owen. See Wilson 2000, 
116-74. 
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in that it is a symptom of health, another because it is 
capable of it,” likewise all things are said to “be” by 
reference to “one starting point”—the being of substance.209  
The characteristic feature of analogy of attribution 
is the definitional priority of the primary usage of a term 
to that of a secondary, a feature that Aquinas will 
incorporate into his own account of transcendental analogy. 
Healthy food, for example, must be defined with reference 
to that which makes a body healthy. What distinguishes 
analogy of attribution from pure equivocation is the fact 
that there is some relation between the two uses. Yet as we 
have mentioned, analogy of attribution does not presuppose 
any form of ontological likeness. Joshua P. Hochschild 
consequently calls this form of analogy “associated 
meaning,” claiming that it is “not so much a matter of how 
things are related, but of how words are used.”210 Later 
scholastics such as Cajetan, will argue that in cases of 
analogy of attribution such as “healthy,” the term is 
extended beyond its primary usage merely by “extrinsic 
denomination” since to describe urine or food as “healthy” 
is not to predicate of these things the quality the term 
designates in its primary application.
211
 To describe food 
                                                          
209 Quotation from White 2010, 73-4. 
210 2010, 2. 
211 Cajetan 1953, 15-23. 
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as “healthy” is to name it according to something that is 
extrinsic to it, i.e., a particular causal relation it 
bears to those bodily qualities we describe as “healthy.” 
If the term “healthy” were extended to food by “intrinsic 
denomination,” however, we would be affirming that there is 
something like the quality of bodily health within the food 
as such. Though scholastic thinkers will apply analogy of 
attribution to the relationship between divine and 
creaturely predicates, they will usually do so with the 
assumption that there nevertheless is also some ontological 
resemblance underscoring the usage.  
Aristotle’s account of how comparisons can be made 
across kinds has obvious significance for religious 
language. As Roger M. White observes, “With analogy, we can 
compare things that are different in kind, no matter how 
strictly we interpret the idea of “different in kind,” 
without violating the fact that they are different in kind. 
It is precisely because of this that we can find in 
Aristotle’s use of analogy an initial indication of how it 
is that, when we move beyond Aristotle, analogy seems to 
offer a way of comparing God and humanity without violating 
the infinite difference between them.” 212 Indeed, Aquinas 
will explicitly adapt Aristotle’s models of analogy to 
                                                          
212 White 2000, 51. 
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religious language. Like Descartes, he appeals to divine 
simplicity to explain why univocal predication of God and 
creatures is impossible. Unlike Descartes, however, he 
explicitly denies that divine names are purely equivocal, 
for he argues that would undermine our ability to speak 
intelligibly of God.
213
 He appeals to analogy to resolve 
this paradox.  
 
II. Aquinas and Analogy 
Though Aquinas’s treatment of transcendental analogy 
would be a model for later scholastic accounts, he never 
offered a systematic account of analogy in general.
214
 
Moreover, it is difficult to gauge the significance of many 
of his discussions of analogy, for he appeals to it to 
address a variety of philosophical and theological 
concerns. Like Aristotle, Aquinas appears to employ a 
general notion of analogy that includes cases of both 
                                                          
213 For example, In the Summa Theologiae, to the question “Is what is 
said of God and creatures univocally predicated of them?” Aquinas 
responds by saying that if the names of God and creatures were 
“completely equivocal [… ] then it would follow that from creatures 
nothing can be known of God. Thus names are predicated analogically” ( 
ST . I.13.5). 
214 As Hochschild puts it, “there is no ex professo teaching on analogy 
in Aquinas’s corpus […] the mentions of analogy are occasional and ad 
hoc. There is no dedicated treatise or section of a treatise, no 
systematically elaborated doctrine of analogy” (2010, 10). 
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intrinsic and extrinsic denomination.
215
 And though he 
prefers analogy of attribution to proportionality as a 
model for transcendental analogy in his mature works, it is 
not clear to what extent this represents a doctrinal change 
rather than a mere shift in emphasis.
216
 It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that there is a historical and ongoing 
interpretive dispute regarding Aquinas’s theory of 
analogy.
217
 For our purposes, however, the most important 
                                                          
215 Mondin, for example, notes that “Aquinas uses ‘analogy’ to mean 
direct similarity, similarity of proportions, reasoning by resemblance, 
proportionate distribution, right degree of being, metaphor, simile and 
several modes of predication” but that “for both Aquinas and  Aristotle 
analogy is first of all a logical category concerning the meaning of 
names.” 5-7. Alston too cautions that Aquinas’s logical notion of 
analogy doesn’t presuppose any form of ontological likeness: “We must 
be careful not to read Thomas on analogy in terms of some likeness or 
similarity between things. Analogically related uses of terms, or the 
things they are applied to in these uses, need not be markedly similar 
to each other. Similarity is only one of the relations that can tie 
together analogically related senses.” 152. White agrees: “Among 
mediaeval theologians ‘analogia’ became a generic term, covering all 
cases where a word was used in many different ways, but where it was 
not by chance that the same word was used” (2010, 73). 
216 He appears to favor analogy of attribution in the Summa Contra 
Gentiles and the Summa Theologiae. Ashworth (2013) suggests he 
abandoned analogy of proportionality (as advocated in De veritate) 
because “the problem of divine names arises precisely because the 
relationship of God to his properties is so radically different from 
our relation to our properties.” Montanges (2004, 74) suggests that he 
initially prefers analogy of proportionality because it does not assume 
a direct likeness between God and creatures but rather a resemblance in 
terms of their relations to their qualities and so seems to safeguard 
divine transcendence. Yet proportionality seems to preserve 
transcendence at the risk of entailing equivocity. Yet, in De Nominum 
Analogia, Cajetan argues that analogy of attribution is always 
extrinsic and hence it is the analogy of proportionality in Aquinas 
that justifies extending predicates to God. Hochschild (2010, 19-29) 
argues that it is a mistake, however, to read De Nominum Analogia as an 
interpretation of Aquinas.  
217 Topics of dispute include: the status of analogy of proportionality 
vis à vis analogy of attribution in Aquinas’s works; whether and how 
his views on analogy developed throughout his works; whether analogy 
should be understood exclusively as a matter of logic rather than 
metaphysics; and the role of judgment in analogy.  
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features of Aquinas’s treatment of transcendental analogy 
are the following: a) his appealing to Platonic principles 
of exemplarism, participation, and causal transmission to 
explain the ontological resemblance between creatures and 
God; b) his insistence that, since God possesses the 
perfection in question fully and by identity whereas 
creatures possess the perfection only by participation, a 
given term applied to God has definitional priority over 
its creaturely analogate; and c) his providing a 
paradigmatic example of a traditional bottom-up derivation 
of analogical concepts of the divine nature. 
 
A) Ontological Resemblance: 
Aquinas explicitly denies that transcendental analogy 
of attribution entails an extrinsic denomination of the 
sort suggested by examples like “healthy” or “medical.” 
Rather, he argues that it is in virtue of a real 
ontological similarity that predicates are legitimately 
extended from creatures to God. Montagnes has thus argued 
that one of Aquinas’s most important innovations with 
respect to the Aristotelian theory of analogy is his 
insistence that, between the primary and secondary 
analogates, there exists “a real community of being, and a 
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communication of being by the causality of the first 
being.”218 The analogy of attribution is for Aquinas an 
analogy of intrinsic attribution. God can be said to be 
“good” not merely because he is the cause of creaturely 
goodness, but because he and he alone is fully good—in 
fact, he is Goodness itself—and creatures are good in only 
a derivative sense.
219
 Though the fact that God is the cause 
of creaturely goodness explains why God himself must be 
good, it is this latter intrinsic feature of God rather 
than his causal relation to creatures that justifies the 
ascription.
220
 In his own analysis of Aquinas’s doctrine of 
analogy, Mondin emphasizes this point: 
 
intrinsic attribution requires a real similarity 
between analogates and that this similarity is based 
on a relation of efficient causality. For example, 
there is analogy between the Venetian painting and 
Titian, because Titian is the author of the painting. 
But efficient causality of itself alone does not 
guarantee a similarity between cause and effect…we may 
know that an omelet has been prepared by the Chinese 
Chiang, but this fact gives us no assurance that the 
omelet is Chinese. […] the possibility of analogy of 
                                                          
218 2004, 31. 
219 ST I. 13. 2. “’God is good’ therefore does not mean the same as ‘God 
is the cause of goodness’ or ‘God is not evil’; it means that what we 
call ‘goodness’ in creatures pre-exists in God in a higher way.” 
220 As Alston puts it, “in deriving the sense of the predicate in 
application to God from its sense in application to creatures we are 
exploiting the causal dependence of the prior analogate on the 
posterior one (in the order of meaning derivation), but we are doing so 
in awareness of the fact that by virtue of this causal dependence there 
is, and must be, a commonality in intrinsic form, though possessed in 
more and less perfect ways.” (157)  
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intrinsic attribution rests, then, on the validity of 
the principle of likeness between cause and effect.
221
 
 
Though indebted to Aristotle for the model of attribution, 
Aquinas frequently appeals to Platonic and Neo-Platonic 
principles of exemplarity, participation and causal 
transmission to explain the likeness between creatures and 
God.
222
 As we have discussed at length, Descartes had 
appealed to similar principles in his own discussion of the 
resemblance relation between creatures and God. All three 
principles emphasize an unequal relation of two things to a 
given perfection. While creatures perfectly imitate the 
ideas God has of them (“intellectual exemplarism”) they 
only imperfectly imitate God’s attributes (so-called 
“natural exemplarism”).223 Creatures are good, but only 
insofar as they imitate divine goodness, only insofar as 
they receive from God a limited version of that perfection 
that exists in him in an unlimited fashion.
224
 Participation 
                                                          
221 Mondin 1963, 67. 
222 Rolnick observes that “The analogy of participation turns out to be 
used more abundantly (126 times) than any other kind of analogy in the 
Thomistic corpus. Furthermore, it is employed over the entire span of 
Aquinas’ writings, with increasing emphasis in the later works. 
Participation analogies are closely linked to exemplarity analogies and 
analogies of causal proportion; indeed, in Aquinas’ later works, 
exemplarity and causal proportion seem to be subsumed in participation 
analogies” (1993, 46). 
223 See Doolan 2008, 148-152. 
224 However, Rolnick notes that for Aquinas “creaturely participation is 
not in the divine esse, but in the esse received from God, an 
affirmation which is consistent with creation ex nihilo. Allowing a 
direct participation in the divine Ipsum Esse Subsistens might generate 
a pantheistic account of creation, essentialism, or something like 
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implies a similar relation. In his Commentary on Boethius, 
Aquinas argues that “to participate is to receive as it 
were a part; and therefore when anything receives in a 
particular manner that which belongs to another in a 
universal [or total] manner, it is said to participate it.” 
Creatures are thus said to participate in the divine 
perfections to the extent that they fail to possess them in 
an unqualified manner. It is easy here to see in the case 
of exemplarism and participation a Christianized Platonism, 
the identification of God with the form of the Good in 
which every other “good” thing participates.225  
 In his more mature works, however, Aquinas tends to 
argue for resemblance by appealing to the principle that 
every agent produces something like itself. Since God is 
simple and infinite, however, Aquinas designates him an 
“equivocal” or “analogical” cause rather than a “univocal” 
cause since the perfections of his effects must fall short 
absolutely of his own: “Every effect of a univocal agent is 
adequate to the agent’s power: and no creature, being 
finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent 
which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Scotus’ assessment of being as a univocal core common to God and 
humankind. Instead, Aquinas keeps the infinite God and finite creature 
distinct while providing an account of their similarity through the 
divine being as cause of all other being.” 
225 See Quinn 1996, 19-25. 
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creature to receive a likeness to God univocally.”226 
Nevertheless, some resemblance must hold. In the Summa 
Contra Gentiles, he uses the example of the sun to 
illustrate this point: 
 
[T]he heat generated by the Sun must bear some 
likeness to the active power of the Sun, through which 
heat is caused in this sublunary world, and because of 
this effect the Sun is said to be hot, even though not 
in one and the same way. And so the Sun is said to be 
somewhat like those things in which it produces its 
effects as an efficient cause. Yet the Sun is also 
unlike all these things in so far as such effects do 
not possess heat and the like in the same way as they 
are found in the Sun. So, too, God gave things all 
their perfections and thereby is both like and unlike 
all of them.
227
 
 
The heat the sun generates in a stone must resemble, in 
some way, a property of the sun itself. Knowing the nature 
of an effect thus enables us to make inferences about the 
nature of the cause. Since God is the first cause, we can 
draw conclusions about his nature based upon the nature of 
creation. Of course, knowing that a given property is 
possessed by a creature does not alone justify the 
inference that God possesses an analogically similar 
property. Only those properties that are co-extensive with 
being (the transcendentals) and that do not entail some 
                                                          
226 Quotation taken from White 2010, 86.  
227 Ibid., 84. 
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form of imperfection (the pure perfections) can be 
predicated of God in a literal fashion.  
The general theory of CPP does not, however, 
presuppose a causal relation between the perfect and the 
imperfect. An imperfect circle’s resemblance to a perfect 
one is not explained by the former being an effect of the 
latter. Of course, when it comes to the relation between 
creatures and God, such a causal relation will obtain. 
Nevertheless, what justifies the extension of a predicate 
from the perfect to the imperfect will be some form of 
resemblance between the two. On this point, Aquinas’s 
insistence that the transcendental analogy of attribution 
is an intrinsic analogy, i.e. founded upon the ontological 
resemblance between the analogates, holds for analogy 
within CPP as well. But what is the nature of this 
ontological resemblance? Is it reducible to some form of 
qualitative identity and hence amenable to some form of 
univocal predication? The question can also be framed in 
terms of the concepts purportedly analogical predicates 
express: how can the content of one concept be similar to 
the content of another without there being some sort of 
overlap between the two?
228
  
                                                          
228 As we shall see, for Scotus these questions are separable: conceptual 
univocity is in fact compatible with ontological diversity (i.e. the 
complete absence of any qualitative identity). 
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In his own effort at rehabilitating Aquinas’s theory 
of transcendental analogy, Alston argues that, even though 
the proper meanings of analogical terms predicated of God 
and creatures are not univocal, we can generate a more 
generic meaning that encapsulates both uses by abstracting 
from the differences between the meanings.
229
 He claims that 
there is some basis in Aquinas’s theory of abstraction for 
such an account. Aquinas, for example, thinks that we can 
“form a very general concept of corporeity that abstracts 
from the difference between corruptible and incorruptible 
bodies, and hence can be predicated univocally of both.” 
Alston therefore wonders why we shouldn’t be able to “form 
a concept of willing, knowing, forgiving, or loving that 
abstracts from the differences in the ways in which these 
forms are realized in God and creatures, and hence that can 
be predicated univocally of both?”230  
Alston’s account of analogy as partial univocity may 
have merit as a theory of religious language. Such an 
account is certainly easier to understand than traditional 
analogous predication. Yet, from the perspective of the 
traditional theory, what Alston is proposing is no longer a 
doctrine of analogy. The consensus interpretation of 
scholastic accounts of transcendental analogy is that at 
                                                          
229 Alston 1993. 
230 Ibid., 175 
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both the ontological and the conceptual level the 
resemblance is primitive and hence irreducible to any form 
of qualitative identity or conceptual overlap allowing for 
univocal predication.
231
 In the case of the relationship 
between God and creatures, any sort of qualitative identity 
would seem to be a violation of divine transcendence, and 
indeed impossible given divine simplicity.
232
 Like Alston, 
other contemporary philosophers of religion in the analytic 
                                                          
231Burrell, for example, argues that “the most promising of the 
traditional statements on ‘analogy’ emphatically deny the presence of a 
single common property, for the usage they sought to explain could not 
be restricted by a ‘something common’ clause.  We need not imply that 
God and Socrates share any features when we call them both just. If we 
could find anything identifiably common, analogy would prove 
superfluous” (1973, 19). Yvres R. Simon argues that treating analogy as 
though it were analyzable in terms of some sort of overlap in meanings 
is to commit a “beginner’s” mistake: “In the beginner's understanding, 
to say that a term is not purely equivocal but analogical is the same 
as to say that, in spite of all, the meanings do have in common some 
feature, albeit a very thin one, which survives the differences and 
makes it possible for a term, whose unity is but one of analogy, to 
play the role of syllogistic term” (1960, 6). Even Alston acknowledges 
that “the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition has been committed to the 
theses that certain predications are essentially or irretrievably 
analogical, in that we are incapable of getting below the proportional 
similarity so as to specify features that are wholly in common. The 
favorite examples for this are the ‘transcendentals’, terms that apply 
across the Aristotelian categories. Thus it is frequently said that 
‘being’ is said analogically of substance, quality, quantity, 
relations, and so on. A substance and a quality each is in a way 
appropriate to its category, but there is no way of specifying a 
neutral sense of being, such that a term for that sense is univocally 
predicable of things in any category. Needless to say, this is all 
highly controversial” (1993, 153). 
232 Aquinas notes that divine simplicity also renders the subject-
predicate grammatical form (modi significandi) of creaturely 
predication inadequate for literal predication of God. I agree with 
Alston, however, that this issue is actually extraneous to the issue of 
analogy: “The inaptness of our modi significandi for theological 
application is not going to affect inferences insofar as they depend on 
the meanings of the terms employed, for the mode of signification is 
distinguished from that. Thus, to the extent that implications of 
divine knowledge or will or goodness depend on the specific content of 
those concepts, it will not matter that our grammatical forms are ill-
suited to talk about God. Any trouble here will come from differences 
in the res significata” (1993, 168). 
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tradition have criticized traditional accounts of analogy 
for assuming that such a primitive resemblance relation 
holds between analogates.
 233
 It is argued that similarity in 
meaning must either be explicated in terms of partial 
univocity or be dismissed as equivocation. The notion that 
two properties might be similar without thereby being the 
same in some respect, or that concepts of similar 
properties might not share content, is rejected more or 
less outright. For better or worse, however, this is 
precisely the sort of resemblance that intrinsic analogies 
assume.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
233 “Among analytic philosophers, the standard objections to the 
Thomistic theory of analogy are generally variations on a theme, 
clustered around a rejection of the notion of intrinsically analogous 
concepts. Similarity in meaning, it is argued, requires at least 
partial sameness in meaning and hence an element of univocity in the 
terms we use to describe both God and human beings. As such, there can 
be no intrinsically analogical terms; any proposed examples of such 
terms can always be analyzed in such a way that their meaning is partly 
univocal and partly equivocal, so that the appearance of irreducible 
analogy is eliminated. Thus, the analytic philosopher proposes a 
dilemma for the Thomist: either the terms used of God and of creatures 
are at least partly univocal, so that there is enough commonality of 
meaning to constitute them as related in meaning, or they are not, in 
which case they share no common meaning and are thus purely equivocal” 
(Duncan 2006, 72). Interpreting analogy as a form of partial univocity 
is not unique to so-called “analytic” philosophers. For example, the 
philosopher of religion, Ronald Nash, has argued that, in Aquinas’ 
thought, “the very thing that keeps an analogy from being equivocation 
is the presence of some univocal element. […] If someone says that a 
bird’s nest is analogous to a beehive, there must be something that the 
nest and the hive have in common” (1999, 178-9). 
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B) Definitional Priority of the Primary Analogate 
We have noted that in extrinsic analogy of 
attribution, the term as it is applied to the primary 
analogate has definitional priority to the term as it is 
applied to the secondary. We cannot provide a proper 
account of what “healthy” predicated of food means without 
including in its definition the meaning of “healthy” 
predicated of the body. Food is “healthy” insofar as it is 
a contributing cause of the condition constitutive of 
bodily health. Does a similar definitional priority apply 
to transcendental analogy of attribution as well? Certainly 
the definition of divine goodness need not make any 
reference to creaturely goodness, for God is not designated 
“good” merely because he is the paradigm for or cause of 
creaturely goodness.  
Yet Aquinas nevertheless insists that there is a 
definitional priority in transcendental analogy of 
attribution. Theological reflection leads us to conclude 
that we must define creaturely goodness in terms of that 
goodness in which it participates. As Mondin puts it “the 
primary analogate possesses [the perfection] essentially, 
absolutely, and therefore by identity and not by 
participation. Only the secondary analogate is not 
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identical with the analogous perfection but has a limited 
degree of it and is, therefore, said to participate in 
it.”234 In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas argues that this 
unequal relation of creatures and God to a given perfection 
means that, from an ontological perspective, it is the term 
as it is used of creatures that is the “extended or 
analogical use”: 
 
Whenever a word is used analogically of many things, 
it is used because of some order or relation to some 
central thing. In order to explain an extended or 
analogical use of a word it is necessary to mention 
this central thing. The primary application of the 
word is to the central thing that has to be understood 
first; other applications will be more or less 
secondary in so far as they approximate to this use. 
[…] When we say He is good or wise we do not simply 
mean that he causes wisdom or goodness, but that he 
possesss these perfections transcendently. We 
conclude, therefore, that from the point of view of 
what the word means it is used primarily of God and 
derivatively of creatures, for what the word means—the 
perfection it signifies—flows from God to the 
creature.
235
 
 
Since human goodness and wisdom is merely a likeness of 
divine goodness and wisdom, the divine qualities are the 
primary senses of “good” and wise.”  
As we suggested in the introduction, Aquinas’s account 
of semantic-cum-definitional priority ought to be 
understand as a claim regarding the analogy of terms rather 
                                                          
2341963, 65. 
235 Quotation from White 2010, 89. Emphasis mine.  
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than the analogy of concepts. Though Aquinas holds that 
analogical concepts of divine qualities are derived from 
concepts of creaturely ones, he does not believe that we 
ought to define divine “goodness” or “wisdom” in terms of 
creaturely “goodness” or “wisdom.” Rather, given the 
ontological fact that creaturely qualities are mere 
participations of divine ones, he thinks we ought to define 
the latter in terms of the former. Consider the example of 
a fake duck discussed earlier. A child’s only familiarity 
with ducks might be with decoys. As far as the child knows, 
the primary sense of “duck” applies to these decoys. Yet 
when the child learns what a real duck is, he understands 
that the term “duck” is used only derivatively of the 
decoys. He learns that a decoy can be said to be a “duck” 
only insofar as it is an imitation of one, and that one 
cannot understand the derivative sense in which the decoy 
is a duck unless one understands the standard sense of 
“duck.” Likewise, “good” and “wise” may initially appear to 
apply primarily to creatures since our initial concepts of 
goodness and wisdom are derived from experience of them. 
Yet when we come to understand (however inadequately) the 
supereminent version of these qualities within God, we may 
then view the creaturely qualities as imperfect instances 
of the real thing. Consequently, we may define terms 
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designating these creaturely qualities in terms of the 
divine qualities they imitate.  
A similar train of thought has appealed to 
contemporary thinkers. Charles Hartshorne, for example, 
notes that there is a sense in which the divine meanings of 
terms can have priority over their creaturely applications, 
even though our concepts of God are derived from concepts 
of creatures (in this case concepts of our own cognitive 
abilities): 
 
I have […] sometimes argued that, unless we have in 
our own natures instantiation of concepts (say that of 
decision-making) which we use to conceive God, we 
could not have these concepts [of God]. But I have 
also sometimes argued that we can conceive our own 
form of knowing, say, by introducing qualifications 
into what we know of divine cognition. God knows—
period; we—partially, uncertainly, vaguely; and much 
of what we can hardly avoid taking as knowledge is 
erroneous belief. The appearance of contradiction here 
has sometimes occurred to me.
236
 
 
Aquinas, as we have seen, seems to go even further, arguing 
that since the terms designating divine perfections have 
definitional priority over their application to creatures, 
there is a sense in which terms predicated of God have a 
semantic priority to their application to creatures. 
Lyttkens, as well as other commentators, have taken this 
claim to be a consequence of Aquinas’s Platonic and 
                                                          
236 Quotation from Dombrowski 1996, 162. 
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Neoplatonic influences. Roger White agrees, and argues 
further that Aquinas’s insistence on the semantic priority 
of the divine predicates over creaturely ones is his “most 
important contribution to the theory of religious 
language.”237 White argues that if we give semantic priority 
to terms as they are used of creatures, we thereby run the 
anthropomorphic risk of measuring God according to the 
human. He notes that Aquinas portrays the image-model 
relation as asymmetric, for “just as we do not say that man 
is like his image, although the image is rightly said to be 
like him” so we cannot say that God is like a creature.238 
If we use terms designating pure perfections and 
transcendentals as if they designated God’s nature 
primarily and only secondarily and imperfectly the 
attributes of creatures, we can avoid the anthropomorphic 
tendency to understand God in terms of creatures. 
Nevertheless, this definitional priority provides only 
a superficial barrier to anthropomorphism. Though we may 
define creaturely attributes in terms of divine attributes, 
Aquinas’s account suggests that we conceive of God via 
concepts derived from our experience with creatures. 
Indeed, White provides an interesting, though ultimately 
mistaken, account of how this definitional priority is 
                                                          
237 2010, 98. 
238 SCG I.29.139. Quoted from White 99.  
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reflected in Plato’s account of reflection in the Phaedo. 
Understanding how Aquinas’s account diverges from the 
Platonic one will help us to distinguish definitional 
priority from the issue of concept-derivation. Noting that 
Aquinas must respond to the commonsense objection that our 
initial acquaintance is with creaturely attributes and that 
the meanings of terms such as “good” or “wise” are, for us, 
in initially creaturely in nature, White suggests that 
Aquinas could appeal to Plato’s account of geometrical 
notions in the Phaedo in support of this notion of 
semantic-cum-definitional priority. “Plato’s basic point,” 
he says, is that geometrical terms such as “equal in 
length” are never “perfectly exemplified in experience” but 
describe “an ideal, or standard, to which empirical 
phenomena approach to a greater or lesser extent.” 
Nevertheless, when  
 
we first learn the meanings of these geometrical 
terms, we inevitably start with their empirical 
employment, talking of square buildings or round 
cushions. But part of what we learn, when we learn to 
apply those words empirically, is that we can make 
sense of the idea that to a greater or lesser extent 
they fall short of perfect squareness or roundness, 
and that what we mean in calling things square or 
round is that they approximate to an ideal of 
squareness or roundness. Even though it is only by 
subsequent reflection on our everyday practice of 
classifying everyday objects as square and round that 
we arrive at the geometer’s conception of squareness 
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and roundness, it is the geometer’s conception that 
explains our everyday practice and not vice versa.
239
  
 
The same relation holds for predicates applied first to 
creatures and only subsequently to God, for this “is no 
barrier to saying that the primary application of such 
words is to God, as setting the standard by which all 
earthly goodnesses, wisdoms and justices are to be measured 
and judged.”240 White fails, however, to recognize that this 
example from Plato indicates an epistemological priority 
that is absent in Aquinas’s account. The standard reading 
of Platonic recollection holds that our initial use of 
geometrical terms –“talking of square buildings or round 
cushions” –is guided by a prior awareness of the ideal 
standards to which these empirical objects approximate. For 
Plato, the geometer’s concepts “explain[ ] our everyday 
practice” in the robust sense that an implicit awareness of 
them informs our everyday judgments or classifications; 
subsequent reflection on this activity is a way of making 
explicit what had hitherto been a latent yet cognitively 
active item of knowledge. We had noted that Descartes and 
Cudworth provide a similar account: prior to an explicit 
awareness of the imperfection of sensed triangles in 
comparison to the perfection of the geometer’s notion, we 
                                                          
239 2010, 89-90. 
240 Ibid., 90. 
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unknowingly draw on an innate idea of a perfect triangle in 
our everyday classifications. 
But this cannot be the sense in which concepts 
“explain” our practices in White’s example, for there we 
can be said to possess the geometer’s concept only after 
reflection on our everyday practices. As an empiricist, 
Aquinas would not agree that our initial capacity to 
recognize creaturely instances of goodness is guided by a 
concept of ideal (divine) goodness. Rather, our ability to 
classify various creatures as “good” is to be explained 
solely by an abstracted notion of creaturely goodness, and 
it is by manipulating this notion that we arrive, for the 
first time, at a concept of divine goodness. After all, if 
we did not really possess concepts of creaturely goodness 
or wisdom in this manner, how could we arrive at concepts 
of divine goodness or wisdom by manipulating these original 
notions? It is perhaps true that, once we have reached a 
concept of divine goodness by modifying a creaturely one, 
we may, as it were, ‘return’ to the creaturely concept and 
modify it in light of our concept of the divine; we may, in 
other words, recognize creaturely goodness as being merely 
an imitation or imperfect example of its divine correlate. 
Thus there might be a sense in which we can provide a 
proper definition of creaturely goodness only after we have 
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compared it to its divine case. Nevertheless, the meaning 
of “good” as it is predicated of God is obtained by 
manipulating a prior notion of creaturely goodness. 
 
C) Direction of Analogical Derivation 
What distinguishes traditional accounts of analogy 
such as Aquinas’s from that required by CPP is thus the 
fundamental direction of the analogical derivation of 
concepts. Aquinas, along with most scholastic thinkers, 
held that our concepts of divine perfections are 
constructed out of our concepts of creaturely ones. This is 
what Adams had called the “bottom-up” approach to divine 
predicate formation. Even if God’s perfections are 
definitionally prior to our own, our initial notions of 
goodness, for example, originate in our experience of 
instances of creaturely goodness. For Aquinas, the meaning 
of a word is a concept of the thing the word signifies. In 
order to extend “good” in a literal fashion to God, we need 
to possess a concept of divine goodness. We do this, 
according to Aquinas, by modifying our concept of 
creaturely goodness. “When we say that God is good […] the 
meaning is, Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-
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exists in God, and in a more excellent and higher way.”241 
The concept of divine goodness thus produced is not the 
same as the notion of creaturely goodness. Rather, it is 
the notion of a goodness existing in “a more excellent and 
higher way,” and is thus only analogous to the creaturely 
concept.  
Aquinas does not, however, believe that we can possess 
any quidditative knowledge of God (i.e. knowledge of God’s 
nature). As is suggested by the vague intensifier “more 
excellent and higher,” the concept of divine goodness is 
not adequate to the reality to which it refers in the way 
our concept of creaturely goodness is.
242
 As Wippel puts it, 
“this name, like any other we may apply to him, leaves the 
thing signified as something which we do not comprehend and 
something which surpasses any meaning we may give to the 
                                                          
241 ST 1.13.3 
242 Some interpreters have suggested that analogy in Aquinas must be 
understood in terms of a special role of the act of judgment. These 
interpreters will allow that the concepts we employ in speaking of God 
are inherently creaturely. What makes our language about God analogical 
rather than univocal, however, is not the nature of the concept of the 
divine we employ prior to judgment but a concept produced through the 
act of judgment itself. Rocca, for example, allows that “Aquinas does 
not hesitate to assert that the names we employ in divine predication 
are known to us only insofar as they are used of creatures. For some, 
such a claim would immediately raise the specter of cryptic univocity: 
for if the meanings are inherently creaturely, then are we not simply 
saying something creaturely of God whenever we predicate of God names 
taken from creatures? How could a divine name really mean anything 
different when predicated of God? […] Aquinas’ path around the obstacle 
of univocity is to recognize a judgment that both uses and produces 
concepts, all the while transcending them” (2004, 192). I do not, 
however, understand in what sense an act of judgment could either 
“produce” or “transcend” concepts.  
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name.”243 Since this admittedly imperfect knowledge of God 
is derived from knowledge of creatures, however, Aquinas 
suggests that the meaning of terms designating creaturely 
attributes have a semantic priority over terms designating 
divine ones: “Since we arrive at the knowledge of God 
through things other than God, the reality referred to by 
the names predicated of God and other things exists by 
priority in God according to his own mode, but the meaning 
of the name belongs to God by posteriority, and thus God is 
said to be named from His effects.”244  
This claim (from the Summa Contra Gentiles) that the 
creaturely meanings of terms have semantic priority by 
virtue of their epistemological priority seems to be in 
direct conflict with the earlier quotation (from the later 
Summa Theologiae) in which Aquinas asserts that the divine 
predicates have semantic priority by virtue of their 
definitional priority. While White suggests that the later 
(Summa Theologiae) account represents a development of 
Aquinas’s views, other interpreters have suggested that 
Aquinas is somewhat confused on this point.
 245
  Lyttkens 
                                                          
243 2000, 567. 
244 SCG 1.34.298 
245 Lyttkens argues that the ambiguity of semantic priority in Aquinas is 
a product of his effort to reconcile discordant elements of his system. 
From the philosophical perspective, says Lyttkens, Aquinas give 
semantic priority to terms used of creatures when he is “thinking 
logically,” whereas he gives semantic priority to the terms used of God 
when he is “thinking ontologically” (1952, 369). From a historical 
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describes the confusion as follows: “The difficulty is that 
we are apparently moving in a circle. The concept is first 
stated analogously of God, who must be named from creation 
because we do not know what He is per se, and afterwards 
used to designate a likeness in creation to the divine. But 
if, logically, the concept is the first time characterized 
by its import in creation, and then stated of creation as a 
designation from God, the same is apparently stated of the 
same.”246 The problem can be expressed in terms of the value 
the definitional priority of divine predicates are 
purported to have. Though we may define creaturely goodness 
in terms of divine goodness, we cannot understand what 
divine goodness is except by reference to the only form of 
goodness we have experienced—creaturely goodness.  
 In any case, the meanings of terms as they are 
applied to creatures are semantically prior to their 
meanings as they are applied to God in the sense that the 
latter are derived from the former. The kind of semantic 
priority identified with definitional priority is a 
secondary and relatively superficial sort when compared to 
this initial order of derivation. There is nothing ‘in’ the 
meaning of the divine sense of a term that is not obtained 
                                                                                                                                                                             
perspective, the ambiguity can be attributed to his attempting to do 
justice to both Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of epistemology and 
ontology. 
246 1952, 368. 
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by modifying the original creaturely sense. Responding to 
the paradoxical passages like the one above that suggest 
that the meanings of divine terms are definitionally prior 
to creaturely ones, Alston argues that, “be that as it may, 
I am concerned here, as Aquinas is primarily concerned in 
these discussions, with semantic order, with what meanings 
are derivative from what others, with what meanings have to 
be explained in terms of what others. And on that point he 
is quite clear that the application to creatures is 
semantically prior.”247 Even if a proper definition of 
“good” as it is applied to creatures requires us to make 
reference to the divine goodness of which it is merely a 
likeness, this definitional priority is to be distinguished 
from the more basic semantic priority of, as Alston puts 
it, “what meanings are derived from what others.” It is 
this more basic semantic priority, rooted in the 
epistemological order, that distinguishes the geometrical 
example in the Phaedo from Aquinas’s account. For Aquinas, 
there is no getting around the fact that we conceive of God 
in terms of concepts that are derived from experience with 
creatures.  
Gyula Klima too takes the derivation of concepts of 
the divine attributes from concepts of creaturely ones to 
                                                          
247 1993, 160. 
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constitute a defining feature of Aquinas’s account of 
analogical derivation. In fact, he distinguishes Aquinas’s 
account from the sort of ‘top-down’ account of analogical 
derivation required by CPP. He begins by noting that “since 
according to Aquinas we gain our primary concept of being 
from created substances, we need to understand divine being 
by analogically ‘stretching’ our mundane concept.”248 Thus 
even though “the primary significate of the term “being” in 
the ontological order has to be divine being […] this is 
cognized by us only secondarily, on the basis of a primary 
concept we first acquire from creaturely being.” Klima 
adds, however, that 
 
if we gained our primary concept of being directly 
from God, that is, if the primum cognitum of our minds 
were divine being, and not created being in general, 
then we could understand created being directly as a 
sort of diminished being, delimited and specified by 
the limited nature it realizes, and then the cognitive 
order would match the ontological order. However, 
since our mind is first confronted with the being of 
created substances, it has to arrive at the cognition 
of divine being in this more circuitous way, at least 
in accordance with Aquinas's doctrine.
249
 
 
Here Klima is comparing Aquinas’s account to the top-down 
account of analogy required by CPP, a form of analogy that 
(contra White) adheres more faithfully to the Platonic 
tradition. This sort of analogy is “top-down” in the strong 
                                                          
248 2012, 384-5. 
249 Ibid., 385. 
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sense that concepts of certain creaturely attributes are 
obtained, not from experience, but by limiting or 
diminishing concepts of divine attributes, concepts that 
are not the product of modifying concepts of creaturely 
ones. Terms designating pure perfections and 
transcendentals are said primarily of God and secondarily 
of creatures not merely because the divine terms are 
ontologically and hence definitionally prior, but because 
our concepts of the creaturely versions of these attributes 
are derived from prior concepts of the divine attributes.
250
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
250 As we indicated in the second chapter, Descartes would not deny 
Aquinas’ claim that the way in which we represent to ourselves God’s 
goodness, or any of his other perfections, is by ‘stretching’ (i.e., 
amplifying) our concepts of creaturely perfections. However, he would 
argue that in so doing we are guided by an innate understanding of 
these (qualitatively distinct) divine perfections.  
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Ch. V. Analogy and Abstraction by Confusion 
The theory of CPP claims that we apprehend certain 
creaturely attributes as absolutely imperfect, i.e., 
falling short of the kind definitive of the perfect. 
Additionally, the theory assumes that the imperfect is 
apprehended as being in some sense like the perfect. Even 
though creaturely goodness, for example, is grasped as 
failing to be an instance of genuine goodness, it is 
nevertheless viewed as resembling or imitating it and hence 
worthy of the designation “goodness.” In chapter III we 
introduced various ways of making sense of this relation 
and argued that Descartes, in his own version of CPP, may 
have been appealing to a theory of analogical resemblance. 
In the last chapter, we noted that the traditional theory 
of analogy treated resemblance as primitive in the sense 
that it cannot be explained by or reduced to any form of 
univocity. For many contemporary and historical critics of 
analogy, however, similarity in meaning presupposes partial 
sameness in meaning and qualitative resemblance presupposes 
qualitative identity. Hence, the “irreducible resemblance” 
of meanings of purportedly analogical terms can always be 
shown to rest on a latent partial univocity, and the 
primitive likeness of things can be reduced to some form of 
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qualitative identity. In this chapter, we will attempt to 
dispel some of the mystery surrounding the notion of 
primitive resemblance by exploring traditional scholastic 
accounts of how such resemblance can be cognized and by 
drawing parallels to more modern accounts of concept 
formation in cases of inexact similarity. 
 
I. Abstraction by Confusion 
The traditional theory of transcendental analogy 
invokes a resemblance or unity at both an ontological and a 
conceptual level. A single term used in different contexts 
is taken to signify, via concepts that resemble one another 
without sharing content, things that resemble one another 
without sharing a common nature or form.  That the 
foundation of similarity between two things, or two 
concepts, could in some way be inextricably bound up with 
the foundation of their difference is indeed a paradox. 
Yet, as Yves R. Simon has observed, “the understanding of 
analogy begins when we realize that between likeness and 
difference there is, in analogy, such a link, such an 
essential relation of interdependence that if the 
differential is removed, the like is removed also and 
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nothing is left.”251 The scholastic critics of the 
traditional theory often attempted to undermine the notion 
of a primitive metaphysical resemblance by rejecting the 
unity of analogical concepts and therefore “denying the 
logical possibility of analogy.”252 The great scholastic 
critic of analogy, Duns Scotus, argued that only univocal 
concepts possess a unity of meaning such that they 1) can 
be employed as the middle term of a valid syllogism and 2) 
cannot be affirmed and denied of the same thing without 
contradiction.
253
 Though Aristotle and Aquinas had assumed 
that analogical concepts could be used in reasoning without 
committing the fallacy of equivocation, they had never 
explained precisely how this could be done. 
Later scholastic advocates of analogy therefore 
attempted to show how analogical concepts could possess 
sufficient unity (or resemblance) to be employed in valid 
reasoning, a resemblance that was taken to reflect a 
primitive analogical resemblance of things. Oftentimes this 
was framed as a matter of identifying a single analogical 
concept capable of representing imperfectly or confusedly 
each of the analogous natures. This sort of solution, in 
                                                          
251 1955, 7. 
252 Hochschild 2010, 139. 
253 Hochschild observes that even though Scotus’ criticism concerns the 
logical nature of analogy, his “logical assumptions are just an attempt 
to shore up his denial of the metaphysical category of proportional 
unity” (2010, 39). 
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fact, can be traced back to the account of analogy at which 
Scotus’ critique was primarily aimed—that of Henry of 
Ghent’s. Though Ghent held that our analogous concepts of 
divine and creaturely being cannot be said to overlap in 
any way (indeed, as simple, they cannot), he nevertheless 
suggested that, due to their primitive similarity, we tend 
to confuse the two notions in thought, producing a single 
concept of the two analogous natures.
254
 Later scholastics 
attempted to respond to Scotus’ criticism and open up a 
logical space for analogy by supplying a formal analysis of 
such abstraction by confusion. Cajetan, who favored a model 
of analogy of proportionality, argued that the natures of 
analogous things are proportionally similar such that the 
concepts of each bear a proportional similarity to one 
another.
255
 The proportional similarity of these concepts 
enables us to form a single concept that represents each of 
the analogous natures, a concept that can be employed in 
syllogistic reasoning. Yet since analogous natures are 
                                                          
2541998b, 302-3. 
255 Even though analogy of proportionality is usually taken to express a 
resemblance of relations (A:B::C:D), for Cajetan, the analogy signifies 
not a relation but the “foundation of a relation.” Here we see, as we 
did with Aristotle, how the four-part scheme of proportionality can be 
a roundabout way of describing a direct proportion between two things. 
Though Cajetan deviates from Aquinas in explicitly rejecting analogy of 
attribution, he accepts the bottom-up account of analogical concept 
derivation: “[W]hen men rose to a knowledge of the divine nature and 
saw the proportional similitude between us insofar as we are wise and 
God, they extended the name wisdom to signify in God that to which our 
wisdom is proportional” (1953, 73). 
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similar without possessing anything in common, this concept 
is neither a generic one derived by abstracting something 
they share, nor a notion of a mere arbitrary collection.
 256
   
Cajetan argues that while proportional natures are 
each represented by their own “perfect” concept, each 
perfect concept can represent other proportional natures 
confusedly or “imperfectly.”257 Given two perfect concepts 
of proportional natures, we can form a sort of quasi-
abstraction whereby we apprehend a single concept 
representing both natures imperfectly.
 258
  This is not the 
abstraction of something common to each proportional 
                                                          
256 Cajetan: “Things which give rise to univocation are similar to one 
another in the sense that the foundation of similitude in one has 
exactly the same nature as the foundation of similitude in the other. 
Thus the notion of one contains in itself nothing which the notion of 
the other does not contain. In this way, the foundation of univocal 
similitude in both extremes abstracts equally from the extremes 
themselves. On the other hand, things which give rise to analogy are 
similar in the sense that the foundation of similitude in one is 
absolutely different in nature from the foundation of similitude in the 
other. Thus the notion of one thing does not contain in itself what the 
notion of the other contains. For this reason the foundation of 
analogous similitude in either of the extremes is not to be abstracted 
from the extremes themselves but the foundations of similitude remain 
distinct, although they are similar according to proportion, and 
because of this they are said to be the same proportionally or 
analogically” (1953, 30-1). 
257 So, Cajetan argues that “every concept of a creature is a concept of 
God, just as every creature is a kind of likeness of God” 1953, 80. 
258 Hochschild notes an interesting ambiguity here: “[I]s what we call 
the imperfect concept another concept in addition to the distinct 
perfect concepts? Or is what we call the imperfect concept really just 
(any) one of the (many) perfect concepts, considered insofar as it 
imperfectly represents the other analogates of which it is not a 
perfect concept?” He suggests that there is evidence for both, but 
argues that “the two alternatives may not be so different: the many 
imperfect concepts implied by the latter alternative—each a perfect 
concept of a distinct analogate, imperfectly representing other 
analogates—may be regarded as proportionally one imperfect concept—
insofar as they all represent all analogtes imperfectly—as implied by 
the former alternative” (2010, 147-8). 
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nature, says Hochschild, but “a kind of abstraction by 
confusion: the diverse proper analogues are considered as 
similar, and their diversity is ignored or ‘confused.’ What 
is confused (blurred, or made indistinct) is the 
distinction between the proportionally similar rationes, so 
that what is considered is their proportional 
similarity.”259 Even though there is not some commonly 
abstractable ratio (i.e., concept), abstraction by 
confusion successfully yields a single concept because 
proportional similarity is a genuine form of similarity. 
While the foundation of univocal predication is shared 
conceptual content reflecting a qualitative identity, the 
foundation of analogy is the proportional similarity of 
such content reflecting the proportional similarity of 
forms or natures. Thus an analogous term can signify these 
analogous natures insofar as they are similar. And just as 
the process of abstraction by confusion is not a matter of 
isolating a common element, so the reverse process 
(contraction) is not the addition of a differentia to a 
generic notion, for what distinguishes one analogous nature 
from another must already be “contained” in the imperfect 
concept. Rather, a concept imperfectly representing a 
plurality of analogates is rendered a perfect concept of a 
                                                          
259 Ibid., 149. 
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given analogate by uncovering or rendering explicit their 
primitive diversity.
260
  
Cajetan holds that his account can justify inferences 
employing proportionally similar concepts. When the 
different concepts are regarded according to what makes 
them distinct (i.e. as perfect representations of their 
respective natures), he notes that employing them in 
reasoning would indeed “lead to the error of 
equivocation.”261 But if we regard the concepts according to 
their unity (i.e. via an abstraction by confusion) he 
claims that then “one does not commit any fault, because 
whatever belongs to one belongs also to the other 
proportionally, and whatever is denied of the one is also 
denied of the other proportionally. The reason is that 
whatever pertains to a similar object as such pertains also 
to that to which it is similar, proportionality of course 
being always duly observed.” Cajetan provides the following 
example of such an inference: “Every simple perfection is 
                                                          
260 John of St. Thomas notes that since standard abstraction proceeds by 
way of adding “something extraneous […i.e.,] something of which the 
abstracted concept cannot be predicated,” standard contraction occurs 
by adding something extraneous to the abstracted concept. In analogy, 
however, contraction proceeds not by “the addition of anything 
extraneous but needs merely something of which the abstracted concept 
can be predicated.” So, for example,  “in order that ‘being’ be 
contracted to ‘substance’ or ‘accident’ or ‘living’ or ‘body,’ it needs 
something which also is being, and of which being is predicated and 
which, consequently, is not extraneous to being. Such contraction is 
not effected by addition” (Simon 1955, 173). 
261 1953, 69. 
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in God; Wisdom is a simple perfection; Therefore, [wisdom 
is in God].”262 The fallacy of equivocation is avoided, he 
says, because “the word wisdom in the minor does not stand 
for this or that notion of wisdom, but for wisdom which is 
proportionally one, i.e. for both notions of wisdom, not 
taken in conjunction nor in disjunction, but insofar as 
they are undivided proportionally, insofar as one is the 
other proportionally, and insofar as both constitute a 
notion which is proportionally one.” Nor can the confused 
concept of wisdom be affirmed and denied of the same thing 
without contradiction. Though one can say God is both wise 
and not wise when employing concepts perfectly representing 
divine wisdom (the former) and perfectly representing 
creaturely wisdom (the latter), one cannot do so when 
employing an imperfect concept of wisdom in both uses.
263
  
 
II. Modal Distinction vs. Abstraction by Confusion 
It may seem, however, that this account of abstraction 
by confusion is itself unclear. Can we possess a concept 
representing the analogical unity of two things without 
                                                          
262 Ibid., 71. 
263 Responding to Scotus’ definition of a univocal concept in terms of 
the principle of contradiction, Cajetan argues that “if identity which 
is sufficient for contradiction is made the definition of univocation, 
then it is clear that, by stating that being is analogous and unified 
merely by proportion, one will fulfill the definition of univocation” 
(1953, 72). 
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thereby isolating an element of qualitative identity? And 
if the concept is not produced by isolating a shared 
feature, what distinguishes this concept from that of an 
unrelated or arbitrary collection?
264
 The kind of example 
that best expresses the intuitive plausibility of 
abstraction by confusion is, somewhat ironically, the very 
kind favored by Scotus in his own account of univocity: 
scalar properties like color that are taken to vary 
primitively in intensity or strength. Scotus had wanted to 
show how univocal predication of creatures and God could be 
consistent with the fact that, unlike most natures 
admitting of univocal predication, they don’t share in any 
reality and hence the natures and proper concepts of each 
are in fact only analogous to one another. Since the proper 
concepts of God and creatures are not distinguished from 
one another by differentiae added to a genus, we cannot 
form a generic concept common to God and creatures. 
Nevertheless, he argues that if the proper concepts are 
distinguished as concepts of different determinates (or 
intrinsic modes) of a determinable magnitude, we can form a 
common univocal concept by conceiving of this magnitude 
without determining it to a given mode. This univocal 
                                                          
264 Yves R. Simon asks the same question. Since we cannot isolate a 
feature shared by analogous items, he notes that “it is reasonable to 
ask whether the unity of an analogical set is anything else than that 
of a collection” (1960, 8). 
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concept can be only an imperfect representation of the 
creaturely and divine realities since the magnitude exists 
in each only as contracted to a given mode.  
Scotus derived this so-called “modal distinction” from 
the scholastic theory of the intension and remission of 
forms.
265
 Previous thinkers had attempted to explain how 
certain accidental qualities could undergo changes in 
magnitude without altering the species of the form itself. 
Though a piece of paper might become less intensely white 
with age, because whiteness is a quality admitting of 
remission, the underlying form of whiteness remains the 
same. This reasoning could also explain univocal 
predication in such cases; though one piece of paper might 
be more intensely white than another, we can predicate 
“white” univocally of both. Scotus suggests that a similar 
sort of univocity is possible in cases of predicating 
attributes to God and creatures. He suggests that the idea 
of infinite being is related to the idea of being in the 
way that the notion of intense white is related to the idea 
of white in general. Different degrees of white do not 
represent different species, for the color white is the 
sort of nature that varies primitively in degree. Thus 
 
                                                          
265 Dumont 1998b, 317-8. 
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when I say “infinite Being,” I do not have a concept 
composed accidentally, as it were, of a subject and 
its attribute. What I do have is a concept of what is 
essentially one, namely of a subject with a certain 
grade of perfection-infinity. It is like “intense 
whiteness,” which is not a notion that is accidentally 
composed, such as “visible whiteness” would be, for 
the intensity is an intrinsic grade of whiteness 
itself.
266
  
 
Even though white can exist only as contracted to a given 
degree of intensity, we can nevertheless form a univocal 
concept of it. We do this not by abstracting white from its 
intrinsic degree (which is impossible), but by regarding 
the reality in an imperfect manner.  The same follows for 
the idea of being and the other pure perfections and 
transcendentals. Even though being exists only as 
contracted to a given degree, we can nevertheless form a 
univocal concept of it. The univocal concept is not the 
idea of a reality (e.g. being) distinct from infinite or 
finite being, but is simply an imperfect representation of 
being as it exists according to its intrinsic modes.
267
 
 One might suspect, at this point, that the dispute 
between Scotus and Cajetan is merely a verbal one. In fact, 
                                                          
266 Scotus 1962, 27. 
267 As Dumont describes it: “some particular instance of white existing 
at the tenth grade of intensity can be conceived perfectly, and then it 
is known according to the degree of perfection with which it is 
actually found. That same instance of white can be conceived 
imperfectly, and then only the nature of ‘whiteness’ as such, apart 
from the real condition of its grade of intensity, is known. The former 
is a proper concept of whiteness in some determinate grade, the latter 
a concept common to the various instances of white differing in 
degrees.” (1998 319) 
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the late scholastic John of St. Thomas, who endorses 
Cajetan’s position, characterizes the unity of the 
imperfect analogical concept as a sort of modal 
distinction, according to the “way of having a form, for 
each analogate has its form not in the same way, but 
proportionally.” 268 The key question in clarifying the 
distinction between Scotus’ account and abstraction by 
confusion is this: what is the difference between 1) an 
imperfect univocal concept obtained by prescinding from the 
intrinsic modes of various natures and 2) an imperfect 
analogical concept obtained by confusing or ignoring the 
diversity of various natures. St. Thomas goes into some 
detail in describing abstraction by confusion. Whereas 
standard abstraction proceeds by changing the content of 
what is conceived (i.e., by excluding any contracting 
differentiae) abstraction by confusion consists in changing 
how the content is apprehended, and thus unlike the 
standard abstracted concept, it includes contracting 
features in act rather than in potency (as a standard 
abstracted univocal concept does). To illustrate how this 
is done, he provides the example of viewing a collection of 
similar things from a distance: 
 
                                                          
268 Simon 1955, 171. Emphasis mine. St. Thomas also interprets Aquinas as 
holding that “being is not contracted by addition but by modes” 174. 
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[W]hen, from a great distance, I see a thousand men or 
a hill of sand, I do not discern the individual {men 
or grains of sand}, I see the whole multitude in one 
vision. The individuals are many and they terminate 
one act of vision as if they were one thing, yet you 
cannot say that in such apprehensions the many are 
attained only in potency: they are attained in act, 
though confusedly. This is how the confused concept of 
being is related to all its analogates: it represents 
immediately all things under the confusion of ‘having 
existence,’ and the only thing that it tells 
explicitly is ‘having existence.’269 
 
He goes on to explain that a confused concept is like an 
equivocal one in the sense that it “requires the actual 
plurality of the things that are taken confusedly, as 
happens when I perceive a multitude.”270 However, whereas an 
equivocal concept signifies “several as several, that is, 
as having nothing in common,” the analogous concept “which 
attains several things confusedly unites those things 
through that confusion itself and the only thing that it 
expresses in explicit fashion is the unity of those several 
things: again, this unity is not one of isolation, but of 
confusion.”271 
St. Thomas alleges that the Scotistic account of 
transcendental univocity is ultimately inconsistent. If, as 
Scotus claims, being is contracted by intrinsic modes 
rather than differentiae, then this either a) implies that 
                                                          
269 Ibid., 179.  
270 Ibid., 180. 
271 Ibid., 179. 
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“the concept of being cannot be perfectly separated from 
the modes which contract it [and thereby] vindicates our 
own theory” or b) means that “being abstracts perfectly 
from its modes” which would render the modes differentiae 
and being a genus.
272
 According to St. Thomas, the Scotists 
mistakenly assume that if a concept does not explicitly 
represent its inferiors (i.e, the entities falling under 
it) in act, it therefore does not include its inferiors in 
act. Rather, the example of seeing a multitude as unified 
is intended to show that what is not represented in act 
explicitly many nevertheless be included implicitly.
273
 Just 
as we can say that the diversity of the individuals is seen 
yet “confused” within the perceiver’s perspective, so the 
diversity of individual analogical natures can be included 
within a concept even though it is their unity that is 
expressed explicitly.  
                                                          
272 Simon 1955, 198-9. 
273 James F. Anderson, who endorses the sort of abstraction by confusion 
proposed by Cajetan and St. Thomas, explains that “the intrinsically 
analogous and formally ontological concept that characterizes Analogy 
of Proper Proportionality does not prescind from its instances so as to 
remain ‘in potency’ to them, as does the univocal sort of notion. 
Because of this the latter is limitable by the addition of some 
extrinsic differential factor. ‘Living organism,’ for example, is 
conceptually univocal with respect to all its species, including its 
dividing differences only ‘potentially,’ thus being divisible 
extrinsically by them. I.e., it is because such terms are univocally 
conceivable, when one prescinds form their various kinds, that the 
items responsible for their specific differentiation ‘lie outside’ 
their definitive natures. (Every cow is a living organism, but not 
every living organism is a cow. On the other hand, since all non-
univocal objects –and of these ‘being’ is the principal one-really 
embrace their ‘differences,’ they cannot in truth simply exclude them 
even conceptually)” (1967, 58). 
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Part of the force of Scotus’ argument is the 
assumption, shared by both advocates and opponents of 
abstraction by confusion, that the sort of change accounted 
for by the theory of remission and intensification of forms 
allowed for univocal predication. 
274
 Yet if we jettison the 
metaphysical assumption of a common form, we can see how 
our ability to produce a common concept of a color might be 
best explained by a process like abstraction by confusion. 
In his own attempt to explain the intuition underlying 
Scotus’ claims for univocity, Richard Cross uses the 
example of different shades of blue: 
 
I take it that we can talk of a word's having two (or 
more) similar senses only if there is something in 
common between the two senses. But the senses can have 
something in common only if the attributes signified 
by the terms themselves have something in common. The 
attributes, presumably, include some more basic 
property that they have in common. If they did not, it 
would be difficult to see how we could claim that they 
were similar (rather than wholly different). For 
example, we could not claim that light blue and dark 
blue were similar colors unless they both had a 
feature in common—in this case blueness—in virtue of 
which they could be said to be similar to each other. 
Now, we can presumably find, or invent, a term to 
signify any common basic attribute. And this term will 
                                                          
274 It should also be noted that some scholastics denied that a single 
form could undergo change in (for example) intensity; rather, they held 
that when a given color became less intense, this was due to the fact 
that the original form was replaced by another. This issue is, however, 
distinct from the question of whether univocity is preserved, for even 
if there is a numerically different form in cases of such qualitative 
change, it does not follow that the same kind of quality (e.g. 
whiteness;) is no longer present when, for example, a sheet of paper 
becomes less intensely white. 
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be univocal: it will be used in the same sense in all 
statements.
275
 
 
The underlying assumption at work here is that similarity 
must be explained in terms of the possession of a common 
feature.
276
 Though Scotus denied that God and creatures 
possess something in common in the sense allowing for 
standard abstraction, Cross argues that Scotus does seem to 
assume that some sort of ontological commonality 
constitutes their analogical resemblance and makes possible 
univocal predication. 
277
 Unfortunately, Scotus never 
explicitly addresses this issue. In fact, Dumont has shown 
that Scotus’ fourteenth century followers were themselves 
divided on the topic. While Scotists such as Antonius 
Andreas and Peter Thomae felt that there must nevertheless 
be some real community underlying the univocal concept of 
being, he explains that others, such as Peter of Navarre 
and Peter of Aquila, held that “the univocal concept of 
                                                          
275 Cross 1999, 33. 
276 Or as Burrell puts it in his own analysis of Scotus: “if the same 
word names (or signifies) different things, then it must do so by a 
feature they hold in common” (1965, 651). 
277 Cross thinks that Scotus’ account is intelligible only if it assumes 
that some sort of real commonality underlies univocal predication. 
Though God and creatures are really diverse, Cross explains that “this 
does not, according to Scotus, exclude all commonality. He notes that 
the idea (ratio) of a simple transcendental attribute (i.e., the 
attribute considered without its intrinsic modes) is common ‘as a 
transcendental is.’ The account is not very explanatory, since Scotus 
offers no further account of what it is for a transcendental to be 
common. But it is clear that Scotus does not want to deny all 
commonality. (If he did, of course, his own univocity theory could not 
be sustained)” (1999, 39). 
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being results purely from an indifference in the mode of 
conception.”278  
Neither option appears to be fully consistent with 
Scotus’ account. 279 Andreas argued that if the common 
concept of being does not correspond to “something common 
in reality serving as its foundation,” then this would 
violate Scotus’ stated aim that metaphysics constitute a 
“science of reality.”280 On the other hand, if Andreas is 
right that there is a “real unity” underlying univocal 
predication of creatures and God, then this would seem to 
threaten their real diversity and hence God’s transcendence 
and simplicity. The advocates for abstraction by confusion, 
however, would claim that both disputants are laboring 
under the false assumption that the only kind of 
ontological unity capable of grounding conceptual unity is 
a unity of commonality. As Hochschild argues, the Scotists 
have overlooked the possibility that this conceptual unity 
could be explained by invoking a form of analogical 
similarity irreducible to any sort of commonality.
281
 
                                                          
278 1992, 144. Unlike Andreas, Thomae holds that the real community does 
not lie outside the soul, but in “intentional or conceptual being […] a 
type of middle existence between a being of reason and an actually 
existing being in reality” (145). 
279 I am not here considering Thomae’s account since I don’t fully 
understand it.  
280 Dumont 1992, 142. 
281 “[T]he Scotist simply refuses to recognize something that is, in 
fact, real: proportional sameness, analogical unity. Although Scotus 
argues against the analogy of ’being’ by denying the logical 
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Indeed, if we look at Cross’s example of the two 
shades of blue more closely, we see that both Scotistic 
options prove difficult to defend. What is the common 
feature that explains their similarity? It cannot be 
explained by their sharing a common color in addition to 
their own particular shades, for each just is the color it 
is and no other. To explain their similarity by reference 
to their both being instances of the color blue is to beg 
the question, for the fact that we can truly predicate 
“blue” of both is what needs to be explained. And even if 
we could isolate a common property, what would distinguish 
the sort of predication it underwrites from standard 
univocal predication? On the other hand, if the univocity 
of the concept blue is not given any foundation in the 
colors themselves, there seems to be no explanation for why 
these two colors are represented by it while a third, say a 
shade of orange, is not. This concern is similar to the one 
Andreas raised regarding being. Just as there must be 
something in reality that secures the truth of the claim 
                                                                                                                                                                             
possibility of analogy, we can see based on these considerations that 
in fact Scotus’ logical assumptions are just an attempt to shore up his 
denial of the metaphysical category of proportional unity; that is why 
he must define univocation in terms of its capacity to serve as the 
basis for contradictory statements and so to preserve inferences from 
the fallacy of equivocation. While plausible enough at first sight, 
this is a radical innovation; but Scotus could do it only because he 
refused to countenance the reality of proportional unity” (2010, 139). 
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that both creatures and God are beings, so something must 
ground the truth of the claim that both shades are blue.  
 
III. Modern Accounts of Resemblance 
The difficulty of explaining why a given thing 
satisfies or falls under a given concept has been discussed 
in modern philosophy in the context of the problem of 
universals. Though it is comparatively easy to use 
universals to explain the extension of concepts in cases of 
exact resemblance, the problem is more difficult in cases 
of inexact resemblance. In his own analysis of resemblance, 
H.H. Price considers the example of various white objects—
snow, chalk, paper, an unwashed tie—each of which exhibits 
a different degree of whiteness. Though they certainly 
resemble each other in terms of their color, he asks 
whether we can maintain that the same color (whiteness) 
really recurs in each. Since it instead appears that each 
object is characterized by a different color (and hence a 
different universal), “the resemblance seems to be ultimate 
and underivative, not dependent on the presence of a single 
universal in all these objects.” 282 The unity of the class 
of white objects, it would then appear, is constituted not 
                                                          
282 1996, 17. 
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by qualitative identity but by a primitive (“ultimate and 
underivative”) form of resemblance. The concept “white” 
would accordingly apply to a given range of objects because 
there is a sufficient likeness between them with respect to 
their color, not because they possess a color in common. 
Hume made a similar claim in his Treatise regarding 
comparisons between simple ideas, arguing that resemblance 
is compatible with simplicity: 
 
It is evident, that even different simple ideas may 
have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is 
it necessary, that the point or circumstance of 
resemblance should be distinct or separable form that 
in which they differ. Blue and green are different 
simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue or 
scarlet; though their perfect simplicity excludes all 
possibility of separation or distinction. It is the 
same with particular sounds, and tastes, and smells. 
These admit of infinite resemblance upon the general 
appearance and comparison, without having any common 
circumstance the same. (1.1.7.7, emphasis mine) 
 
There is little doubt that we possess concepts of whiteness 
or blueness in general, and that such concepts can be 
employed in reasoning without producing an equivocation. 
Nevertheless, philosophers have found ways of explaining 
the unity of classes and the extension of such concepts 
without assuming a form of resemblance irreducible to 
identity.  
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 The realist about universals could insist that the 
extension of the concept white is to be explained by a 
shared property, so long as we make a distinction similar 
to the modal one employed by Scotus—a distinction between 
determinate and determinable properties. A determinate 
property can be described as a specific way of having a 
determinable one. So, for example, lime-green and forest-
green could be characterized as determinates of the 
determinable property green. The resemblance in color of a 
lime-green object and a forest-green one could thus be 
explained in terms of the existence of the same 
determinable characteristic (green) in both objects. 
Crucially, the determinate/determinable relation differs 
from the species/genus relation insofar as the former is 
always non-conjunctive; that is, the determinate’s relation 
to its determinable is not analyzable as the product of 
adding a contracting third property (as the species ‘man’ 
is created by adding the differentia ‘rational’ to the 
genus ‘animal’).283 Rather, the determinate “marks-off” a 
“space” within the determinable without the assistance of a 
logically independent differentiating property.
284
 In this 
                                                          
283 Rosenberg 2009, 210.  
284 See Searle 1959: “in order for some property to be a genuine 
differentia of a species within a genus, it must be logically possible 
that entities outside the genus could have that property, i.e., the 
differentia must be logically independent of the genus. For example, 
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sense, the determinate/determinable relation appears to 
capture the paradoxical feature of analogical resemblance, 
namely, that similarity and difference spring from the same 
source.  
Other realists about universals agree that resemblance 
must always be reducible to some form of identity, but 
reject the existence of determinable properties. D. M. 
Armstrong argues that there is no property being red 
corresponding to the predicate “red” since all universals 
must be determinate. That this must be so, he thinks, 
follows from the principle that nothing can agree and 
differ in the same respect. If redness is a property in all 
red particulars, then the same respect—their redness—will 
be the foundation of both their sameness and their 
difference. Yet since “it is impossible that things be 
identical and different in the very same respect [and it 
is] undeniable that different shades of red are different 
properties […] it follows that redness is not a property 
                                                                                                                                                                             
even if humans are in fact the only rational things it is at least 
logically possible that calculating machines, spirits, etc., could show 
signs of rationality. But it is not logically possible that things 
without shape could have all points on their surface equidistant from a 
common centre. […] In short, a species is a conjunction of two 
logically independent properties-the genus and the differentia. But a 
determinate is not a conjunction of its determinable and some other 
property independent of the determinable. A determinate is, so to 
speak, an area marked off within a determinable without outside help” 
(143). 
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common to all red things.”285 Armstong argues instead that 
the predicate “red” designates not the determinable 
property being red but a class of resembling shades. He 
claims that this resemblance is ultimately to be cashed out 
in terms of partial identity. Though properties like color 
seem to lack complexity, he argues that just because we do 
not recognize the partial identity underlying a given 
instance of resemblance, it does not follow that that 
resemblance is not actually constituted by partial 
identity. In support of this claim, he cites Thomas Reid’s 
example that we can and do recognize the resemblance of two 
faces even if we can’t specify those respects in which they 
are, in fact, identical.
286
  
If we use abstraction by confusion to explain the 
extension of the concept white, however, the unity of the 
class falling under the concept (e.g., the brilliant white 
of fresh snow, the off-white of a dirty collar) will not be 
                                                          
285 1978, 117. A related problem arises when a defender of determinable 
properties asserts that resembling shades of a color do not appear to 
share a quality because determinables are abstract universals and hence 
unobservable. Panayat Buchvarov counters that it is “nonsensical” to 
claim that while two resembling properties are observable, the 
determinable constituting their resemblance is not (1966, 146). Given 
the unique logical relationship between determinates and determinables, 
if the common quality instantiated is unobservable, so must be the 
instances themselves.  
286 He takes Reid’s example to show that either our awareness of a 
respect of resemblance is 1) “vague and […] perhaps cannot be put into 
words”; 2) “unconscious”; or 3) “even if both inarticulate and 
unconscious awareness of a respect is lacking, it might yet be the case 
that the resemblance which we were aware of was in fact resemblance in 
a certain respect” (98). 
238 
 
 
 
attributed to either an identity of determinable properties 
or to a latent partial identity of the determinate ones. 
Nor does it follow, however, that the class of white things 
is a mere arbitrary collection, the unity of which lacks 
any foundation in reality. Rather, abstraction by confusion 
assumes that the unity of the class flows from a primitive, 
irreducible resemblance between the properties themselves. 
In this way, abstraction by confusion treats cases of 
inexact resemblance in the same way contemporary theories 
such as trope nominalism do, for they both take similarity 
between distinct attributes to be an unanalyzable feature 
of the world.
287
  Analogical resemblance could be said to 
represent a third option, lying between identity and 
difference. If two simple properties are not qualitatively 
identical, it does not follow that they are qualitatively 
diverse, for they could still be analogically similar. 
Because they are similar, they can be conceived either with 
respect to their diversity (their failing to be 
qualitatively identical) or with respect to their unity 
(their failing to be wholly diverse). This latter operation 
is abstraction by confusion. Because the items in the class 
are not identical in color, the term “white” does not refer 
                                                          
287 However, abstraction by confusion could be consistent with a mixed-
account in which universals are employed to explain exact but not 
inexact resemblance.  
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to a universal; yet since the properties are not completely 
diverse, the term represents something more than a mere 
arbitrary collection. As St. Thomas would put it, “white” 
would signify “not an aggregate of all its inferiors but 
their kinship in an analogical notion.”288  
 It is at least possible that the classes of concepts 
of scalar properties such as color are unified through a 
primitive form of resemblance, and that the concepts of 
these properties are produced by something like abstraction 
by confusion. Perhaps, however, the realists are right and 
these and other instances of inexact resemblance can always 
be attributed to some sort of identity. Such an analysis, 
however, will not work for explaining the resemblance 
relationship between creaturely and divine attributes 
without substantially altering the traditional theistic 
notion of God.
289
 Whereas the ontological simplicity of 
colors and other scalar properties is assumed (rightly or 
wrongly) on the basis of their phenomenal simplicity, 
divine simplicity is taken to follow from divine 
perfection. And, even if divine simplicity is denied, 
qualitative identity (however slight) between creaturely 
and divine attributes is traditionally held to be 
                                                          
288 Simon 1955, 97. 
289 Or without altering our notions of ourselves, though these are 
usually not subject to dispute.  
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inconsistent with divine transcendence. This is not to deny 
that there might be other reasons, and good ones, for 
questioning the traditional doctrines of divine simplicity 
and divine transcendence. It is, however, a mistake to 
argue that we must either assume some form of qualitative 
identity and deny the traditional theistic concept of God 
or embrace equivocity and its consequent agnosticism.
290
 On 
the contrary, we can affirm both that 1) there is a 
qualitative distinction between creaturely and divine 
attributes and 2) creation is an image and likeness of God, 
so long as we assume that their resemblance is analogical 
and hence irreducible to any form of qualitative identity. 
291
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
290 According to CPP, this would be agnosticism regarding creatures.  
291 This issue is distinct from the question as to whether the 
traditional conception of God is consistent with univocal predication. 
Scotus, as we have mentioned, affirmed that God and creatures are truly 
diverse and yet they can nevertheless be conceived univocally.  
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Ch. VI. Top-down Analogy 
The goal of this chapter is to understand how analogous 
concepts of creaturely pure perfections could be derived 
from concepts of divine ones. To this end, we will first 
address one of Scotus’ critiques of bottom-up derivation. 
Though Scotus took his argument to apply to all doctrines 
of analogy, we will argue that it can actually be taken to 
support top-down analogical derivation. In the next 
section, we will attempt to show how Descartes’ explicit 
application of analogy to the notion of divine self-
causation can be understood in terms of a top-down 
derivation. Finally, we will end the chapter with a few 
examples of transcendental top-down derivation suggested by 
Hartshorne and Descartes.  
 
I. Top-down Analogy and the Traditional Problem of 
Religious Language 
 
The problem of religious language is traditionally 
framed in terms of the adequacy of creaturely concepts. If 
the language we use to speak of God’s nature is 
intelligible only in light of concepts derived from 
experience with creatures, it is feared that any effort to 
describe God’s nature will entail anthropomorphism—i.e., 
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the illegitimate attribution of creaturely attributes to 
God. One solution to this problem was to abandon any 
pretense of being able to conceive of God in terms of 
positive attributes. Instead, the tradition of negative 
theology maintained that we can at most conceive of God in 
terms of what he is not. There are at least two problems 
with this sort of solution. First, it seems to violate our 
own intuitions about the perfection of God; a God who 
cannot be conceived as good or wise no longer seems to be 
worthy of worship. Second, negative theology undermines the 
scientific aspirations of theology, specifically our 
ability to make inferences about God based upon the nature 
of his effects. Transcendental analogy was introduced to 
solve this dilemma. We can obtain analogous concepts 
adequate to the nature of God by “stretching” certain 
concepts derived from our experience with creatures. God is 
good, but good in a higher or more perfect way that is only 
analogous to creaturely goodness.  
CPP, however, turns the problem of religious language 
on its head. The problem is not how we might conceive of 
God in terms of concepts derived from our experience with 
creatures, but instead that of conceiving of creatures in 
terms of concepts derived from concepts of God. This is not 
the issue of how we might define creatures in light of 
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notions of God derived from our experience with creatures. 
Rather, this issue concerns the more radical proposal of 
Descartes, Leibniz and others that we might, perhaps 
unknowingly, conceive of creaturely pure perfections and 
transcendental attributes via concepts of these attributes 
in God.
292
 If the concepts are unchanged, the risk is not 
anthropomorphism but what Hartshorne has termed 
“deimorphism”—the illegitimate attribution of divine 
attributes to creatures. Alternatively, if the attributes 
of God are deemed too perfect or otherwise unsuitable for 
creatures, the consequence is (to use another term from 
Hartshorne) a “negative anthropology”—the conceiving of 
creatures either in terms of their lacking various positive 
properties of God, or merely by extrinsic denomination as 
effects of God.
293
 
In our analysis of Descartes, we observed that 
deimorphism may characterize some of our pre-philosophical 
                                                          
292 Ronald Nash briefly proposes such an account as a solution to what he 
sees as the anthropomorphic consequences of Aquinas’s theory of 
analogy, which he thinks is analyzable as a form of partial univocity. 
“Anthropomorphism is avoided when the person explaining our knowledge 
of God is not an empiricist. Thomas’s explanation founders because of 
his insistence that human concepts are derived from sensory experience. 
But if empiricism is rejected, if one holds instead that humans possess 
a priori knowledge given to them by God, we have an explanation of how 
the univocal knowledge about God that grounds analogical knowledge is 
possible” (1999, 179).  
293 So, for example, creatures would be said to be “good” not because of 
any intrinsic feature they possess but because they are effects of that 
which is intrinsically good (God). This sort of anthropology is 
negative in the sense that it does not propose to say anything about 
the positive (intrinsic) nature of creatures.  
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understanding of creatures. Just as we may initially judge 
and classify what are really imperfect triangles as 
(perfect) triangles, we may also unknowingly apprehend 
creaturely goodness, for example, as an instance of genuine 
(perfect) goodness. It is only when we become aware that 
the creaturely instances of goodness fall short of true 
goodness that we can be said to possess a notion of 
imperfect (creaturely) goodness. Deimorphism in this way 
resembles the naïve anthropomorphism that is often said to 
characterize an individual’s understanding of God prior to 
theological reflection.  
A similar parallel can be found between negative 
theology, which typically arises through theological 
reflection, and negative anthropology. Indeed, Simon has 
observed a tendency towards negative anthropology in the 
history of religious thought. He claims that “many 
metaphysicians and religious thinkers are driven, more or 
less consciously and consistently, by the tendency to 
believe that being, goodness and the other absolute 
perfections belong to God in such an exclusive fashion that 
they can never be predicated of a creature in an intrinsic 
way.”294 As we noted, Hartshorne provides a contemporary 
version of this tendency, observing “a strange sense in 
                                                          
294 1960, 11. 
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which the analogical concepts apply literally to deity, and 
analogically to creatures.”295 Citing the example of the 
perfection of knowledge, he suggests that “It is indeed a 
curious thing to see how much need there is, not so much of 
a negative theology as of a ‘negative anthropology.’ We say 
we know—ah, but do we? We guess, on more or less reasonable 
grounds, but do we literally know? If “know” means to have 
conclusive evidence, then when do we literally attain 
knowledge?”296 Interestingly, for Hartshorne negative 
anthropology is not merely a matter of how we might define 
creaturely perfections, but a consequence of the fact that 
our concept of a given human perfection may be, as he puts 
it, “a derivative concept, produced by drastically 
restricting the idea arising from our intuition of 
deity.”297 On this score, he ties his account directly to 
the Cartesian doctrine that our ideas of our own 
perfections are (partial) negations of an innate notion of 
God: 
 
I really believe that we know what “knowledge” is 
partly by knowing God, and that though it is true that 
we form the idea of divine knowledge by analogical 
extension from our experience of human knowledge, this 
is not the whole truth, the other side of the matter 
being that we form our idea of human knowledge by 
                                                          
295 1962, 141. 
2961970, 155. 
297 Ibid., 156. 
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exploiting the intuition (called by Descartes, ‘innate 
idea’, and as such not really disproved, except in a 
strawman version, by Locke) which we have of God. To 
‘know’ ought to mean, having conclusive evidence, such 
as God has, shutting off the very possibility of 
error; but to apply this idea to man we must tone it 
down drastically indeed.
298
  
 
Yet if negative anthropology does justice to our intuition 
of divine infinity, it seems to do so at the cost of 
violating our sense of the reality and goodness of the 
world. Hartshorne, for example, questions whether we “honor 
deity by denying to ourselves and the creatures generally 
even the most modest analogon to the divine attributes.”299 
Similarly, Simon argues that if we take seriously the claim 
that only God is good and real, “the created world 
disappears into a vacuum.” Yet he claims that this is a 
viewpoint that cannot be maintained for long, “since any 
such experience as that of pain or love or duty causes us 
again to touch the universe of finite perfection […] All 
mystics proclaim that God is He who is, and that I am the 
one who is not; but these mystical expressions of God's 
infinity and of the creature's wretchedness are balanced by 
equally mystical expressions of a sense for what is real 
                                                          
298 Ibid., 155. 
299 1962, 147, 
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and great in this most wretched of all creatures, 
myself.”300 
A negative anthropology is not, however, an inevitable 
consequence of CPP. Though we apprehend creatures in light 
of that which is truly good and real (God), we need not 
thereby conceive of them solely in terms of what they lack. 
Just as transcendental analogy has been employed to explain 
the bottom-up construction of concepts of positive divine 
perfections from concepts of creaturely ones, thereby 
avoiding the threat of negative theology, so it can be used 
to explain how concepts of creaturely positive perfections 
can be drawn from concepts of God. As Descartes had 
suggested, while only God is truly being, it does not 
follow that creation is equivalent to non-being; rather, 
creatures are apprehended as somehow falling between being 
and non-being. His claim that we arrive at a notion of 
“diminished being” by partially negating an innate notion 
of infinite being could thus be read as a description of 
the diminishing operation of a top-down analogical 
derivation. Hartshorne too points towards such a solution: 
“An all too negative theology made God the great emptiness, 
and an all too negative anthropology made the creatures 
also empty. I suggest that nothing is only nothing, that 
                                                          
300 1960, 11. 
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the divine attributes are positive, and the creatures’ 
qualities are between these and nothing.”301 
 
II. Scotus’ Critique of Bottom-up Derivation  
In the previous chapter, we explained how multiple 
simple concepts that adequately represent analogous natures 
can, by virtue of their primitive resemblance, be treated 
as a single concept that imperfectly (or confusedly) 
represents both natures. Our ability to form a single 
concept of a general color (e.g. whiteness) on the basis of 
our simple concepts of various resembling shades was used 
to illustrate this process. When applied to the case of 
God, however, abstraction by confusion presupposes that we 
already possess proper concepts (i.e., concepts 
representing the natures) of both creatures and God from 
which we form the confused concept representing their 
analogical resemblance. What is left unexplained is how we 
obtained a proper notion of God in the first place. In his 
analysis of Scotus’ critique of analogy, Wolter emphasizes 
this problem: “Where do we get this notion which applies 
properly to God and is only analogous to the concept we 
apply to creatures? Where do we get the notion of being, 
                                                          
301 1962, 147. 
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for instance, as absolutely indetermined and hence 
implicitly including the mode of infinity and therefore 
proper to God? Once we have it, the theory of analogy 
follows logically enough. But analogical knowledge is 
always a relative and comparative knowledge.”302  According 
to Scotus, there are only two ways we could obtain (by 
natural means) proper concepts of God: by abstracting them 
from sensation or by a process of rational inference on the 
basis of proper concepts of creatures. Though we can 
abstract concepts of creaturely attributes from sense 
experience, Scotus argues that there is no way such 
experience could provide us with a proper, simple concept 
of God: 
 
No object will produce a simple and proper concept of 
itself and a simple and proper concept of another 
object, unless it contains this second object 
essentially or virtually. No created object, however, 
contains the “Uncreated” essentially or virtually […] 
For it is contrary to the very notion of what is 
essentially secondary to include virtually what is 
prior to it. It is also obvious that the created does 
not contain, as part of its essence, something that is 
not merely common, but is exclusively proper to the 
“Uncreated”; Therefore, it produces no simple and 
proper concept of the “Uncreated” at all.303  
 
                                                          
302 1946, 41. 
303 Scotus 1962, 23. Wolter provides the following illustration of 
virtual containment: “A baseball, for instance, could produce a simple 
proper notion of itself as a sphere and also a simple proper notion of 
a circle, for the notion of circularity is virtually contained in the 
notion of sphericity. But it could not give rise to a simple notion of 
triangle or pentagon” (1946, 51).  
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Scotus is not here making the broad claim that we can never 
derive the simple concept of a thing from knowledge of that 
which is merely analogous to it. Rather, he is claiming 
that, given the fact that creaturely perfections fall short 
absolutely of God’s, there is nothing ‘in’ creatures the 
abstraction of which will provide us with a simple concept 
of a divine attribute. Hence the only way we can form a 
proper concept of God is by a process of rational inference 
from our proper concepts of creatures. According to Scotus, 
however, this entails that 1) we must be able to derive a 
univocal concept from our proper concept of creatures as a 
‘bridge’ to form a proper concept of God and 2) the proper 
concept of God will not be utterly simple but a composite 
of this univocal bridging notion and the particular mode or 
grade of perfection unique to God (infinity).  
In their analyses of analogy, both Mondin and Lyttkens 
concede Scotus’ point about the unavailability of a proper 
concept of God for analogy by abstraction.
304
 Yet they 
observe that advocates of both intrinsic analogy of 
attribution and analogy of proportionality have often 
maintained that if we possess a proper concept of the 
                                                          
304 Mondin: “Since we do not have a direct knowledge of both primary and 
secondary analogates we cannot proceed to form a concept which 
represents vaguely both of them, by disregarding the different ways in 
which the analogous perfection is realized by them” (81). See also 
Lyttkens 1953, 360-5. 
251 
 
 
 
primary analogate (the creature), then, owing to the 
analogical similarity between the creature and God, we can 
use this concept as an imperfect representation of the 
secondary analogate (God) of whom we have no direct 
knowledge. Mondin suggests that while the procedure of 
abstraction by confusion discussed in the previous chapter 
is a form of “incomplete abstraction,” this latter process 
is “a sort of vague intuition: in some way we intuit in the 
perfectly known analogate the other analogates.” Aquinas’s 
account of how we extend the term “good” from creatures to 
God—“When we say that God is good […] the meaning is, 
Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God, 
and in a more excellent and higher way”—could perhaps be 
interpreted as just such a procedure: when we use the term 
“good” to describe God we are using the creaturely concept 
to imperfectly represent the goodness of God.
305
  
There are a few problems with such analogy by 
intuition, however. First, it does not seem that this 
maneuver produces a concept capable of meeting Scotus’s 
logical criteria of univocity. Either we employ the concept 
                                                          
305 It should be noted, however, that the imprecision of this concept is 
not the same kind characterizing the imperfection of a concept derived 
from abstraction by confusion. In the latter, the proper concepts of 
the analogates are included actually yet implicitly within the confused 
concept, and we can attend to proper concepts of these analogates by 
uncovering this latent diversity. We could not, however, derive a 
proper concept of God’s goodness from the creaturely concept that is 
regarded as an imperfect representation of this goodness, for it wasn’t 
‘within’ the concept to begin with.  
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as a perfect representation of the creaturely analogate or 
we use it as an imperfect representation of the divine 
analogate—since we can’t regard the concept in two 
different ways at the same time, there doesn’t seem to be 
any way of representing both analogates at the same time.
306
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the knowledge 
produced by such analogy is disappointingly thin. On the 
basis of a concept of creaturely goodness we can conceive 
of God as being in some way good, but we cannot be said to 
possess a concept of the qualitatively unique property that 
is divine goodness. We may use terms such as “perfect” 
“supreme” “highest” or “infinite” to characterize God’s 
goodness, but these terms must be empty apart from 
signifying only that the goodness in question is greater in 
some qualitatively distinct yet unknown way. If we want 
these concepts to have a more robust positive significance, 
it seems that our only option is to accept Scotus’ position 
that they can be added to a univocal notion of goodness to 
specify the mode in which that goodness is realized.  
Alston has criticized Aquinas’ account of analogy on 
just this point. For Aquinas, he says, “the perfection 
signified is not fully specified; instead we simply 
                                                          
306 In other words, the claim is that since what differentiates the 
concept of a creaturely property from that of its analogous divine one 
is the manner in which we regard the concept, there doesn’t seem to be 
any way to represent the unity of these properties.  
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indicate that it is a higher form of a creaturely 
perfection but without being able to say just what the 
higher form is.”307 This is a problem, he thinks, because it 
leaves the truth conditions of the predication unknown. If 
we cannot specify the respects in which the divine and 
creaturely versions of the perfections are similar and 
different, then we cannot infer facts about the divine 
nature by considering creation. This problem, says Alston, 
“strikes at the heart of Thomistic theology, for at many 
crucial points it depends on taking principles (assumed to 
be) true of human so-and-so’s to be true of divine so-and-
so’s.”308 By yielding only indeterminate concepts of the 
divine attributes, the bottom-up approach to transcendental 
analogy undermines the scientific aspirations of 
theology.
309
  
                                                          
307 1993, 170. 
308 Ibid., 173. 
309 Alston provides the following example: “The whole argument for the 
central thesis that the perfections of all things are in God hangs on 
the principle that whatever the cause bestows on the effect preexists 
in the cause, a principle that is drawn from reflection on causal 
relations in the created order. Thomas would, presumably, reply that 
the ways in which divine perfections surpass their created counterparts 
are not such as to invalidate the applications of these principles to 
the divine case. But how, on his own principles, can he know this, or 
even be reasonably assured of it? By his own admission he is in no 
position to spell out the respects of similarity and dissimilarity 
between divine and human causal agency, willing, and so on. Therefore, 
how can he be assured that the dissimilarities are not such as to 
undermine the application of principles arrived at by a consideration 
of the creaturely analogues?” (1993, 173). 
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Advocates of the bottom-up approach to transcendental 
analogy therefore face a dilemma: either the derivation 
produces only an indeterminate (vague) concept of the 
divine analogue, or it produces a determinate (proper) 
concept in violation of the ontological difference between 
divine and creaturely attributes. While the former option 
appears to deprive religious language of much of its 
presumed significance, the latter amounts to pulling a 
rabbit out of a hat. Yet a top-down approach to 
transcendental analogy can avoid this dilemma. Descartes, 
as you may recall, shared Scotus’ skepticism regarding our 
ability to derive proper notions of divine attributes from 
analogous concepts of creaturely ones. He had argued that 
if we did not possess an innate idea of the divine 
attribute to begin with, any process that begins with a 
concept of a creaturely attribute can produce at best a 
notion of a divine attribute differing merely by degree. 
Unlike Scotus, however, Descartes explicitly disavows any 
form of univocity; and unlike many advocates for analogy, 
he did not abandon the position that we possess determinate 
(proper) concepts of God’s nature. 
 While the qualitative distinction between creaturely 
and divine attributes may forestall any direct derivation 
of the former from the latter, it does not follow that the 
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opposite derivation cannot be made. Since God cannot be 
said to lack formally any pure perfection present within 
creation, it would follow that there is nothing ‘in’ the 
concept of creaturely perfection that is not present, in 
some way, within the proper concept of the divine 
correlate. This is the possibility that Klima had raised 
when he observed that if Aquinas had held that divine being 
were first known, then the conceptual order would match the 
ontological, for “we could understand created being 
directly as a sort of diminished being.” Since what is 
responsible for the qualitative distinction of creaturely 
pure perfections from divine ones is not a positive quality 
but merely a lack of some sort, possessing a proper concept 
of a divine attribute should enable one to derive, by a 
process of partial negation, a proper concept of an 
analogous creaturely one.  
 
III. Descartes’ Analogy of Divine Self-Causation  
Descartes explicitly appeals to transcendental analogy 
in his defense of the claim that God derives his existence 
from himself. He argues that we possess a common 
(analogical) concept of a preserving or sustaining cause—a 
concept derived from proper concepts of self-sustaining 
256 
 
 
 
causation (necessary existence) on the one hand and 
external-sustaining causation (contingent existence) on the 
other. If we did not possess such an analogical common 
concept, derived from proper concepts of qualitatively 
distinct divine and creaturely existence, we would not be 
able to infer God’s existence from our own. Descartes did 
not believe that any of our proper concepts of God could be 
derived from those of creatures; indeed, his account 
suggests that our original notion of existence must be that 
of necessary existence, and it is from this concept that we 
derive a notion of contingent existence. We shall further 
argue that this example illustrates how philosophical 
theology (in this case, a causal argument for divine 
existence) can presuppose positive knowledge of the divine 
nature and hence require top-down analogical derivation. 
The second causal proof in the Third Meditation is 
intended to show that only God could be the source of a 
thinking thing with an idea of God. The narrator must 
therefore show why he could not be responsible for his own 
existence. To this end, he argues that if he were powerful 
enough to preserve himself in existence, then he would be 
powerful enough to “give” himself every perfection of which 
he has some idea, and thus he would “neither doubt nor 
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want, nor lack anything at all” (CSMII 168).310 Even if the 
power of self-causation were not a sufficient condition for 
possessing other attributes, the narrator can nevertheless 
claim that it is a sufficient condition for possessing any 
item of knowledge, for such knowledge would be “merely an 
accident of that substance” (CSMII 33). Thus any instance 
of doubt, including doubt as to whether one possesses the 
power of self-causation, would be incompatible with 
possessing such power.
311
 The narrator therefore believes 
that he can be certain that his existence is sustained by 
something outside of himself.  
 Several of Descartes’ critics, however, objected to 
his description of necessary or independent existence as a 
condition in which a thing “derives its existence from 
itself” (CSMII 34).  In the First Objections, the 
theologian Johannes Caterus argued that the expression is 
ambiguous. The statement that a thing derives its existence 
                                                          
310 It will turn out that Descartes does not believe that God literally 
‘gives’ himself further perfections, any more than he ‘gives’ himself 
existence. Rather, this language is a consequence of the fact that the 
proof involves treating divine formal causality as analogous to 
efficient causality. Properly speaking, says Descartes, “we perceive by 
the natural light that a being whose essence is so immense that he does 
not need an efficient cause in order to exist, equally does not need an 
efficient cause in order to possess all the perfections of which he is 
aware: his own essence is the eminent source which bestows on him 
whatever we can think of as being capable of being bestowed on anything 
by an efficient cause” (CSMII 168).  
311 It is also possible that Descartes is here appealing to the 
transparency of mental phenomena. Accordingly, if we (as thinking 
things) possessed the power of self-causation, we would necessarily be 
aware of it.  
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from itself can be interpreted in the traditional way as 
the purely negative claim that it is uncaused, or as the 
positive (and paradoxical) claim that it somehow causes 
itself as though it were its own efficient cause. Assuming 
that it is impossible for something to be the efficient 
cause of itself, Caterus believes that Descartes means the 
expression to be taken in its traditional (negative) 
sense.
312
 He argues that since a thing’s lacking a cause is 
merely an extrinsic fact about that thing and hence does 
not tell us anything positive about that thing’s nature, it 
cannot license the conclusion that the thing possesses any 
other perfection. Descartes, however, did intend the claim 
“derives its existence from itself” to be taken positively. 
He maintains that, aside from the “literal and strict 
meaning of the phrase ‘efficient cause,’” there is a “place 
for another kind of cause analogous to an efficient cause” 
(CSMII 79). It is this analogous sense of the phrase that 
gives positive meaning to the expression “derives its 
existence from itself.” The bulk of his reply to Caterus, 
as well as to Arnauld who will raise more pointed 
                                                          
312 As Carriero has explained, the traditional (negative) notion of 
divine aseity assumes the Aristotelian claim that since “everything 
that is moved is moved by another,” a regress to a first cause leads us 
to an “unmoved mover,” not a self-moving one. Yet Descartes, he says, 
is not “seeking a first cause for motion or change” but rather “for 
something’s existing rather than falling into nothingness” (2009, 217). 
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objections, is his explanation of what this positive 
meaning could be. 
Descartes admits that it is obvious that a thing 
cannot be its own efficient cause in the sense of a mere 
originating cause, for this sense presupposes 1) the 
temporal priority of cause to effect and 2) the existence 
of a cause distinct from the effect. Regarding the first 
point, he reminds Caterus that, in inquiring into the 
explanation for his existence as a thinking thing with an 
idea of God, he is searching for an explanation 
encapsulating both the originating and the preserving cause 
of his existence. Indeed, the narrator in the Third 
Meditation had argued that there is merely a conceptual 
distinction between creation and preservation, for to 
preserve something in existence is equivalent to, at every 
moment, creating “that thing anew as if it were not yet in 
existence” (CSMII 33).313 Thus even if a thing had existed 
from eternity, we would still require some explanation as 
to what sustains it in existence, and this efficient cause 
would not be something temporally prior to it. Thus the 
                                                          
313 Schmaltz notes that Descartes is here endorsing “the received 
scholastic position in Suarez that God conserves the world by means of 
the very same act by which he created it […] the power by which God 
conserves is not merely the same type as, but also token-identical to, 
the power by which he creates” (2008, 83). The simultaneity of cause 
and effect was a premise in Aquinas’ Second Way (his proof for the 
existence of an unmoved mover based upon the existence of a series of 
efficient causes). See Secada 2000, 166-7. 
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concept of efficient cause does not presuppose temporal 
priority. 
314
  
Yet even if the notion of an efficient cause 
simultaneous with the existence of its effect is 
intelligible, how could something sustain itself in 
existence? Once we have established that God derives his 
existence “from himself” in the negative sense that he does 
not depend on anything outside himself for his continued 
existence, Descartes argues that we nevertheless can and 
should request an explanation for why God does not need 
such an external sustaining cause, for “it is impossible 
for us to imagine anything deriving existence from itself 
without there being some reason why it should exist rather 
than not exist.”315 The only sort of explanation we could 
provide, however, is one that appeals to God’s own nature 
(of which we all have a robust idea). Descartes does not 
                                                          
314 One way of understanding this is to say that Descartes is interested 
in causation in esse rather than causation in fieri. Causation in fieri 
concerns merely the becoming of a thing, whereas causation in esse 
concerns the origin and continued existence of a thing. In his reply to 
Gassendi, Descartes illustrates this distinction by comparing the 
dependence of a house on its builder with the dependence of sunlight on 
the sun: “[A]n architect is the cause of a house and a father of this 
child only in the sense of being the causes of their coming into being; 
and hence, once the work is completed it can remain in existence quite 
apart from the ‘cause’ in this sense. But the sun is the cause of the 
light which it emits, and God is the cause of created things, not just 
in the sense that they are causes of the coming into being of these 
things, but also in the sense that they are causes of their being; and 
hence they must always continue to act on the effect in the same way in 
order to keep it in existence” (CSMII 254). 
315 Descartes is here appealing to a very strong version of the principle 
of sufficient reason. See Schmaltz 2008, 74. 
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therefore mean that God sustains himself in the way he 
sustains a creature, i.e., through “the kind of 
preservation that comes about by the positive influence of 
an efficient cause” (CSMII 79). Rather, to say that God 
preserves himself in existence is to say that “the essence 
of God is such that he must always exist.” What sort of 
essence is that? It is the idea of a nature possessing 
“immense and incomprehensible power” (CSMII 79). If the 
preserving cause of a thing lies outside it, then there is 
a clear sense in which that thing lacks the power to 
determine its own existence. That God’s existence is not 
contingent upon anything outside himself can and should be 
explained in positive terms as following from his 
omnipotence. 
In the Fourth Objection, however, Arnauld presses 
Descartes to explain in more detail the positive sense of 
causation involved in divine self-preservation. Quoting 
from Descartes’ First Reply, Arnauld asserts that it is 
simply “false” that “God ‘in a sense stands in the same 
relation to himself as an efficient cause does to its 
effect’” (CSMII 146). Like Caterus, Arnauld claims that the 
notion of something causing its own existence is 
incoherent, for an efficient causal relation always implies 
the temporal priority of cause to effect and the 
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distinction between cause and effect.
316
 Further, Arnauld 
argues that if the explanation for God’s existence is to be 
found in an examination of his essence, then it doesn’t 
make any sense to cite this as a “cause” for God’s 
existence: “If anyone asks why God exists, or continues in 
existence, we should not try to find either in God or 
outside him any efficient cause, or quasi-efficient cause 
[…] instead, we should confine our answer to saying that 
the reason lies in the nature of a supremely perfect 
being.”317  In other words, Arnauld is accusing Descartes of 
employing an equivocal notion of “cause” in his proof for 
God’s existence. To ask for an explanation for the 
continued existence of a thing is to request an explanation 
by way of efficient cause, but this is not what is provided 
when we cite God’s essence as the explanation for his 
existence, for here we are providing a formal cause. 
Arnauld claims that Descartes’ explanation is akin to 
                                                          
316 Arnauld’s objections are more detailed. As Bonnen and Flage observe, 
Descartes argues for the distinction between cause and effect by citing 
both the “irreflexive nature of causality” (nothing can cause itself) 
as well as its “dyadic and assymetrical nature” (“there is a mutual 
relation between cause and effect. But a relation must involve two 
terms.") (1999, 848). 
317 Italics mine. Bonnen and Flagge describe Arnauld’s objection as 
follows: “[I]n appealing to efficient causation with respect to God, 
Descartes has misstated the proof. Rather than repeatedly asking 
whether or not the cause of one’s being is self-caused and pushing the 
inquiry until such a point as one finds a self-caused being, Descartes 
should have asked whether the cause of one’s being is itself caused or 
is God. The chain would have ended at the point that God was identified 
as an efficient cause of one of the causes of one’s being, since the 
essence of God entails existence: A formal cause would have ended the 
chain of efficient causes” (1999, 849-50). 
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citing an efficient cause to explain why the three angles 
of a triangle are equal to two right angles.  
  Though Descartes dismisses Arnauld’s objections as 
the “least well-taken,” he nevertheless decides to answer 
them at length. He argues that Arnauld has failed to 
appreciate that he had claimed that God is his own 
efficient cause only “in a sense” (i.e., analogously) and 
hence did not suppose that “he was the same as an efficient 
cause” (CSMII 165). Temporal priority is not a necessary 
feature of efficient causes in general, and though the 
distinction between cause and effect is a criterion of an 
external sustaining (efficient) cause, it is not a feature 
of the notion of a self-sustaining cause. Descartes 
therefore agrees with Arnauld that God’s sustaining cause 
is, properly speaking, not an efficient cause but a “formal 
cause” insofar as it is “a reason derived from God’s 
essence” (CSMII 165). Why, then, does he believe that 
citing a formal cause could constitute an answer to, rather 
than a repudiation of, the request for an explanation for 
God’s existence? The answer is that, in this case, citing a 
formal cause explains why God does not, and cannot, depend 
for his existence on anything external to him. God is his 
own cause in the sense that “the inexhaustible power of God 
is the cause or reason for his not needing a[n] [external] 
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cause. And since that inexhaustible power or immensity of 
the divine essence is as positive as can be, I said that 
the reason or cause why God needs no [external] cause is a 
positive reason or cause” (CSMII 165). Descartes is not 
committed to the absurd view that formal “reasons” are 
always analogous to efficient “causes.” Arnauld’s triangle 
objection therefore misses the mark. Rather, “the formal 
cause will be strongly analogous to an efficient cause” 
because, “in this context,” the formal cause can do the 
explanatory work of an efficient cause (i.e., it can 
explain why God exists independently) (CSMII 168 emphasis 
mine).
318
 And the reason why a formal cause can do the 
explanatory work of an efficient cause in this context is 
that, in God, “there is no distinction between existence 
and essence,” for his ontological independence follows from 
his omnipotence (CSMII 170).  
 What kind of analogy is Descartes here invoking? Upon 
an initial reading, one might conclude that he is providing 
an account of analogy by intuition, in which we use our 
determinate concept of an efficient sustaining cause as an 
imperfect (indeterminate) representation of a formal self-
                                                          
318 “And just as no one criticizes these proofs, although they involve 
regarding a sphere as similar to a polyhedron, so it seems to me that I 
am not open to criticism in this context for using the analogy of an 
efficient cause to explain features which in fact belong to a formal 
cause, that is, to the very essence of God” (CSMII 168) (emphasis mine) 
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sustaining one. After all, Descartes states that he is 
using “the analogy of an efficient cause to explain 
features which in fact belong to a formal cause” (CSMII 
168), and he describes the phenomenon of self-sustaining 
existence in language that is normally reserved for 
efficient causality, not the other way around. He appears 
to suggest as much when he uses geometrical examples to 
illustrate the extension of the concept of an external 
sustaining (efficient) cause to the phenomenon of self-
sustaining causation: “[I]n between ‘efficient cause’ in 
the strict sense and ‘no cause at all’, there is a third 
possibility, namely ‘the positive essence of a thing’, to 
which the concept of an efficient cause can be extended. In 
the same way in geometry the concept of the arc of an 
indefinitely large circle is customarily extended to the 
concept of a straight line; or the concept of a rectilinear 
polygon with an indefinite number of sides is extended to 
that of a circle” (CSMII 167). Just as we may conceive of a 
circle as a rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number 
of sides, so the passage suggests we may use the concept of 
an efficient cause to represent self-sustaining causation.  
 Yet Descartes does not believe, and his geometrical 
examples do not suggest, that our concept of a self-
sustaining cause is nothing more than the concept of an 
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efficient cause regarded indeterminately. This is the 
position an advocate of the traditional (bottom-up) account 
of analogy would endorse; it is the sort of bottom-up 
position that Gassendi had argued for in the Fifth 
Objections, where he asserts that “it is more than enough 
if, on the analogy of our human attributes, we can derive 
and construct an idea of some sort for our own use—an idea 
which does not transcend our human grasp and which contains 
no reality except what we perceive in other things” (CSMII 
200-01). What needs to be distinguished is 1) the origin of 
the analogous concepts from 2) how these concepts are 
employed within the proof for God’s existence. Archimedies’ 
proof, in which a circle is regarded as though it were a 
polygon with infinite sides, presupposes that we already 
possess a determinate concept of a circle and grasp its 
similarity to such a figure. It is only because we already 
recognize that a circle is analogous to a polygon with 
infinite sides that we are willing to accept that features 
demonstrated of this figure have application to the circle. 
Thus, Descartes imagines Archimedes asserting that “If I 
thought that a sphere could not be taken to be a 
rectilinear or quasi-recitlinear figure with an infinite 
number of sides, I should attach no force to my proof, 
since the proof does not strictly apply to a sphere as a 
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curvilinear figure but applies to it only as a rectilinear 
figure with infinitely many sides” (CSMII 171). The proof 
will, of course, involve our treating a circle as if it 
were a polygon with infinite sides rather than the other 
way around, and we may consequently describe a circle as a 
polygon with infinite sides. Yet this is simply a result of 
the direction of the inference (our inferring features of 
the circle from features of the polygon), and not a sign 
that our concept of a circle is nothing more than the 
concept of a polygon with an indefinite number of sides.
319
   
 Similarly, Descartes insists that, for the sake of his 
proof, we must understand and describe God’s self-
sustaining existence in terms of efficient causality, as a 
condition of deriving existence “from himself” as though he 
were his own efficient cause. But this assumes that we 
already possess a notion of such self-sustaining existence 
and grasp its likeness to efficient causality. “In refusing 
to allow us to say that God stands toward himself in a 
relation analogous to that of an efficient cause,” says 
Descartes, “M. Arnauld not only fails to clarify the proof 
                                                          
319 If we were instead drawing an inference about the nature of a polygon 
from the nature of a circle, then we would extend the concept of a 
circle to that of a polygon, and we could describe a polygon with 
infinite sides as though it were a circle. Similarly, if Descartes were 
interested in drawing inferences about efficient causes of existence 
from formal causes of existence, then he might very well describe a 
case of efficient causality as a scenario in which the reason for a 
thing’s existence lies outside its essence.   
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of God’s existence, but actually prevents the reader from 
understanding it” (CSMII 170). Just as we can infer facts 
about a circle from facts about polygons only if we are 
willing to treat a circle as though it were a polygon with 
infinite sides, Descartes asserts that we must be willing 
to treat God’s formal causality as though it were an 
instance of efficient causality so as not to exclude 
outright from our inquiry the case of divine existence: 
 
[I]t is clear to everyone that a consideration of 
efficient causes is the primary and principal way, if 
not the only way, that we have of proving the 
existence of God. We cannot develop this proof with 
precision unless we grant our minds the freedom to 
inquire into the efficient causes of all things, even 
God himself. For what right do we have to make God and 
exception, if we have not yet proved that he exists? 
In every case, then, we must ask whether a thing 
derives its existence from itself or from something 
else; and by this means the existence of God can be 
inferred, even though we have not given an explicit 
account of what it means to say that something derives 
its existence ‘from itself.’ (CSMII 166) 
 
Yet if a willingness to treat an instance of formal 
causality as similar to an instance of efficient causality 
is necessary if we are to include God within the scope of 
our inquiry, so a recognition that this formal causality is 
only analogous to, and hence not the same as, efficient 
causality is necessary if our inquiry is to have an end: 
“How would those who do not yet know that god exists be 
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able to inquire into the efficient cause of other things, 
with the aim of eventually arriving at knowledge of God, 
unless they thought it possible to inquire into the 
efficient cause of anything whatsoever? And how could they 
reach the end of their inquiries by arriving at God as the 
first cause if they thought that for any given thing we 
must always look for a cause which is distinct from it?”  
The proof for God’s existence therefore presupposes 
that the inquirer will possess, and apprehend an analogical 
relation between, determinate concepts of dependent and 
independent existence. This is clear from Descartes’ 
explicit assertion that we are able to derive an analogical 
“common” concept from these concepts via a process similar 
to that of abstraction by confusion. We can infer God’s 
existence from the principle that everything “derives its 
existence from itself or from something else” only because 
we can  
 
spontaneously form a concept of cause that is common 
to both an efficient and a formal cause: that is to 
say, what derives its existence ‘from another’ will be 
taken to derive its existence from that thing as an 
efficient cause, while what derives its existence 
‘from itself’ will be taken to derive its existence 
from itself as a formal cause—that is, because it has 
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the kind of essence which entails that it does not 
require an efficient cause. (CMSII 166)
320
 
 
Efficient and formal causes of existence fall under an 
analogically common concept of cause. They do not, and 
cannot, fall under a univocally common concept because an 
efficient cause must be distinct from its effect. Again, 
Descartes allows that we can form a univocal concept of an 
efficient cause embracing both instances in which the cause 
is prior to its effect as well as those in which a cause is 
simultaneous with its effect, for “the restriction ‘prior 
in time’ can be deleted from the concept while leaving the 
notion of an efficient cause intact” (CSMII 167). However, 
instances of self-sustaining causation cannot fall under a 
univocal concept of efficient cause since “a cause which is 
not distinct from its effects is not an efficient cause.” 
Yet it does not follow, he says, that the formal cause of 
God’s existence is “in no sense a positive cause that can 
be regarded as analogous to an efficient cause; and this is 
all that my argument requires.”  
 
 
 
                                                          
320 Descartes continues “Accordingly, I did not explain this point in my 
Meditations, but left it out, assuming it was self-evident” (CSMII 166-
7). 
271 
 
 
 
IV. Descartes’ Analogy of Causation as Top-down Derivation 
Abstraction by confusion presupposes proper concepts 
from which the “common” analogical concept can be derived. 
Accordingly, Descartes must hold that we possess proper 
(determinate) concepts of both efficient and formal causes 
of existence. What is the origin of these concepts? Is our 
concept of independent (necessary) existence a negation of 
the concept of dependent (contingent) existence? The fact 
that “independent” is a grammatical negation of “dependent” 
would seem to support such a reading,
321
 yet Descartes 
repeatedly emphasizes that we possess a positive concept of 
divine existence far exceeding the negative notion of 
something that is merely uncaused. The narrator’s idea of 
this cause or reason is a concept of the “immense and 
incomprehensible power that is contained within the idea of 
God” (CSMII 79).  If Descartes were an empiricist, he would 
face the difficult task of explaining how we could attain, 
from experience, the concept of the sort of power from 
which existence follows. Yet he holds that our idea of God, 
including all that it implicitly contains, is innate; 
indeed, in the Third Meditation proofs for the existence of 
                                                          
321 For example, in the Fourth Meditation: “Cumque attend me dubitare, 
sive esse rem incompletam & dependentem, adeo clara & distinct idea 
entis independentis & complete, hoc est Dei, mihi occurrit;” (AT VII 
53, emphasis mine) 
272 
 
 
 
God, the narrator cannot yet appeal to anything more than 
his own existence and his idea of God.  
In fact, Descartes states that one of the reasons why 
the explanandum of his proof must be his existence as a 
thinking thing with an idea of God is that this idea 
“provides me with the opportunity of inquiring whether I 
derive my existence from myself, or from another” (CSMII 
78).
322
 In his own analysis of this passage, Carriero 
suggests that Descartes is here claiming that the idea of 
God provides us with the “categories dependent and 
independent in a manner that enables me to apply them to 
myself and see that (1) that I fall on the dependent as 
opposed to the independent side of things and (2) that 
things that fall on the dependent side depend immediately 
on the thing that falls on the independent side.”323 It is 
clear that the idea of God, particularly his omnipotence, 
provides us with a concept of independent or necessary 
existence, for this existence is one of his properties. But 
how could the idea of God provide us with the category of 
deriving existence “from another”?   
                                                          
322 Descartes claims that an idea of God is also necessary for the proof 
insofar as 1) the idea “contains the essence of God […] and according 
to the true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything 
until we first understand its essence”; 2) “this idea provides me with 
the opportunity […] of recognizing my defects”; and 3) “this same idea 
shows me not just that I have a cause, but that this cause contains 
every perfection, and hence that it is God” (CSMII 78).   
323 2009, 213. 
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The best, and indeed only, answer I think we can 
provide here is that the concept of contingent or dependent 
existence is derived from our concept of necessary or 
independent existence. We noted that Descartes, as well as 
others, describe the derivation of analogical creaturely 
concepts from divine ones as a process of partial negation. 
Examples of such derivation exhibit a common pattern. 
According to CPP, we initially employ concepts of the 
divine versions of pure perfections and transcendentals in 
our everyday judgments and classifications without 
realizing it. It is only when we recognize the 
insufficiency of purported instances of these properties 
that we attain concepts of their imperfect varieties as 
well as an explicit awareness of the perfection of the 
original divine analogues. That possessing the concept of 
the divine version would enable us to both recognize 
creaturely (imperfect) instances of this property as well 
as apprehend their relative imperfection is explained by 
the ontological fact that there is nothing ‘in’ the 
creaturely version of the property that cannot be found to 
reside formally in the divine correlate. Since this 
ontological basis for resemblance cannot be analyzed by 
identifying a shared feature among differentiating ones, 
the resemblance must instead be attributed to a primitive 
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relation between one or more aspect(s) of the (complex) 
creaturely property and the divine one.
324
 
To return to our example, how might we derive the 
concept of a thing that draws its existence “from another” 
from the concept of a thing that exists “from itself”? 
Though Descartes often describes God’s necessary existence 
in traditional terms as following from the fact that he is 
identical with his essence, he actually holds that since 
existence is an attribute and hence only conceptually 
distinct from substance, creatures too are identical with 
their existence. What distinguishes God’s existence from 
that of creatures’ is that God is identical with necessary 
existence, while creatures are identical with possible 
existence: “Possible or contingent existence is contained 
in the concept of a limited thing, whereas necessary and 
perfect existence is contained in the concept of a 
supremely perfect being” (CSMII 117). Just as God’s 
independence follows from his completeness—particularly, 
his perfection with respect to the attribute of power—
creaturely dependence could be said to follow from their 
incompleteness, their possession of an imperfect analogue 
of divine power. From the concept of a thing whose power 
                                                          
324 The resemblance could hold between individual aspects of the complex 
creaturely property and the divine one, or between some or all of the 
features of the complex creaturely property considered as a whole and 
the divine one.  
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entails existence, therefore, we could derive the concept 
of a thing that possesses no such power and consequently 
does not exist “from itself” but “from another.”   
This analysis implies, however, that we possess 
determinate concepts of divine and creaturely power. Though 
the distinction between God’s power and our own is often 
cast as one of degree, divine omnipotence can be 
interpreted as a consequence of uniquely creative nature of 
divine power. Descartes often refers to God as a “total 
cause” of existence, distinguishing his creative power from 
the sort of (creaturely) causal power that requires 
preexisting material. In a passage in the Conversation with 
Burman, Descartes illustrates this distinction as part of 
an explanation of the causal similitude principle. A house 
need not resemble its builder, for  
 
[h]e is not the cause of the house, in the sense in 
which we are taking the word here. He merely applies 
active forces to what is passive, and so there is no 
need for the product to be like the man. In this 
passage, however, we are talking about the total 
cause, the cause of being itself. Anything produced by 
this cause must necessarily be like it. For since the 
cause is itself being and substance, and it brings 
something into being, i.e. out of nothing (a method of 
production which is the prerogative of God), what is 
produced must at the very least be being and 
substance. To this extent at least, it will be like 
God and bear his image. 
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Whereas creaturely power is always limited by the “passive” 
material on which it can work, and is therefore 
appropriately described as constructive power, the divine 
correlate does not require any preexisting material. God’s 
power is unlimited because it is creative in the absolute 
sense that he can create ex nihilo (i.e., produce being 
from nothing). In a recent work, the philosopher of 
religion Barry Miller suggests a similar qualitative 
distinction between creaturely and divine power.
325
 
Creaturely power, he argues, varies according the degree to 
which a given effect is due to the agent versus how much is 
attributable to preexisting materials.  Miller suggests we 
can derive the analogically distinct notion of a purely 
creative power by attending to a series of ever-greater 
instances of creaturely constructive power (where less and 
less of the outcome is due to preexisting material). 
However, CPP suggests that our initial (unexamined) notion 
of power is the absolute (creative) kind,
326
 and it is from 
this that we derive a concept of the lesser sort.  
Descartes’ analogy of causation thus implies a top-
down derivation of concepts of both existence and power. 
                                                          
325 1996, 87. 
326 This power is, perhaps, the ‘magical’ sort exhibited in fairy tales 
and movies that most of us, as children, accepted without question. 
Experience is then an education in the limits of human power; we 
discover that, at least within the realm of experience, that every 
instance of human creation is in fact a form of construction.  
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God’s existence and power are the genuine or true version 
of these properties. When we apprehend creaturely analogues 
in light of these standards, we see they resemble existence 
and power even though they fall short absolutely of these 
kinds. We express the resemblance by extending the terms 
“existence” and “power” to them, their difference through 
the qualifications “contingent” and “constructive.” This 
characterization may give the misleading impression that 
“necessary/contingent” and “creative/constructive” are 
differentiae, “existence” and “power” genera. Yet this is 
not the case, for true existence is necessary existence, 
genuine power is creative power, and the predicates 
“contingent” and “constructive” do not represent positive 
differentiae, but are equivalent to “non-necessary” and 
“non-creative.” Again, the paradox of partial negation is 
the paradox of analogy, where the same thing is apprehend 
as the source of commonality and difference.  
Carriero has argued that for Descartes “philosophical 
theological investigations presuppose that we already have 
some grasp of what God is; this is not the sort of thing we 
can bootstrap our way into.”327 Indeed, the second causal 
proof for God illustrates a form of philosophical theology 
that would be impossible were it to be based on a 
                                                          
327 2009, 209.  
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traditional, bottom-up account of analogical derivation. 
The proof requires us to assume, from the outset, a 
particular analogical relation between creaturely and 
divine existence: the fact that God is like creatures in 
possessing a cause but unlike them in being self-caused.
328
 
We can grasp this analogical relation only because we 
already possess an idea “containing the essence of God,” 
particularly, the idea of an immense power from which 
existence follows.
329
 Since we possess determinate concepts 
of creaturely and divine existence, and can grasp the 
analogy between them, we are entitled to the premise that 
everything must either derive its existence from itself or 
from another. Apprehending the analogy is essential for the 
proof, for without it Descartes claims we would either 
exclude God from our inquiry or we would assume that God 
needed an external cause as well.
330
 Since, as Alston 
                                                          
328 God’s existence has a cause in the sense that there is a cause (i.e. 
reason or explanation) for his not needing an external preserving 
cause.  
329 As Carriero puts it, “the contention that we cognize God immediately 
(and positively), as something a se, and not negatively (and 
obliquely), as something sine causa, is essential, Descartes holds, to 
our ability to advance causal demonstrations for God’s existence” 
(2009, 221). 
330 If I thought that nothing could possibly have the same relation to 
itself as an efficient cause has to its effect, I should certainly not 
conclude that there was a first cause. On the contrary, I should go on 
to ask for the cause of the so-called ‘first’ cause, and thus I would 
never reach anything which was the first cause of everything else. 
However, I do readily admit that there can exist something which 
possesses such great and inexhaustible power […] that it is, in a 
sense, its own cause.  
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argued, a bottom-up approach to analogy could provide us 
with only negative or indeterminate notions of divine power 
and existence, it could never underwrite the 
intelligibility of something deriving existence “from 
itself.” Yet a top-down approach provides Descartes with 
determinate concepts of both God and creatures: the idea of 
God directly provides him with a determinate concept of a 
thing deriving its existence from itself, and it indirectly 
(via partial negation) provides him with the determinate 
concept of a thing deriving its existence “from another.” 
 
V. Top-down Derivation of Knowledge and Love 
In addition to being metaphysically necessary and 
omnipotent, the theistic God is also often characterized as 
omniscient and omnibenevolent. Though we will not attempt 
to provide detailed accounts of top-down derivation for 
these properties, we can provide a rough sketch of why such 
an account might be called for. An important requirement 
for motivating a top-down account of analogical derivation 
for a given property is being able to explain how our 
concept of the divine version could differ from our concept 
of the creaturely property  in such a way that prohibits 
the derivation of the former from the latter (e.g., by 
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amplification or negation).
331
 In the case of knowledge and 
love, for example, we must be able to show that the divine 
properties are not distinguished from their creaturely 
versions merely by their scope or degree, e.g., the fact 
that God knows everything there is to know and loves 
everything worthy of love, for it is the qualitative 
difference between the divine and creaturely versions of 
these perfections that calls for a top-down derivation.  
We noted that Hartshorne, in his own account of a top-
down derivation of knowledge, affirms a qualitative 
distinction between the divine and creaturely properties. 
He suggests that the divine sense of “know” means having 
“conclusive evidence […] shutting off the very possibility 
of error,” and that if we “tone [this concept] down 
drastically” we arrive at a concept of creaturely 
knowledge, which does not require having conclusive 
evidence. It is not that God merely knows more than we do, 
but that his knowledge features a definitive quality absent 
in its creaturely version. Descartes had suggested 
something similar when he responded to Burman’s claim that 
human understanding, considered essentially, is not 
imperfect. He responds that it “is not just that our 
understanding ranges over fewer objects than that of God: 
                                                          
331 Of course, this must be done without precluding the possibility of 
deriving a concept of the creaturely property from the divine one. 
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rather, it is extremely imperfect in itself, being obscure, 
mingled with ignorance, and so on.” In the Third 
Meditation, the narrator argued that we can judge doubt to 
be a sign of imperfection only because we possess the idea 
of a state of (perfect) knowledge precluding such 
uncertainty: “[H]ow could I understand that I doubted or 
desired—that is lacked something—and that I was not wholly 
perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a more 
perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own defects 
by comparison?” (CSMII 31). 
 God’s knowledge does not differ from ours merely in 
its scope, but in its conclusive nature. Yet we cannot take 
this analysis to express a simple qualitative identity 
underlying the resemblance relation (e.g., that human 
knowledge is equivalent to divine knowledge minus the 
feature of conclusiveness). Traditionally, the conclusive 
nature of divine knowledge was attributed to the fact that 
it was considered immediate, non-propositional, and 
identical with divine power.
332
 Descartes appears to share 
this view, arguing that “[i]n God, willing, understanding 
and creating are all the same thing without one being prior 
to the other even conceptually” (CSMK 26). In his own 
                                                          
332 According to CPP, these further features would ostensibly enable us 
to recognize that the mediated, propositional and truth-contingent 
aspects of human knowledge constitute imperfections as well.  
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analysis of the Meditations, Stephen Menn therefore 
emphasizes that Descartes, like traditional Neoplatonist 
thinkers, held that God is not just omniscient 
 
but that he is essentially omniscient; and since the 
fact that god knows X cannot be dependent on anything 
outside God, it follows that God must have knowledge 
by being himself the standard according to which 
knowledge is assessed, and not merely by being 
perfectly conformed to that standard. This is, for 
Plotinus and for Augustine and for Descartes, the 
primary way of knowing; souls have knowledge only in a 
weaker and derivative way, and we confuse our 
conceptions of God’s knowledge if we imagine it along 
the model of psychic knowledge. (emphasis mine)
333
 
 
The definitive nature of God’s knowledge is due to the fact 
that he is “himself the standard according to which 
knowledge is assessed.”334 Its unlimited scope can be 
attributed to this same fact, for an actual (quantitative) 
infinity of things known could follow from the qualitative 
difference that divine knowledge is not conformity to a 
standard. Thus the sense in which creaturely knowledge is 
“weak” or “derivative” is not due merely to the fact that 
God knows more than we do and with a level of assurance 
that we cannot match. Rather, God’s way of knowing is 
radically different from the mediated, propositional, and 
                                                          
333 Menn 1998, 289 
334 Whereas for Plotinus this follows from the fact that “Nous not only 
knows all the ingelligibles, but also is them, or contains them all 
within itself,” Descartes would say it follows from the fact that 
“everything is either identical with God or essentially dependent on 
God’s will” (289) 
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truth-contingent nature of “psychic” knowledge. This does 
not appear to be a concept of knowledge that we can produce 
simply by amplifying aspects of our own way of knowing. We 
can, perhaps, represent to ourselves an approximation of 
such knowledge by amplifying features of our own (e.g., the 
extent and degree of certitude), but we cannot construct a 
concept of divine knowledge through such amplification.  
 Hartshorne also provides a top-down account of the 
property of love.
335
 He argues that if love means caring 
about the well-being of others (full stop), then we must 
admit that humans fail to fully exhibit this property: “A 
human being appreciates the qualities of this or that other 
person—except the qualities he does not appreciate, through 
some limitation of his own; he cares about the other’s weal 
or woe, with similar exceptions; he wishes him well—except 
so far as (perhaps unconsciously) he has impulses to wish 
him harm, whether from envy, rivalry, fear, or what not.”336 
                                                          
335 Ronald Nash also uses love as an example of top-down derivation: “An 
empiricist like Aquinas is forced to say that our first contact with 
love comes through our experiences with other human beings. But human 
love falls miles short of divine live, thus forcing us to treat our 
fundamental understanding of love as an analogy. But suppose instead 
that our contact of such predicates as “love” and “perfection” are ours 
as part of our innate idea of God present within us as part of the 
image of God. In this second case, we recognize instances of human love 
(the real analogy) because we have an implicit understanding of God’s 
love. We are drawing a theological application from Plato’s treatment 
of equality and Augustine’s explanation of our knowledge of unity. The 
reason we can recognize two equal particulars is because we first know 
Equality itself. We can recognize imperfection in the creation because 
we first have an innate idea of perfection” (1999, 179). 
336 1962, 141-2. 
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Yet God, says Hartshorne, “appreciates the qualities of all 
things—period. […] He cares about their weal and woe—there 
is no material qualification or negation.” As with the case 
of knowledge, however, the resemblance relation is not 
amenable to a simple analysis of partial qualitative 
identity. I take Hartshorne to be arguing that the problem 
with the human property is not merely that it is exhibited 
only selectively, infrequently, and according to various 
degrees, but that these very limitations are signs that the 
regard is defective even when it appears to be expressed at 
its fullest. To love one person while hating or feeling 
indifferent towards another is to exhibit something less 
than genuine love towards the former. Divine love is not 
qualitatively identical to human love minus selectivity, 
for example, for such differentiae (for lack of a better 
term) change the very nature of the thing they specify.  
 Though Descartes never provides an account of divine 
love, his description of the most altruistic forms of human 
love suggest a qualitative distinction between the two.  In 
his work The Passions of the Soul, he characterizes the 
passions as inherently egoistic, originating in a concern 
for, and functioning on behalf of, our own welfare. In the 
case of love, says Descartes, the passion “impels the soul 
to join itself willingly to objects that appear to be 
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agreeable to it,” in such a manner that “we imagine a 
whole, of which we take ourselves to be only one part, and 
the thing loved to be the other” (CSM 356). What 
distinguishes altruistic love from lesser varieties is 
that, in the case of the former, we take ourselves to be 
the less important part of the imagined whole. A father 
regards his children, says Descartes, “as other parts of 
himself, and seeks their good as he does his own, or even 
more assiduously. For he imagines that he and they together 
form a whole of which he is not the better part, and so he 
often puts their interests before his own and is not afraid 
of sacrificing himself in order to save them.” While the 
scope of our love is determined by the extent of the whole 
of which we imagine ourselves to be a part, its degree is 
determined by how we value other parts in comparison to our 
own. “In the case of devotion,” which Descartes takes to be 
the proper form of love for God, “we prefer the thing loved 
so strongly that we are not afraid to die in order to 
preserve it” (CSM 357).  
 What is significant about Descartes’ account is that 
human love, even in its purest and most altruistic forms, 
is conditioned by the egoistic nature of human passion. In 
order to love something such that we put its interests 
before our own, we must engage in act of imaginative 
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projection bordering on self-deception: we must regard the 
loved thing as in some way connected to ourselves, as parts 
of a larger whole, and thus momentarily disregard the truth 
that “each of us is a person distinct from others, whose 
interests are accordingly in some way different from those 
of the rest of the world” (CSMK 266).337 We cannot, 
apparently, love another while continuing to regard them as 
they truly are, i.e., distinct from ourselves. The problem 
is not that human love thereby always fails to be truly 
altruistic, but that due to the egoistic nature of our 
passions, altruism is attainable for us only if we engage 
in an act of imaginative projection. If Descartes’ analysis 
is correct, the selectivity and frailty of human love could 
be attributed to the limits of such projection: it is one 
thing to regard one’s children as part of oneself, it is 
quite another to regard other people, especially one’s 
enemies, in this way. The apparently quantitative deficits 
that Hartshorne claims distinguishes human love from its 
divine correlate may be rooted in just such a deeper 
                                                          
337 Though Descartes describes the injunction to view oneself as part of 
a whole one of the “truths most useful to us,” what he wants us to 
accept is not the truth that our distinctness is an illusion, but the 
truth that we “ought […] to think” in this way because engaging in this 
imaginative projection has practical value (CSMK 266). Frierson (2002, 
325-31) provides good reasons for interpreting Descartes in this 
manner. As our earlier analysis of the real distinction between God and 
creatures suggests, if the distinction between creatures and God were 
illusory then this would impute imperfection to God. Descartes’ 
description of this procedure as an imaginative, rather than 
intellectual, exercise also supports this interpretation.  
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qualitative distinction between the properties. As with the 
case of existence, power, and knowledge, CPP would suggest 
that our original, unexamined notion of love is the divine 
sort—a regard that is unlimited in scope and degree because 
it is totally un-egoistic in nature. This is not the sort 
of concept that we can produce by merely imagining a regard 
that is less selective or inconstant, for the distinction 
is ultimately a qualitative one.  
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Ch. VII. CPP and Perfect Being Theology 
The tradition of perfect being theology (PBT) employs 
the intuition of divine perfection to determine God’s 
nature. A perfect being, it is held, must possess every 
great-making property (i.e., pure perfection) in the 
highest possible way. For Descartes, as well as other 
early-modern rationalists, divine perfection is the guiding 
notion for understanding God’s nature. Descartes’ 
endorsement of CPP, however, enables him to successfully 
respond to two major critiques of PBT. The first criticism, 
expressed in contemporary thought by Barry Miller, is that 
PBT provides us with concepts of divine attributes that 
differ only by degree from creaturely ones, thereby failing 
to do justice to divine transcendence and divine 
simplicity.
338
 Yet if Miller’s critique is justified, we are 
apparently left with the difficult task of explaining how 
we can attain concepts of qualitatively distinct divine 
perfections in the first place. A proponent of CPP, 
however, can affirm that there is a qualitative distinction 
between creaturely properties and divine ones without 
thereby suggesting that the concepts of (qualitatively 
distinct) divine properties are derived from creaturely 
                                                          
338 1996, 2-4. 
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ones—the sort of operation that many perfect being 
theologians (e.g., Scotus) have argued is impossible. The 
top-down direction of derivation in CPP also enables its 
proponents to address the argument that the criterion of 
perfection inevitably reflects the interests and values of 
the perfect being theologian. According to CPP, however, it 
is by virtue of already possessing a notion of a standard 
of perfection (God) that we apprehend certain creaturely 
properties as instances of pure perfections.  
 
I. Perfect Being Theology and Univocity 
Barry Miller has provided a general critique of the 
univocist tendencies of PBT. Though some advocates of PBT 
(e.g., the early modern rationalists) affirmed that the 
divine perfections are nevertheless qualitatively distinct 
from creaturely ones, Anselm as well as contemporary 
advocates of PBT such as Thomas Morris often seem to 
portray the distinction as one of degree. According to 
these theorists, we determine God’s nature by identifying 
which creaturely properties are pure perfections and then 
amplifying them to their maximal degree. For example, we 
recognize that the property of wisdom is always preferable 
to anything incompatible with it, and that since this 
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property can be realized more or less perfectly, we can and 
must conclude that God possesses it in the highest 
degree.
339
   
Miller does not deny that we ought to understand God 
as the absolutely perfect being. He argues, however, that 
PBT fails to conceive of God as a transcendent being worthy 
of worship. Though understanding God as possessing every 
pure perfection in the maximal way succeeds in setting him 
apart from creatures, Miller thinks that this separation 
does not constitute an “absolute divide.”340 He argues that 
it is “difficult to see how it could be more than a 
difference of degree, since the terms indicating his 
properties –‘powerful,’ ‘knowing,’ ‘loving,’ ‘merciful,’ 
‘generous’ and so on –seem to be used univocally of God and 
creatures.”341 In treating the distinction between 
creaturely and divine pure perfections as one of degree, he 
thinks PBT conceives of God as merely the greatest 
creature, thereby succumbing to anthropomorphism and 
idolatry.
342
  
                                                          
339 Possessing wisdom is preferable both to its absence (folly) as well 
as to any property (e.g. that of being a stone, or being non-conscious) 
incompatible with it.  
340 1996, 2. 
341 Ibid. 
342 “Anthropomorphism” is the attribution of human properties to God and 
“idolatry” is the worship of anything less (or other) than God. 
Anthropomorphism is a violation of divine transcendence, while idolatry 
is the worship of something that is unworthy of worship.  
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For Miller, however, the alternative is not to reject 
positive predication altogether and embrace negative 
theology. Rather, he thinks we can preserve the basic 
intuition of perfect being theology so long as we recognize 
a distinction between what he calls the “limit simpliciter” 
and the “limit case.”343 Whereas the limit simpliciter is 
the final member of a series of things ordered according to 
which they possess a given property (F) to an increasing 
degree, the limit case of such a series is that which lies 
outside the series and is that towards which the series 
converges. The crucial distinction is that while the limit 
simpliciter of a series is an instance of F along with 
every other member of the series, the limit case of a 
series is not an F. What perfect being theologians have 
overlooked, says Miller, is “the possibility of there being 
anything similar to, but beyond, the maximum of a series of 
Fs.”344  
Miller asks us to imagine, among other examples, the 
case of a series of regular polygons ordered according to 
the number of theirs sides, taken to infinity. The limit 
case of such a series, that towards which this series 
converges, is itself not a polygon but a circle. Since a 
defining characteristic of regular polygons (being 
                                                          
343 1996, 7. 
344 Ibid., 10. 
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equiangular and equilateral) is absent from a circle, it 
does not really belong to the series. When Miller applies 
the distinction to the pure perfection of power (described 
in the previous chapter), he finds that the limit case of 
constructive power is the qualitatively distinct property 
of divine creative power. After constructing a series “in 
which increasingly more of the effects produced was due to 
the power employed and increasingly less to the materials 
on which the power was expended,” Miller claims that he can 
see that the series converges upon a “case where the 
constructor has nothing whatever to work on, the case in 
which all the causality comes from him and none at all from 
his using any preexisting materials.”345  
Yet the limit case/limit simpliciter distinction does 
not imply that there is no relationship between the two. 
Even though ‘F’ cannot be predicated univocally of members 
of the series and the limit case of the series, Miller 
argues that it does not follow that ‘F’ must be equivocal. 
If the limit case of a series were merely a matter of 
convention, then the limit case of one series would be 
interchangeable with the limit case of another. That they 
are not substitutable, however, suggests that there must be 
some similarity between members of a given series and the 
                                                          
345 1996, 87. 
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limit cases of those series. Miller concludes that the 
relation must be one of analogical resemblance.
346
  
 Miller argues that if we apply the distinction to our 
language about God, we will find that it radically changes 
the significance of the terms we use to qualify divine 
predicates. Though perfect being theologians may 
distinguish divine attributes from creaturely ones by 
characterizing the former as “infinite,” “perfect,” or  
“unsurpassable,” Miller argues that these “qualifiers do 
nothing to change the sense of the terms they qualify.”347 
They merely serve to indicate that the qualities are 
possessed at a maximal degree. Yet if the divine attributes 
are viewed as the limit cases of creaturely ones, Miller 
claims the qualifications function as “alienans 
adjectives,” for they change the meaning of the terms they 
qualify.
348
 The adjectives “decoy” in “decoy duck” or 
“negative” in “negative growth” combine with the terms they 
modify to designate things that are not, respectively, true 
ducks or true instances of growth. Similarly, the 
adjectives “infinite” in “infinite knowledge” or “perfect” 
in “perfect goodness” combine with the terms they qualify 
to designate divine attributes that are not, respectively, 
                                                          
346 He devotes a separate article to this claim. See 1990, 63-84. 
347 Ibid., 2. 
348 Ibid., 10. 
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really instances of knowledge or goodness. God’s so-called 
knowledge and goodness are qualitatively distinct from the 
creaturely varieties insofar as these attributes, as limit 
cases, fall outside any series of increasingly more perfect 
creaturely instances of them.  
Miller argues that treating God’s attributes as the 
limit case instances of human attributes not only preserves 
God’s transcendence without disregarding the intuition of 
divine perfection, but is able to make sense of the 
doctrine of divine simplicity. One of the chief obstacles 
to the doctrine of divine simplicity (as well as divine 
transcendence) is that it seems to preclude any sort of 
likeness between God and creatures. Yet if God’s attributes 
are the limit case instances of human ones, he claims that 
we can do justice to the qualitative distinction demanded 
by the doctrine without violating the intuition that 
creatures resemble God with respect to their perfections. 
Miller does not abandon the principle of divine perfection. 
However, he believes that the guiding or controlling notion 
that ultimately decides which of the properties are 
legitimately attributed to God ought to be one that does 
justice to the limit case/limit simpliciter distinction. 
For this reason, he prefers the principle of subsistent 
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existence (God’s identity with his existence) to that of 
perfection.  
 
II. Miller’s Critique and CPP 
 Much of Miller’s account is consistent with the theory 
of religious language suggested by CPP. Though Descartes 
and others employed the intuition of divine perfection as a 
principal guiding notion for understanding God, they too 
wanted to affirm a qualitative break between divine 
qualities and their creaturely correlates so as to secure 
divine transcendence and satisfy the apparent logical 
demands of divine simplicity. Like Miller, they appeared to 
rely (or so I have argued) upon a doctrine of analogical 
resemblance to explain how creaturely perfections could 
nevertheless be said to resemble their divine correlates. 
Yet what distinguishes Miller’s account from those like 
Descartes’ is his insistence that we derive concepts of 
divine attributes from our concepts of creaturely ones. 
Miller’s account is a contemporary version of bottom-up 
analogical derivation; it suggests that we can obtain (or 
construct) a concept of the analogically distinct notion of 
a limit case quality by attending to a series of creaturely 
instances of a given quality. The Cartesian critique of 
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bottom-up analogical derivation thus applies to Miller’s 
account just as it does to traditional scholastic theories 
of transcendental analogy. According to this critique, we 
would never be able to arrive at a proper concept of an 
analogically distinct divine attribute by modifying a 
concept of a creaturely one unless we already possessed 
(implicitly) a concept of the divine attribute in question.  
 Miller outlines a basic strategy for determining 
divine attributes. The first step is to see, for any given 
creaturely attribute F, whether it has a limit case or not. 
Miller adds, however, that since “the limit case terminates 
an ordered series of instances of F, the question cannot be 
answered without first specifying in what respect the 
instances can be ordered.”349 Once we order a series of F in 
such a way that they do, in fact, lead towards a limit case 
instance of F, he thinks we will be able to ‘see’ that the 
series ‘points’ to this limit case. Applied to the example 
of the regular polygon and the circle, we would first 
construct a series of regular polygons with increasing 
numbers of sides and angles. Once we have such a series, we 
can ostensibly grasp the fact that this series, taken to 
its limit, converges on the limit case of a circle. 
However, Descartes had questioned this assumption in his 
                                                          
349 Miller, 86. 
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critique of amplification arguments. Could we really grasp 
that the series ‘points’ to a circle without already 
possessing a notion of a circle in the first place? Though 
improbable, it is at least conceivable that we might 
unwittingly construct the series without possessing a 
notion of a circle, but it is hard to see how we could ever 
‘see’ that this series converges on the limit case of a 
circle unless we already possessed such a concept. Or, to 
employ another example from Descartes, we might construct a 
series of creatures with ever-decreasing degrees of 
dependence. But could this series provide us with the limit 
case concept of an absolutely independent being (God) 
unless we already possessed (at least implicitly) this 
notion?  
 Nor is Miller able to answer the broader critique of 
bottom-up transcendental analogical derivation raised by 
Scotus. Since creaturely perfections fall short absolutely 
of their analogous divine correlates, the concepts of these 
perfections cannot directly provide us with proper concepts 
of the divine correlates. If proper concepts of divine 
perfections are instead obtained by a process of rational 
inference (of which Miller’s ‘convergence-to-a-limit’ 
approach seems to be an instance), there must be some sort 
of univocal core to which the distinguishing factor of 
298 
 
 
 
supereminence or infinity can be added. However, Miller 
explicitly denies that his account of analogical 
resemblance is compatible with the sort of partial 
univocity favored by Scotus and Alston.
350
  
 The distinction between Miller’s account of analogical 
derivation and that required by CPP can be expressed in 
terms of which qualifiers are assigned the role of alienans 
adjectives. According to Miller, these adjectives signal 
that a limit case instance of F is not really an instance 
of F. When the adjectives “infinite” or “perfect” qualify 
“goodness,” for example, they indicate a (limit case) 
property that isn’t a genuine instance of goodness. 
According to CPP, however, the alienans adjectives are 
those that apply to members of the series, signaling that 
they are not really instances of the limit case property. 
It is instead adjectives like “finite” or “imperfect” that 
shift the meaning of the terms they modify; just as an 
imperfect circle is not a true circle, so imperfect 
goodness is not genuine goodness. This account of language 
more accurately reflects the epistemological requirements 
                                                          
350 “If there were a common core of meaning between ‘F’ in ‘God is F’ and 
‘Maria is F’ then the use of ‘F’ would not be analogical, but either 
partly or wholly univocal. Not only that, but the effect of thus 
predicating ‘F’ of God would  be to apply to him some core predicates 
having exactly the same senses as when predicated of creatures. The 
result would be a God conceived of in the image of creatures—an 
anthropomorphized God” (1996, 150). 
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of the examples he provides.  We can ‘see’ that the series 
of regular polygons converges on the limit case instance of 
a circle because we judge that the shapes will more closely 
approximate, though never reach, the shape of a circle. In 
other words, we (at least implicitly) apprehend the 
polygons as imperfect circles, i.e., approaching yet 
falling short absolutely of the property of circularity as 
such.  
 
III. The Criterion of Perfection 
By invoking a qualitative distinction between 
creaturely pure perfections and their divine analogues, 
proponents of PBT need not portray the distinction between 
these perfections as being merely one of degree, and by 
endorsing a top-derivation, they can explain how concepts 
of creaturely perfections can be derived from concepts of 
qualitatively distinct divine ones. A more basic criticism, 
however, has been lodged against the theory. Even if we can 
affirm a qualitative distinction between creaturely and 
divine perfections, how do we determine which creaturely 
perfections should be seen as having divine analogues in 
the first place? According to PBT, we begin by asking 
whether possessing a given property is preferable to 
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possessing anything incompatible with it. If it is, then we 
ostensibly know that creatures are more perfect (qua 
creatures) to the extent that they possess it, and that God 
must possess its divine equivalent.
351
  
The problem, however, is that this procedure leans 
rather heavily on our fallible and, perhaps, species-
relative intuitions regarding which properties are 
preferable to others.
352
 Xenophanes had famously argued that 
if cows and horses could draw, they would depict gods with, 
respectively, bovine and equine characteristics. Even if 
these animals insisted that the gods possessed only the 
divine analogues of rumination or galloping, for example, 
critics could justifiably accuse them of fashioning deities 
in their own images. Our ascribing analogues of human 
characteristics to God could be similarly ridiculed. Nor 
has there ever been complete consensus across cultures and 
times as to which characteristics a greatest being must 
possess. Though philosophers once held that a perfect being 
must be simple, immutable, and impassible, all of these 
attributes have been questioned in contemporary thought.
353
  
                                                          
351 A tree would not be more perfect as a tree if it possessed wisdom 
(indeed, it would no longer be a tree). Yet it would be more perfect as 
a creature if it were wise.   
352 The procedure also relies on our intuitions regarding possibility and 
compossibility. Divine simplicity has, for example, been criticized on 
the grounds that it leads to logical absurdities (e.g., God’s being a 
property).  
353 Hartshorne, for example, has argued for excluding these attributes.  
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 Advocates of PBT are generally upfront and 
unapologetic regarding the role intuition must play in 
identifying great-making properties. Thomas Morris, for 
example, notes that the method of PBT requires us to 
“consult our value intuitions” and assumes there will be 
“widespread agreement among people who are rightly 
positioned and well disposed” concerning these 
intuitions.
354
 He admits, however, that since “it is a fact 
that philosophical intuitions differ,” PBT will never be 
able to provide us with “the ideal of an armchair science 
of easily ascertained, self-evident truths."
355
 
Nevertheless, he argues that even if there is uncertainty 
regarding what exactly perfection entails, the fundamental 
principles of theism—there is “a creative source of all 
                                                          
354 1991, 38. In an effort to illustrate how advocates of PBT consult 
their intuitions in developing a concept of God, he provides a schema 
in which a perfect being is conceived in an ascending order of 
greatness. God can be conceived as: 
 
 (1) conscious (a minded being capable of an engaged in states of 
thought and awareness), 
 (2) a conscious free agent (a being capable of free action) 
 (3) a thoroughly benevolent, conscious agent, 
 (4) a thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with significant 
knowledge 
 (5) a thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with significant 
knowledge and power, 
(6) a thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with unlimited 
knowledge and power, who is the creative source of all else. 
(7) thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with unlimited 
knowledge and power who is the necessarily existent, 
ontologically independent creative source of all else. 
 
355 1987, 23. Morris thinks our intuitions provide at most “defeasible 
epistemic status” for our selection of great-making properties. See 
1991, 41.  
302 
 
 
 
else that might exist”; “no effect can exceed its ultimate 
cause in metaphysical status”; and there is an “objectivity 
of value structures”—strongly support the basic contention 
that God is a “maximally perfect being.”356 Since theism 
places God at the very top of this hierarchy of value, 
Morris concludes that it is not man but God who is “the 
measure of perfection.”357 Similarly, Katherin Rogers 
recognizes that our ability to correctly identify which 
attributes characterize a greatest being presupposes that 
we have intuitive access to an objective hierarchy of 
value. Despite the fallibility of these intuitions, 
however, she argues that “in all the debates between 
various conceptions of the nature of God, none of the 
participants argues for a God whom they judge to be less 
than the best.”358  
Some contemporary critics of PBT have accused 
Descartes—considered by many a paragon of armchair 
philosophizing—of disguising his own theological intuitions 
about divine perfection as the deliverances of a priori 
reasoning. Some readers find passages such as the following 
to reflect an all too uncritical faith in our ability to 
identify perfections appropriate to God: 
                                                          
356 Ibid., 1987, 28-9. 
357 Ibid., 1987, 29. 
358 2000, 2. 
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In order to know the nature of God, as far as my own 
nature was capable of knowing it, I had only to 
consider for each thing of which I found in myself 
some idea, whether or not it was a perfection to 
possess it; and I was sure that none of those which 
indicated any imperfection was in God, but that all 
the others were. Thus I saw that doubt, inconstancy, 
sadness and the like could not be in God, since I 
myself would have been very glad to be free from them. 
(CSI 128) 
 
Christopher Insole, for example, traces the anthropomorphic 
tendencies of contemporary PBT to Cartesian philosophy of 
religion. He reminds us that Descartes, in the Third 
Meditation, provisionally defines “God” as an “infinite 
substance, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, 
omnipotent, and by which I and all the other things which 
exist […] have been created and produced.”359 This picture 
of God, says Insole, is developed from an “unproblematized 
notion” of human subjectivity—in truth, an Enlightenment 
ideal of human nature—“that of a finite substance, 
temporal, mutable, autonomous in some crucial respects, 
knowledgeable to an extent, potent, the proximate cause of 
some (but not all) of the things which are created and 
produced.” Descartes has here inaugurated a method of 
philosophical theology according to which divine attributes 
are drawn from a constructed and “parochial” model of the 
                                                          
359 2010, 476. 
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human subject. By uncritically selecting such a model of 
subjectivity and then attributing to God supereminent 
versions of these attributes, later philosophers have 
similarly claimed to have arrived at a substantive model of 
God’s nature. Yet according to their theological critics, 
says Insole, this procedure instead yields only “the 
grotesque construction of a super-(human) subject, a 
bloated infinitely magnified mirror-image of the rational, 
powerful, and benevolent man.” 
 In his own analysis of Descartes’ philosophical 
theology, Philip Clayton provides a similar critique of 
Cartesian PBT. Responding to the list of perfections 
Descartes attributes to God, Clayton asks: “[W]hence do we 
derive these notions of perfection that we attribute to 
God? Is it not, as Ludwig Feuerbach argued, merely a matter 
of taking what one most values and projecting it onto the 
universe itself?”360 Just as Morris had admitted in his own 
defense of PBT, Clayton argues that the concept of a 
greatest being seems to presuppose access to an objective 
hierarchy of value: “Unless there were agreement on goods 
and a consensus on their status as objective, the best one 
could achieve would be a hierarchy of things that the 
person, or group of persons, values. To label the top of 
                                                          
360 2000, 171. 
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this scale ‘God’ is to be guilty of projection in the most 
blatant possible manner.”361 Clayton takes Descartes’ claim 
that our concepts of God are derived by amplifying concepts 
of creaturely ones as an explicit admission that our 
concept of God is the result of such projection. He 
consequently claims that Descartes must face what he calls 
“Feuerbach’s dilemma”: “either God is unknowable through 
attributes accessible to humans, which is another way of 
saying that God is simply unknowable to humans; or God is 
knowable in this way, but at the cost of our never knowing 
for sure whether we have come to know a being separate from 
ourselves or whether we have projected our own ideas of 
perfection onto the universe.”362 If we reject negative 
theology and aspire to understand God, concludes Clayton, 
we can never be sure that we are not merely “extrapolating 
from human qualities and longings (for greater power, 
greater understanding, etc.) to the idea of a being who has 
what we lack.”363 
                                                          
361 Ibid., 173. 
362 Ibid., 175. 
363 Ibid., 176. Maritain (1944) also objected to what he interprets as 
the univocist and anthropomorphic tendencies of Cartesian PBT. 
“Cartesian knowledge of divine perfections,” he says, “proceeds in a 
purely geometrical fashion: God being by definition the supremely 
perfection, nothing is more simple than to attribute to Him everything 
which it seems to us to be a perfection to possess—without the 
slightest critical elaboration of the concepts which we thus use, 
without that attribution being therefore justified or compromising any 
sure criterion […]; and without the possibility of any philosophical 
solution being proposed to the apparent antinomies and to the essential 
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There can be little doubt that Descartes endorsed an 
objective hierarchy of value ordered by approximation to 
divine perfection. Indeed, in his account of the human 
will, he provides an explicit account of how God serves as 
a non-egoist standard of value. In the Fourth Meditation, 
the narrator claims that even though God’s will must be 
“incomparably greater,” it is unclear how any such faculty 
could surpass his own; hence he argues that “it is above 
all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear 
in some way the image and likeness of God” (CSMII 40).364 In 
the Passions of the Soul, Descartes goes on to state that 
the human will’s likeness to its divine correlate is the 
foundation of its value. It is because our free will 
“renders us in a certain way like God” that it serves as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
questions which concern the divine nature and operations.” He thus 
concludes that “Cartesianism, in respect to Christian metaphysics 
elaborated during the preceding centuries, has been one of the most 
singular regressions that the history of thought has to record” (152). 
Emblematic of Maritain’s misreading of Descartes is his failure to see 
how Descartes’ mathematical illustration of analogy respects and 
preserves the qualitative difference between God and creatures. 
Maritain quotes T. L. Penido’s claim that Descartes’ Archimedean 
examples betray an “anthropomorphic univocity.” According to this 
reading of the mathematical examples, “One takes a created perfection, 
one increases it indefinitely along the same line and one says: there 
is the ‘way of eminence’ (attributing to God the perfections we know 
here on earth raised to the nth power), divine perfection is at the 
end” (153). To read the mathematical examples in this way, however, is 
to fail to appreciate that the concept of the divine perfection at 
issue is the limit case instance of the creaturely perfection, and 
hence qualitatively distinct from the creaturely perfection.  
364 The narrator states, however, that the equivalence between his own 
will and God’s is only apparent: “it does not seem any greater than 
mine when considered as will in the essential and strict sense” (CSMII 
40) (emphasis mine). Descartes’ commitment to divine simplicity would 
suggest that the human will is, nevertheless, only analogous to its 
divine counterpart.  
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“good reason for esteeming ourselves” (CSMI 384). As one 
commentator puts it, for Descartes, “the free will is 
valued not because it is useful but because its infinitude 
makes us like God.”365 Assuming this analysis would hold for 
the other pure perfections as well, it suggests that their 
value is rooted in their resemblance to their divine 
analogues.
366
 
How, then, do we access this objective hierarchy of 
value? Insole and Clayton’s criticisms of Descartes on this 
score are not new. Indeed, in the second chapter we noted 
that Gassendi made similar arguments, observing that our 
concepts of divine attributes are “taken from things which 
we commonly admire in ourselves.” Descartes’ response to 
Gassendi and other critics also applies to the contemporary 
ones: we are able to attain concepts of divine attributes 
different in kind from our own only because we already 
possess innate notions of these attributes. Despite 
appearances, the process of amplification is not really one 
of forming an idea but of making an idea explicit. We do 
not construct concepts of divine perfections; we enter the 
world already possessing these notions and (unknowingly) 
                                                          
365 Frierson 2002, 324. 
366 The only difference, presumably, would be that we value human freedom 
more than other perfections because we perceive a greater likeness 
between human freedom and its divine analogue than that holding between 
the other human perfections and their divine analogues.  
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employ them in our everyday classifications and judgments, 
constructing concepts of the creaturely versions of these 
perfections through partial negation.  
If our implicit concepts of divine perfections are 
actively responsible for our capacity to amplify our 
creaturely perfections past the point of qualitative 
difference, it stands to reason that they are also 
responsible for our initial selection of these creaturely 
perfections as candidates for amplification as well. In the 
Second Replies, Descartes attributes our ability to 
recognize that certain creaturely perfections are pure 
perfections (and hence must exist “formally” in God) to our 
possessing an innate idea of the divine essence: 
 
[T]here are many indefinite particulars of which we 
have an idea, such as indefinite (or infinite) 
knowledge and power, as well as number and length and 
so on, that are also infinite. Now we recognize that 
some of these (such as knowledge and power) are 
contained formally in the idea of God, whereas others 
(such as number and length) are contained in the idea 
merely eminently. And this would surely not be the 
case if the idea of God within us were merely a 
figment of our minds. (CSMII 99) 
 
Our intuitions regarding which attributes are pure 
perfections are not therefore ungrounded; they are guided 
by our prior (implicit) possession of a standard of 
perfection—an innate idea of God. It is because we already 
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have an idea of that which lies at the very top of the 
ontological hierarchy, that which is most true and real, 
that we apprehend certain creaturely properties as pure 
perfections and so suitable candidates for amplification.
367
 
Just as knowing the model of a series of drawings enables 
us to apprehend these drawings as more or less accurate 
depictions of the model, so innate notions of divine power 
or knowledge enable us to grasp certain creaturely power or 
knowledge as more or less perfect instances of their divine 
analogues.  
In response to the claim that we project onto God 
qualities we admire in ourselves, Descartes could therefore 
answer that we tend to admire these qualities in ourselves 
because we (unknowingly) attribute their more perfect 
analogues to God. An innate idea of God serves as the 
source of the deepest and most universal values common to 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike. We tend to admire 
human knowledge, power and freedom because it is with 
respect to these features that we (implicitly) apprehend 
ourselves as images and likenesses of God. In the Third 
Meditation, for example, the narrator portrays God as the 
implicit object of his aspiration: “I am a thing which is 
                                                          
367 The question of how we justify our claim that a given perfection 
belongs to God is a separate issue. Here Descartes will appeal to 
intuition—the “natural light” or “clear and distinct perfection.”  
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incomplete and dependent on another and which aspires 
without limit to ever greater and better things; but I also 
understand at the same time that he on whom I depend has 
within him all those greater things, not just indefinitely 
and potentially but actually and infinitely […].” The 
universal nature of human aspirations could be attributed 
to the fact that an innate notion of divine perfection is a 
common endowment.  
 This is not to say that we cannot make mistakes about 
what divine perfection entails. Though Descartes did 
believe that, at least among metaphysicians, there was a 
general consensus regarding which attributes a perfect 
being must possess,
368
 he did not claim that we have 
infallible access to what is contained in our idea of a 
perfect being. The average person, he allows, may “muddle 
things up by including other attributes” that are in fact 
inconsistent with absolute perfection (CSMII 99). And even 
the experts (metaphysicians like himself) have at best only 
an imperfect grasp of all that divine perfection requires. 
Yet Descartes argues that such fallibility is entirely 
                                                          
368 In his response to the anonymous objection forwarded by Mersenne, 
Descartes argues that “If the idea were a mere figment, it would not be 
consistently conceived by everyone in the same manner. It is very 
striking that metaphysicians unanimously agree in their descriptions of 
the attributes of God (at least in the case of those which can be known 
solely by human reason). You will find that there is much more 
disagreement among philosophers about the nature of anything which is 
physical or perceivable by the senses, however firm or concrete our 
idea of it may be” (CSMII 99)  
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consistent with the idea of God being innate: “That not 
everyone shares the same understanding of God despite the 
fact that the idea of God is imprinted on them is no more 
surprising than the fact that not everyone shares the same 
understanding of a triangle despite the fact that everyone 
is aware of this idea” (CSMII 257). Indeed, for all the 
perfections that have been disputed (e.g. impassability, 
simplicity, immutability), there are others (e.g., 
knowledge, love, power, freedom) that are rarely 
questioned.
369
 The existence of an innate notion of divine 
perfection thus entails a consensus only among those who 
are suitably equipped to engage in a deliberate, careful 
analysis of divine perfection.
370
  
That the perfections we ascribe to God are mostly the 
analogues of those we admire in ourselves is simply a 
                                                          
369 Proposed supereminent versions of these qualities (e.g., omnipotence) 
have, however, been disputed. One could argue, along with Hartshorne, 
that omnipotence is incompatible with creaturely power and the 
existence of evil, for example.  
370 In his dedicatory letter to the Meditations, Descartes suggests the 
number of suitably equipped meditators will be small indeed: “Although 
the proofs I employ here are in my view as certain and evident as the 
proofs of geometry, if not more so, it will, I fear, be impossible for 
many people to achieve an adequate perception of them, both because 
they are rather long and some depend on others, and also, above all, 
because they require a mind which is completely free from preconceived 
opinions and which can easily detach itself from involvement with the 
senses.” He goes on to assert that the number of those with an 
“aptitude for metaphysical studies” is surely no greater than the 
number who have “an aptitude for geometry”; and whereas students to 
geometry assume that geometrical propositions are introduced only when 
there is “a conclusive demonstration available,” people tend to assume 
that, in philosophy, “everything can be argued either way” and hence 
“few people pursue the truth.” (CSMII 5)  
312 
 
 
 
consequence of the fact that it is with ourselves that we 
are directly acquainted. The innate notions of attributes 
that we unknowingly employ in our everyday judgments will 
inevitably be those that apply to our own nature and 
circumstances. Thus while God may indeed have, as the 
narrator in the Meditations suggests, an infinite number of 
perfections, and while these perfections will also be 
contained in our innate idea of him, yet, due to the finite 
nature of our own minds, we can achieve an awareness of 
only those that are analogous to our own perfections, for 
we represent God’s perfections to ourselves by indefinitely 
amplifying creaturely correlates. If, hypothetically, we 
were to come into contact with beings considerably 
different from ourselves, we may indeed become aware of new 
perfections that are appropriate to ascribe to God. 
Assuming that these beings do possess pure perfections that 
we lack, our very ability to conceive of these perfections 
would be explained by our accessing hitherto latent ideas 
of their divine correlates. Our contact with these beings 
would not provide us with the ideas of these perfections, 
but would merely enable us to make these notions explicit. 
The new experience would merely be the occasion for our 
drawing notions of these novel perfections from our innate 
idea of a perfect being.  
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The version of the dilemma Descartes, and other 
advocates of CPP, actually face is therefore not the one 
Clayton proposed of choosing between negative theology and 
anthropomorphism, but that of choosing between negative 
anthropology and deimorphism: either we are unknowable to 
ourselves given the fact that our self-ascription of 
limited perfections are complete negations of positive 
notions of God’s perfections; or we are knowable in this 
way but at the cost of our never knowing for sure whether 
we have come to know ourselves or whether we have projected 
our ideas of divine perfections onto ourselves. We have 
argued in previous chapters, however, that this is a false 
dilemma—a top-down account could employ a theory of 
analogical resemblance, just as many bottom-up ones do. 
When we apprehend ourselves as imperfectly wise, for 
example, we are not attributing to ourselves the perfection 
of true wisdom; only God is really wise. Nor are we simply 
denying ourselves the property of wisdom. Rather, we are 
acknowledging that we possess a deficient analogue of the 
genuine thing—an imitation of divine wisdom.  
  Though contemporary perfect being theologians tend to 
assume, along with most contemporary philosophers of 
religion, that our concepts of divine perfections are 
derived from concepts of creaturely ones, the bottom-up 
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approach to concept derivation is not an essential feature 
of PBT.
 371
 Not only is PBT consistent with a top-down 
approach, some of the most important traditional 
practitioners of PBT including St. Augustine and St. Anselm 
proposed something similar to the top-down derivation 
required by CPP. Though neither explicitly endorsed a 
theory of analogy,
 372
 they did appeal to theories of divine 
illumination to explain both the certainty characterizing 
various judgments as well as the origin of the concepts 
employed in these and perhaps other judgments.
373
 For these 
thinkers, many of our judgments regarding the perfection of 
creatures presuppose reference to standards of perfection 
exemplified only by God.
374
 Thus even traditional versions 
                                                          
371 Contemporary practitioners of PBT advocating for a bottom-up approach 
include: William Morris (1987, 1991), Daniel J. Hill (2005) and William 
Alston (1989), among others.  
372 An argument for interpreting Anselm as an advocate of univocity and 
not, as some interpreters would have it, a forerunner of scholastic 
analogy, can be found in Ch. V of Rogers 1997. 
373 For a discussion of both of these features of divine illumination in 
St. Augustine’s work, see Evangelist 2010. 
374 Augustine, for example, observes that we possess abstract concepts of 
wisdom, unity, and goodness that could not have been derived from sense 
experience. Though there is scholarly debate concerning the precise 
nature of his theory of divine illumination, Ronald Nash (1969, 109-10) 
has suggested that these concepts are roughly equivalent to innate 
ideas. These concepts not only enable us to recognize imperfect 
instances of, for example, wisdom, unity or goodness, but serve as 
standards according to which we may judge their relative 
(im)perfection. As Evangelist puts it, these concepts are “normative 
standards which we apply when we draw comparisons between things or 
judge how they ought to be” (2010, 10). In the Freedom of the Will, for 
example, Augustine argues that our ability to recognize the absence of 
unity in bodies presupposes our possessing a notion of absolute unity: 
“When I am seeking unity in the corporeal realm and am at the same time 
certain that I have not found it, nevertheless I know what I am seeking 
and failing to find, and I know that I cannot find it, or rather that 
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of PBT are not inherently vulnerable to the projectionist 
critique. To the extent that there is a general consensus 
regarding the properties a perfect being must have, this 
need not be explained as a consequence of humans projecting 
onto God what they value most about themselves. If an 
implicit awareness of God is a constitutive feature of 
human nature, our general agreement about what is both 
valuable in ourselves and necessarily true of God can be 
attributed to this common endowment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
it does not exist among corporeal things. When I know that no body is a 
unity, I know what unity is” (2.8.21). Likewise, in On the Immortality 
of the Soul, he argues that we would not be able to judge that some 
things are better than others “unless a conception of the good itself 
had been impressed upon us, such that according to it we might both 
approve some things as good and prefer one good to another.” See Nash 
(1969, 105-6). Anselm makes similar claims in the Monologian, arguing 
that we would not be able to judge creatures as wise, just or good 
without referring them to standards of divine wisdom, justice and 
goodness. See Ch. IV of Rogers 1997. 
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Ch. VIII. Analysis and Critique of Cartesian CPP 
I. The Plausibility of our Awareness of Absolute 
Imperfection 
 
We concluded in the first chapter that the Cartesian 
argument from CPP is simply the claim that in order to 
judge that something is imperfect insofar as it is like-X 
but not-X, we must possess a concept of X. The significance 
of the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” in CPP is best 
captured by examples such as those we find in geometry 
where the perfection in question is definitive of the kind 
(rendering “perfect” equivalent to “true” or genuine”), and 
hence where imperfection indicates falling short of the 
kind. The idea of a perfect (or “true”) circle is prior to 
the idea of an imperfect one in the sense that we cannot 
conceive of a thing as resembling yet failing to be a 
circle unless we possess a concept of a circle as such; 
however, we can possess the concept of a circle without 
possessing the concept of something that resembles but 
falls short of it. As the idea of a perfect circle is 
simply the idea of a circle, so the idea of a perfect or 
infinite being is the idea of being as such. Since the 
properties possessed by a perfect being are definitive of 
being, anything that fails to possess these properties can 
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be called a “being” in only a non-univocal sense of the 
term. If constructing ideas of God by manipulating (via 
negation or amplification) our ideas of creatures requires 
an awareness of their absolute imperfection, these 
operations presuppose the very concepts they are intended 
to produce.  
 
A. CPP as Transcendental Argument 
The argument from CPP could accurately be described as 
a transcendental argument.
375
 While such arguments are 
usually employed to show how an uncontroversial fact about 
our mental life presupposes some disputed fact about extra-
mental reality, they can also be used to establish other 
facts about our mental life, especially those of which we 
are not directly aware. In the case of CPP, the claim is 
that our apprehension of absolute imperfection presupposes 
a concept of the kind with respect to which we see 
ourselves falling short. Some philosophers, such as Barry 
Stroud, believe that transcendental arguments that infer 
facts about our mental life are more plausible that those 
that attempt to demonstrate facts about the extra-mental 
world.
 376
 Robert Stern, however, has questioned this 
                                                          
375 See Schechtman 2011. 
376  2000, 158, 233-5. 
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assumption: “How can claims of necessary connections 
between some thoughts or experience and some others be 
defended more cogently than claims of necessary connections 
between some thoughts or experience and the world? Why are 
such ‘bridges’ or modal connections easier to make ‘within 
thought’ than between how we think and how the world must 
be to make that thought possible?”377 
Stern’s concern is valid for many transcendental 
arguments of this type. Though it may be true, for example, 
that our being able to think of ourselves as subjects of 
experience presupposes our thinking of the world as 
containing objective particulars independent of our 
experiences, the conclusion is not obvious; it requires, at 
the very least, further elaboration. Compared to a 
transcendental argument such as this one, however, the 
presupposition relation identified by CPP is a truism 
(which may explain why Descartes and others spent so little 
energy explaining or defending it). That I cannot conceive 
of something as not-X without possessing a concept of X is 
hardly a contentious claim. What is not obvious or 
uncontroversial are the purported mental facts from which 
the inference in CPP is made. Do we really apprehend 
ourselves as imperfect in the absolute sense, e.g., as 
                                                          
377 Stern 2011. 
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failing to possess true wisdom or genuine power, as failing 
to be real beings?   
An uncharitable reader might here accuse Descartes and 
others of trading on an ambiguity—of using the 
uncontroversial fact that we are aware that we are in some 
sense imperfect to obscure the fact that the imperfection 
in question must be the absolute sort for the argument to 
work.
378
 Further, if our sense of imperfection is merely a 
vague apprehension that we fall short in some absolute yet 
unspecified way, this awareness could hardly credit the 
inference that we possess proper concepts of these 
qualitatively distinct perfections. Descartes’ critics as 
well as later empiricists such as Locke and Hume often 
responded to rationalist arguments of this type by denying 
that the concept or knowledge in question possesses the 
unique or rich content (or, in the case of knowledge, 
                                                          
378 A defender of CPP perhaps should also address a more general, if 
perhaps rarely articulated, criticism: namely, that the assertion that 
human beings possess an innate idea of the divine essence or receive 
some sort of ongoing divine illumination is an extravagant claim and 
thus requires especially persuasive evidence. From the perspective of 
traditional theism, however, there is no reason why the evidentiary bar 
for CPP should be especially high. If an infinite and transcendent 
being exists and has the sort of special relationship with human beings 
that the Abrahamic religions claim, it would be unsurprising if it 
endowed us with at least an inchoate or dispositional awareness of that 
which is most real and most valuable, i.e., itself. This is not to 
discount the importance of revelation, but explains why the truth of 
revelation has significance for us, i.e., because it answers to deep 
and universal longings that are part of our nature. Leibniz expresses a 
similar view:  “[T]he inclination we have to recognize the idea of God 
is part of our human nature. Even if the first teaching of it were 
attributed to revelation, still men’s receptiveness to this doctrine 
comes from the nature of their souls” (1981, 76). 
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necessity or universality) allegedly incompatible with its 
empirical or manufactured origin. In this case, the critic 
can argue that there is less to our sense of imperfection 
than advocates of CPP presume. It is true that the 
rationalists could and did argue that our absolute 
imperfection is something of which we are usually only 
implicitly aware: Descartes and Malebranche often appeal to 
implicit awareness or implicit knowledge of God, and it is 
well-known that Leibniz developed a robust theory of 
unconscious perception.
379
 Yet if the awareness of 
imperfection at issue in CPP is only an implicit awareness, 
then this awareness ceases to be an uncontroversial fact of 
our mental life and CPP loses much of its force as a free-
standing argument.  
 
B. Transcendental Argument Against Amplification  
However, Descartes can be read as providing an 
argument—another transcendental argument, in fact—to show 
that we do indeed apprehend ourselves, at least implicitly, 
as radically imperfect in the sense required by CPP. 
                                                          
379 Leibniz also invokes implicit knowledge, though it is not clear 
whether this is something distinct from unconscious awareness. See 
Jolley 1984, 175.  Jolly also emphasizes that implicit knowledge is 
unlike dispositional knowledge for Leibniz in that “implicit or virtual 
knowledge is in a sense really actual; it is contrasted not with actual 
knowledge but with express” (173).  
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Descartes’ critics had claimed that the concepts of divine 
perfections that we do have are constructed from concepts 
of our own via a process of amplification. He had responded 
that while we do indeed use a process of amplification as a 
heuristic device for making our concepts of divine 
properties explicit, since the concepts thereby attained 
are qualitatively distinct from the creaturely ones, our 
ability to arrive at them presupposes an implicit awareness 
of the divine perfections. To use the geometrical example, 
we can ‘see’ that a series of polygons ordered according to 
progressively greater numbers of sides converges on the 
limit case instance of circularity only because we already 
possess a concept of a circle. We could never construct the 
concept of a circle merely by noticing that the sides of a 
polygon could always be increased in number. Rather, 
attending to this series enables us to ‘reach’ the idea of 
a circle because we implicitly apprehend the polygons as 
imperfect circles. Similarly, we can obtain concepts of 
qualitatively distinct divine properties by amplifying 
concepts of creaturely ones only because we, at least 
implicitly, apprehend these properties as absolutely 
imperfect versions of divine ones.  
Yet philosophers have objected to the assumption that 
amplification enables us to arrive at proper concepts of 
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absolutely infinite and qualitatively distinct divine 
perfections as well as to the alleged presupposition 
relation that we could arrive at such concepts only if we 
were already (at least implicitly) aware of them. Regarding 
the first objection, the traditional scholastic view was 
that even though we know that certain things are true of 
God (e.g., that he is uncaused), we do not have an idea 
representing his essence. None of our ideas of divine 
perfections can represent these perfections as they exist 
in God—all of our concepts of God are, to use a term we 
employed in our discussion of analogy, improper. This view 
was, in part, a consequence of general assumptions about 
both the origin of our ideas in sense experience (an 
assumption they shared with later empiricists) as well as 
their representative capacity (i.e., that no idea, qua 
finite thing, can represent the infinite).
380
 Though 
Rationalists could address these claims by invoking a 
theory of innateness and by affirming a distinction between 
the objective and formal reality of ideas,
 381
 the true 
                                                          
380 Though Malebranche adopted the Cartesian account of CPP with respect 
to our idea of God, he agreed with Aquinas that, since ideas are finite 
entities, no idea could ever represent the infinite. Thus he held that 
our ‘idea’ of God was really God’s actual presence to the mind.  
381 Carriero suggests that, in response to Aquinas’s claim that “since 
every created image belongs to some fixed genus […] no created image 
can possibly represent God” Descartes could argue that “the argument 
trades on a confusion between formal and objective reality: while it 
may be true that every created representation is finite in terms of its 
formal reality (determined, for example, to belong to the genus human 
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strength of the objection lies in the purported 
experiential fact that we don’t fully understand what 
divine knowledge or power, much less the divine being, is 
like. Perhaps we can be reasonably certain that God has 
knowledge and power and that these properties must differ 
qualitatively in certain ways from creaturely ones, yet 
this knowledge doesn’t seem to presuppose the possession of 
a concept representing the divine essence.  
This objection assumes, however, a criterion for 
concept-possession that advocates of CPP can and did 
reject: namely, that possessing a concept entails an 
awareness of all its contents. According to Descartes, the 
inadequacy of our understanding of the infinite is not due 
to the inadequacy of our idea of the infinite (for this 
idea really contains infinite objective reality), but our 
inability to conceive or represent to ourselves everything 
contained within it. As we have noted, Descartes invokes a 
distinction between comprehending something in thought and 
merely “touching” it with one’s mind, a distinction that he 
applies to both the general concept of an infinite being as 
well as to the individual perfections that we ascribe to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
intellectual idea), it does not follow that every created 
representation is finite in terms of its objective reality” (2009, 
182). 
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this being.
382
 In the same way that we know that certain 
perfections must be ascribed to God even though we assume 
that there are (perhaps) infinitely many of which we have 
no understanding, so Descartes thinks we can be certain of 
various features of these perfections even though we cannot 
pretend to possess knowledge of everything they contain. 
For example, despite the fact that we do not know all that 
infinite being entails, we can be certain that God 
possesses power; and despite the fact that we do not know 
all that infinite power requires, we do know that it is 
incompatible with God’s relying on an external efficient 
cause for his existence. We do not stipulate that an 
infinite being possesses a power incompatible with 
contingency, but discover it though an analysis of our 
concept of infinite being.
383
  
Even if we allow that possessing a concept that truly 
represents a divine perfection or the divine essence need 
                                                          
382 God, says, Descartes “has all those perfections which I cannot 
comprehend, but which I can somehow touch in thought.” Carriero 
observes that this distinction (between ‘touching’ and ‘comprehending) 
resembles the one Aquinas makes between the vision of God that the 
blessed achieve after death and the sort of cognition of God that no 
finite thing, even the blessed, can achieve. He goes on to argue that 
Aquinas would probably agree that if, hypothetically, we possessed an 
idea representing God’s essence, we would indeed have the understanding 
of it that Descartes alleges we do. 
383 Indeed, as we noted in the second chapter, there is a stronger claim 
here too: Descartes believes that not only is non-comprehensive 
awareness compatible with possessing a concept that truly represents 
God’s essence, but it would in fact be incompatible with divine 
infinity if we could comprehend everything contained in our idea of 
God.  
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not entail awareness of everything that concept includes, 
we might still question the assumption that we could never 
produce these concepts by modifying concepts of creaturely 
perfections. Scotus, for example, believes we can form a 
proper concept of a divine property (which applies only 
analogically to creatures) by contracting a candidate 
property to an infinite grade (or mode) of perfection. 
While we can derive a notion of the pure perfection from 
its creaturely instance, he realized that he must provide 
some explanation of how we can conceive of this property as 
intensively infinite without help from innate ideas or 
divine illumination. To this end, he provides a detailed 
account of how one might obtain the concept of an infinite 
grade of being. In brief, he argues that we first move from 
the concept of the potentially infinite in quantity 
(“[which] has only being in the making or potentially”) to 
a concept of the quantitatively infinite in act (“a whole 
[which] has nothing outside itself”) by imagining that the 
succession of parts constituting the potentially infinite 
quantity “were taken at once or that they remained in 
existence simultaneously.”384 If we then wish to think of 
something that is actually infinite with respect to its 
being, we likewise think of something that is whole and 
                                                          
384 Quotation from Frank 1995, 152. 
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perfect in the sense that its qualities cannot be exceeded 
intensively.
385
 In brief, says Scotus, “[f]rom the notion of 
the infinite in the Physics, then, applied imaginatively to 
something infinite in quantity, were that possible and 
applied further to something actually infinite in entity, 
were it possible, we can form some sort of idea of how to 
conceive a being intensively infinite in perfection and 
power.”386  
Some have cast doubt on Scotus’s contention that we 
can move from the quantitative to the qualitative infinite. 
Citing the example of infinite whiteness, Locke argued that 
“properly speaking, we can add infinity only to those 
things with parts […] it doesn’t make sense to speak of 
infinite whiteness or infinite sweetness: to the perfectest 
idea I have of the whitest Whiteness, if I add another of a 
less or equal whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I 
cannot add the idea,) it makes no increase and enlarges not 
my idea at all.”387 Further, as we have noted in a previous 
chapter, critics have questioned Scotus’s assumption that 
ontological analogy could be compatible with conceptual 
                                                          
385 Unlike the quantitatively infinite in act, however, an actually 
infinite being cannot be construed as having parts each of which is 
less than the whole. Infinite being must be metaphysically simple.  
386 Frank 1995, 153. 
3871975, 221. Leibniz, in his response to this objection from Locke, 
argues that “nothing prevents one from having the perception of a 
whiteness more brilliant than one at present conceives.” Nevertheless, 
he goes on to argue that the example of color is misleading since we 
can have only a confused idea of it (1981, 158). 
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univocity. Whatever the merits of these critiques, Scotus’ 
account shows at the very least that it is not obvious that 
we cannot construct proper concepts of actually infinite, 
qualitatively distinct divine properties from concepts of 
creaturely ones.  A defender of CPP would need to explain 
why the qualitative distinction between divine and 
creaturely properties constitutes an insuperable barrier to 
constructing proper ideas of divine properties from ideas 
of creaturely ones but does not prohibit deriving concepts 
of creaturely properties from concepts of divine ones. To 
merely affirm, as Descartes does, the scholastic principle 
that knowledge of what is not cannot bring us to knowledge 
of that which is, is to assume a relationship between the 
conceptual and ontological that Scotus flatly denied.
388
  
 
C. Generalizing the Argument from CPP 
Descartes may be right that our ability to conceive of 
the divine perfections reached through (a purely heuristic 
process of) amplification presupposes an implicit awareness 
that the creaturely properties thus amplified are imperfect 
                                                          
388 Again, Scotus agrees that there is a qualitative distinction between 
creaturely and divine properties and that our proper notions of each 
are only analogically related to the other. Because we can form a 
univocal notion of a property by prescinding from its grade of 
perfection, however, this ontological diversity does not impede our 
moving from a concept of the creaturely property to a proper concept of 
the divine one.  
328 
 
 
 
in the absolute sense. Yet if this argument is the sole 
support for the premise that we apprehend ourselves as 
absolutely imperfect, then CPP rests on a poor foundation 
indeed. Apart from the problems raised by Scotus and 
others, there is the fact that the argument against 
amplification can have purchase only for the few who engage 
in philosophical theology and attain the alleged insights 
into the divine nature in the manner described. In defense 
of CPP, it may be true that there are other contexts in 
which philosophical theology seems to presuppose an 
awareness of the divine nature. Gilson, in his analysis of 
Bonaventures’ account of CPP,389 observes that the premises 
of cosmological arguments often seem to involve knowledge 
of the very features of God that they are invoked to 
establish: 
We think we are starting from strictly sensible data 
when we state as the first step in our demonstration 
that there are in existence beings mutable, composite, 
relative, imperfect, contingent: but in actual fact we 
are aware of these insufficiencies in things only 
because we already possess the idea of the perfections 
by whose standard we see them to be insufficient. It 
is only in appearance and not in reality that our 
reasoning begins with sense data. Our awareness, 
                                                          
389 For Bonaventure’s accounts of CPP, see Aersten 2012, 147-60; Cullen 
2006, 61-6; and Gilson 1965, 108-25. Though Bonaventure argued that we 
conceive of infinite being by virtue of conceiving of being, he held 
that our concepts of all the other divine attributes are derived from 
experience. The tendency of divine illuminationists, especially later 
ones such as Ghent, to fold aspects of Aristotelian empiricism into 
their accounts of ideogenesis makes it difficult to draw historical 
parallels between their accounts of CPP and that which is found in 
early modern rationalism.  
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apparently immediate and primary, of the contingent 
implies a pre-existent notion of the necessary.
390
 
 
Though such cosmological arguments may indeed presuppose 
notions of divine properties, the purported awareness of 
absolute imperfection is here limited to the questionable 
insights of a small group of theologians and 
metaphysicians. Even if their alleged awareness of absolute 
imperfection does indeed presuppose prior ideas of the 
perfect, the argument from CPP would be stronger, and have 
greater significance, if it could be shown that an 
awareness of absolute imperfection is implicated in more 
universal and mundane features of human experience.  
We have, to some degree, done this in our analyses of 
top-down analogical derivation. Harshorne’s insight into 
the radical imperfection of human knowledge and love may be 
a common, if not quite universal, experience. According to 
this analysis, our original, unexamined notion of knowledge 
is one characterized by conclusiveness and immediacy; it is 
when we, as adults, begin to examine our so-called 
knowledge that we see, as the narrator does in the 
Meditations, that our justifications actually lack the 
definitive nature we had (implicitly) assumed they had, and 
that our very need to appeal to (and remember) these 
                                                          
390 1965, 115. 
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justifications is a sign of our absolute imperfection as 
knowers. Similarly, it is perhaps the notion of a love 
unconditioned by ego that we, in the best case scenario, 
carry through childhood and believe is realized in our 
parents’ regard for us. Experience is an education in the 
limits of love, enabling us to apprehend even parental love 
as at best an imitation of God’s love for us.  
 Our initial response to this disappointment may be to 
dismiss our former notions of knowledge and love as 
simplistic or naïve, and hence to classify the more complex 
and comparatively imperfect forms as the genuine thing—we 
might conclude that knowledge just is mediated; love just 
is limited by the bounds of the self, and we were foolish 
to think otherwise. But there are other cases where we seem 
to resist this reclassification. Though we recognize that 
human justice is inevitably imperfect, compromised as it is 
by factors such as limited resources and limited knowledge, 
we are not inclined to redefine our notion of justice 
according to its human approximations. The notion of 
absolute or perfect justice may be unrealistic from the 
perspective of what is attainable within human society, but 
we nevertheless recognize it to be something more than a 
childhood fantasy. In his own analysis of Cartesian CPP, 
James Lawler cites a child’s innate sense of fairness as a 
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consequence of her possessing a standard of perfect 
justice: 
 
The child who has no distinct idea of perfection 
nevertheless knows when something goes wrong or is 
inadequate to its way of looking at things. It’s not 
fair, the sister says when her brother gets more than 
she does. She has no distinct idea of fairness which 
she can articulate consciously, but nevertheless 
operates in the light of an idea that, in a male-
dominated society, may never have been taught to her. 
The idea of fairness is only a particular expression 
of the more general idea of a truth or standard or 
ideal by which all things are variously evaluated.
391
 
 
The girl’s apparently naïve notion of fairness enables her 
to identify injustices that her community does not 
recognize. More importantly, we can imagine that this same 
notion would eventually enable her to recognize the 
imperfection of what passes for justice in human society 
more generally. Since this notion of absolute justice is an 
ideal inspiring us to improve our own systems of justice, 
however, we resist redefining it in terms of its imperfect 
forms.
392
  
Another candidate for a nearly universal awareness of 
absolute imperfection is the sense of metaphysical 
contingency that we discussed in the context of Descartes’ 
                                                          
391 2006, 338. 
392 What is the qualitative distinction between divine and creaturely 
justice? Part of the distinction might be the inherently restorative, 
rather than merely retributive, nature of divine justice. Since human 
justice can be restorative as well, however, one would need to 
distinguish divine restoration from its human counterpart. 
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analogy of causation. According to this analysis, our 
original notion of existence is of metaphysically necessary 
existence following from purely creative power, and it is 
only because we possess these concepts that we can become 
aware of the absolute imperfection of creaturely 
(contingent) existence and creaturely (constructive) power. 
It is perhaps such an implicit concept of necessary 
existence that enables many of us, usually at some point in 
late childhood, to achieve the (often startling) insight of 
our own powerlessness and consequent dependence. The shock 
of this realization and the anxiety it inspires has not 
only been a major theme of art and literature for millennia 
(as well as an important theme in psychology), but it can 
be understood to inspire that most basic religious and 
philosophical question, often first asked in early 
adolescence, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” 
Given sufficient reflection, we may attribute our 
contingency to the fact that the reason or cause for our 
existence lies outside ourselves. This realization may, in 
turn, give rise to an explicit notion of a more perfect 
form of existence enjoyed by a metaphysically necessary 
being, i.e., a being that neither came into existence nor 
could cease to exist since the foundation of its existence 
lies within itself. Such a being would exhibit not merely a 
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very low degree of contingency, but absolutely no 
contingency at all. Yet if CPP is correct, this apparently 
negative concept of necessary existence—expressed 
grammatically as the negation of dependent existence (i.e., 
in-dependent existence)—is in fact our original, positive 
notion of existence, and it is only because we already 
possess such a concept that we can apprehend our own kind 
of (contingent) existence as imperfect in the first place. 
Yet if an implicit awareness of absolute imperfection 
were a universal feature of human nature, one would expect 
it to play some role in shaping human desire and aspiration 
more generally. There is some suggestion of this at the end 
of the Third Meditation, where the narrator states that the 
idea of God—a “mark of the craftsman stamped on his work [… 
which] need not be anything distinct from the work itself”—
shapes human nature by serving as an implicit object of 
human desire. Our awareness of a being possessing every 
perfection “not just indefinitely and potentially but 
actually and infinitely” explains why we aspire “without 
limit to ever greater and better things” (CSMII 35, 
emphasis mine). Lawler thus argues that, for Descartes, the 
idea of perfection is “the better, or the best, that stands 
above pleasure and pain and allows us to be discontent with 
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our contentment.”393 Malebranche too asserts that the 
inexhaustible nature of human desire ought to be attributed 
to an implicit awareness of the absolute inadequacy of 
creaturely goods in comparison to God: “The inclination 
toward the good in general [i.e., God] is the source of the 
restlessness of our will. Everything the mind represents to 
itself as its good is finite, and everything finite can 
momentarily distract our love, but cannot hold it 
permanently.”394 These claims are surely reminiscent of 
Augustine’s famous observation, in the Confessions, that 
“our hearts are restless until they find their rest in 
thee, O Lord.” 
Unfortunately, arguments intended to show that an 
awareness of absolute imperfection is implicated in more 
universal and mundane features of human experience are 
susceptible to objections similar to those raised against 
arguments that appeal to the more recondite insights of 
philosophical theology. Though an unceasing restlessness, 
for example, may indeed be a universal feature of human 
nature, this is not an uncontroversial fact. There are 
certainly some, like Saint Augustine, for whom a perpetual 
dissatisfaction with finite goods seemed to be an explicit 
and dominant feature of their psychology; angst-ridden 
                                                          
393 2006, 338. 
394 1997, 269. 
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characters such as these have also been a staple of 19
th
 and 
20
th
 century literature. Yet how does one explain the 
equally, if not more, common phenomenon of human quietude, 
of apparent satisfaction with worldly goods, knowledge, and 
love? It is true that such satisfaction may be merely 
apparent, and it is one of the achievements of 20
th
 century 
psychology to show how unconscious discontentment and 
anxieties can broil beneath even the most placid surfaces. 
Yet it follows that appeals to chronic disquietude or other 
ostensibly universal signs of an awareness of absolute 
imperfection can be persuasive only in the context of 
further assumptions about human psychology and behavior. 
Further, even if we grant that such infinite restlessness 
is a universal feature of human nature, it is not obvious 
that this cannot be explained without appealing to an 
implicit awareness of absolute imperfection. Perhaps this 
restlessness can be sated—it is just that we have not found 
the finite good or set of goods that will do it.  
Descartes undoubtedly believed that we all possess an 
innate idea of God and that we all, at least implicitly, 
apprehend ourselves as radically imperfect in light of this 
standard. He did not, however, feel it necessary to provide 
independent arguments for the premise that we apprehend 
ourselves as absolutely imperfect. This is perhaps due to 
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the fact that his appeal to an awareness of absolute 
imperfection (as well as his claim that this awareness 
presupposes a robust idea of God) may have been intended to 
have probative force only for the suitably trained and 
properly disposed meditator.
395
 Like his rationalist 
successors, Descartes was often at pains to emphasize that 
anyone can discover the innate truths ‘within’ so long as 
they follow the correct method of philosophizing (e.g., 
turn away from the deliverances of the senses towards the 
intelligible realm, withhold judgment in the absence of 
clear and distinct conceptions, etc.)
 396
 In response to 
Burman’s repeated objections concerning the apparent 
absolute perfection (infinity) of the human will, Descartes 
asserts that “there is no point in arguing like this on 
these matters. Let everyone just go down deep into himself 
and find out whether he has a perfect and absolute will, 
and whether he can conceive of anything which surpasses him 
in freedom of the will. I am sure everyone will find that 
                                                          
395 In the preface to the Meditations, Descartes states that “I would not 
urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to 
meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses 
and from all preconceived opinions. Such readers, as I well know, are 
few and far between” (CSMII 8).  
396 It is difficult, however, to reconcile the rationalists’ confidence 
in their own methods with the fact that scores of intelligent, 
sympathetic inquirers have followed these methods and failed to attain 
the same insights, much less the fact that the rationalist themselves 
did not always agree. To cite a famous case, Leibniz argued that 
Descartes’ ontological argument was incomplete because it failed to 
demonstrate that God’s existence is non-contradictory (as it would be 
if, for example, certain perfections were incompatible). See, for 
example, Leibniz 1981, 437. 
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it is as I say” (CSMK 342). Presumably the same sort of 
introspection would enable us to see how our other 
attributes fall short absolutely of their divine 
correlates. This would suggest that if we are capable of 
going “down deep” into ourselves, our absolute imperfection 
will be obvious and independent arguments for the claim 
unnecessary. Conversely, if we are not properly disposed 
for such meditation, the implication seems to be that 
further argumentation would be pointless. That we possess 
an idea of the infinite in comparison to which we judge 
ourselves to be absolutely imperfect is a truth that, like 
the cogito, we have to discover for ourselves, if at all. 
 
II. The Ontology and Cognition of Primitive Resemblance 
CPP assumes that the imperfect is qualitatively 
distinct from the perfect. An imperfect circle is judged to 
be imperfect insofar as it fails to be a circle. Yet we 
have noted that the argument also assumes a positive 
(resemblance) relation between the two: an imperfect circle 
is apprehended as being in some way like a circle. In the 
case of things like circles, this resemblance could be said 
to supervene on more basic features of qualitative 
identity. When it comes to the resemblance relationship 
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between God and creatures, however, divine simplicity and 
transcendence were traditionally taken to rule out any form 
of qualitative identity. We have therefore argued that CPP, 
as it applies to the perfections of God and creatures, 
assumes a form of analogical resemblance that is primitive 
or irreducible in nature. We used the apparently primitive 
similarity of scalar properties such as the resemblance of 
different shades of a single color to illustrate how this 
similarity might be cognized.  
A problem for Descartes’ account of CPP that we have 
not yet addressed, however, is that examples such as these 
involve a resemblance between two simple phenomenal 
properties. In the case of God and creatures, however, the 
ontological picture appears to be one in which numerous 
qualitatively distinct, individually complex creaturely 
properties bear a primitive (analogical) resemblance to a 
single, metaphysically simple thing—the divine essence. 
Unlike Leibniz, Descartes endorsed the traditional theory 
of divine simplicity, which entails that the divine 
attributes themselves are, in reality, identical to the 
divine essence and hence identical to each other.
 397
 We have 
                                                          
397 See “Divine Simplicity” in vol. 8 of the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, (784). According to Adams, Leibniz “speaks without 
embarrassment of God as having a plurality of distinct properties. He 
maintains that God is simple, but in the same sense in which all the 
monads or fundamental substances of his system are simple—that is, in 
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noted on numerous occasions that a commitment to a strong 
version of divine simplicity was, for many scholastic 
thinkers as well as for Descartes, a primary reason for 
rejecting univocal predication of God and creatures. Yet if 
divine Goodness, Justice, and Wisdom are in reality 
identical, then what basis is there for apprehending 
creaturely goodness as imperfect goodness rather than 
imperfect justice or wisdom? The identity of the divine 
attributes would seem to entail that an analogically 
similar instance of, for example, creaturely goodness must 
resemble divine wisdom in precisely the same way it 
resembles divine goodness. If the divine attributes are not 
qualitatively distinct, then it appears to follow that 
creaturely pure perfections are not either.
398
 
Descartes follows the scholastic tradition in holding 
that divine simplicity is compatible with conceiving of God 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the sense of having no parts that are or could be substances. 
Properties, distinct from each other as they may be, do not count for 
Leibniz as parts that could disturb the simplicity of a substance” 
(2008, 105). 
398 Scotus faced a similar problem in his account of univocal 
predication. If “good” can be predicated univocally of both creatures 
and God, and God’s goodness is identical with his wisdom, it would 
entail that creaturely goodness is identical with creaturely wisdom. He 
attempted to reconcile divine simplicity with univocal predication by 
invoking a weaker form of divine simplicity. Though the divine 
attributes are not really distinct, he claimed that they were “formally 
distinct” insofar as they admit of different definitions. The formal 
distinction of the divine attributes is not something that is imposed 
by the intellect but is a feature of the divine nature itself. Scotus 
thought he could thereby affirm that divine wisdom is really identical 
with divine goodness, and that both “good” and “wise” can be predicated 
univocally of creatures and God, without accepting the absurd 
conclusion that creaturely wisdom is the same as creaturely goodness.  
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in terms of a diversity of attributes. He argues that it is 
due to a “defect of our intellect,” rather than an actual 
metaphysical complexity within God himself, that we ascribe 
attributes to him in a “piecemeal fashion, corresponding to 
the way in which we perceive them in ourselves” (CSMII 98). 
It may appear that he has backed himself into a corner 
here, for how can he maintain that we possess proper 
concepts of God if we are conceiving of him as though he 
exhibits a metaphysical complexity he actually lacks? In 
fact, Descartes did not believe that the distinctions we 
make between the divine attributes are to be attributed 
solely to our own intellects. Rather, he suggests that such 
distinctions always have some basis in the reality 
conceived.
399
  
Indeed, on this score Descartes appears to follow 
Aquinas, who believed that the distinctions we make between 
God’s (really identical) attributes have a foundation in 
his incomprehensible nature: Given God’s transcendent 
greatness, we, finite beings that we are, cannot comprehend 
his essence with a single concept.
400
 As we noted in the 
                                                          
399 “I call it a conceptual distinction—that is, a distinction made by 
reason ratiocinatae. I do not recognize any distinction made by reason 
ratiocinantis—that is, one which has no foundation in reality—because 
we cannot have any thought without a foundation” (CSMK 280). See Skirry 
2005, 39-69. 
400 Aquinas’ account thus falls between those that invoke a purely 
conceptual distinction that has no foundation in reality and the 
Scotistic formal distinction, in which our concepts correspond to 
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second chapter, Descartes believed that our inability to 
comprehend the divine essence with any given concept does 
not entail that our concepts of God are improper; rather, 
our need to conceive of God in terms of a diversity of 
attributes is, like our inability to grasp everything 
contained in our concepts of these attributes, a sign that 
the object of our thought is the divine essence itself.
401
  
Descartes could therefore argue that even though creaturely 
pure perfections resemble the same, metaphysically simple 
thing—the divine essence—we apprehend this resemblance only 
by conceiving of God in terms of various qualitatively 
distinct attributes. We apprehend an instance of creaturely 
goodness as an instance of imperfect goodness rather than 
an instance of imperfect justice or wisdom because it 
resembles the divine essence as conceived as perfect 
goodness, not as conceived as perfect justice or perfect 
wisdom.  
 Yet even if we may conceive of the divine essence in 
terms of qualitatively distinct attributes, one might still 
                                                                                                                                                                             
formalities that are really identical yet differing in terms of their 
definitions.  
401 Beyssade, who emphasizes the positive nature of divine 
incomprehensibility for Descartes in a number of articles, puts it this 
way: “[I]ncomprehensibility is not an obstacle or a limit to our 
intellectual understanding of God; on the contrary, it reveals God in 
his truth, in his real and positive transcendence. This 
incomprehensibility does not reveal a regrettable and provisional 
failure of my limited mind, but instead a necessary incommensurability 
between the infinite and any finite mind, even one more perfect than my 
own, even the mind of an angel” (1993, 89). See also 1996, 192-3. 
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question whether the example of scalar magnitudes is 
appropriate given the complex nature of the creaturely 
attributes in question. How could we grasp a primitive 
resemblance relation between a complex (creaturely) 
property and a metaphysically simple (divine) one? If the 
divine nature can be legitimately conceived in terms of a 
diversity of attributes, one might argue that these 
attributes themselves may be legitimately conceived as 
exhibiting the same complexity as their creaturely 
correlates. Yet this solution will not work if conceiving 
of these attributes as though they were complex involves 
ascribing to God more basic attributes that are, in fact, 
not pure perfections. The complex property of creaturely 
knowledge, for example, involves a psychological state of 
belief that many have argued is incompatible with divine 
perfection; we cannot conceive of divine knowledge as 
involving belief without thereby conceiving of God as 
something that is less than perfect. Alternatively, one 
might argue that only some of the (simple) parts of complex 
creaturely properties resemble the divine attributes.
402
 The 
problem with such an account, however, is that we are not 
then justified in apprehending the entire (complex) 
creaturely property as a pure perfection. 
                                                          
402 For example, creaturely knowledge features thought, which is itself a 
perfection.  
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A more promising explanation for how we might 
apprehend a primitive resemblance between a complex 
(creaturely) property and the metaphysically simple divine 
nature (conceived with respect to individual properties) 
would appeal to our ability to view the complex creaturely 
property holistically. If we can conceive of that which is 
simple as though it were complex, perhaps we can conceive 
of what is complex as though it were simple. Even if none 
of the parts of a creaturely property resemble the divine 
nature when taken in isolation, the suggestion here is that 
they do when taken together as a whole. Though the 
traditional accounts of analogy of attribution and 
proportionality often appear to be insufficiently precise, 
their generality could perhaps be attributed to the fact 
that the analogical resemblance they express lies, as it 
were, on the surface and so cannot be uncovered through 
further precision. We apprehend human knowledge as a 
likeness of the divine quality not by recognizing that 
various aspects of the complex property resemble the divine 
quality, but by noticing a resemblance when viewing the 
property holistically.
403
  
                                                          
403 Such an account of resemblance could apply even to cases where there 
is some form of underlying qualitative identity. Perhaps it is true 
that two shades of green resemble each other by virtue of some 
qualitative identity, but it does not follow that we recognize their 
resemblance by (implicitly or unconsciously) apprehending this 
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A final respect in which the primitive resemblance of 
scalar properties fails to capture all the features of 
transcendental resemblance is the assumption that God, as 
what Descartes termed a “total cause,” cannot be said to 
lack any reality or perfection found in creatures. What 
distinguishes creaturely properties from divine ones is 
merely an absence of some sort. Though this is stretching 
things a bit, there is a sense in which the containment of 
one analogue in another can be applied to scalar 
properties. A shade of dark green might be said to 
‘contain’ everything found in the lighter shades from which 
it is created. We might further imagine that these lighter 
shades are apprehended as imperfect versions of the darker 
one –i.e., resembling it, but nevertheless qualitatively 
distinct. The problem here, however, is that the lighter 
shades aren’t features of the darker shade considered as a 
phenomenal property. The darker shade can no more be said 
to ‘contain’ the lighter ones than the latter can be said 
                                                                                                                                                                             
identity. Rather, it is the primitive resemblance that they bear to one 
another when taken as phenomenal gestalts. To use Reid’s example, even 
if two resembling faces really feature elements of qualitative 
identity, it does not follow that our apprehension of their resemblance 
must be ascribed to an unconscious awareness of this identity, for 
another possibility is that we apprehend a resemblance between the two 
faces regarded holistically.  
345 
 
 
 
to ‘contain’ the former for, when considered phenomenally, 
the constituents of their composition are irrelevant.
404
  
Though it is admittedly difficult to provide a 
satisfying account of transcendental analogical 
resemblance, perhaps this should be unsurprising. Why 
should we expect that the resemblance relation that holds 
between complex creaturely properties and the 
metaphysically simple divine essence would be similar to 
any of the more familiar kinds of resemblance found between 
creatures? Whether or not we find the above or any other 
theory of analogical resemblance plausible will hinge, to a 
large extent, on whether we accept the apparently 
                                                          
404 The traditional claim that the resemblance relation between God and 
creatures is asymmetric—viz., that creatures can be said to be ‘like’ 
God but God cannot be said to be ‘like’ creatures—does not appear to be 
based upon the ontological supremacy of the divine analogate or any 
other feature unique to the resemblance relation itself, but is rather 
attributed to the fact that creatures are created by God in his own 
image. Aquinas, for example, suggests that the impropriety of likening 
God to creatures is akin to the impropriety of likening an image to the 
man who served as its model: “[I]t is more fitting to say that a 
creature is like God rather than the converse. For that which is called 
like something possesses a quality or form of that thing. Since, then, 
that which is found in God perfectly is found in other things according 
to a certain diminished participation, the basis on which the likeness 
is observed belongs to God absolutely, but not to the creature. Thus, 
the creature has what belongs to God and, consequently, is rightly said 
to be like God. But we cannot in the same way say that God has what 
belongs to the creature. Neither, then, can we appropriately say that 
God is like a creature, just as we do not say that man is like his 
image, although the image is rightly said to be like him. All the less 
proper, moreover, is the expression that God is likened to a creature. 
For likening expresses a motion towards likeness and thus belongs to 
the being that receives from another that which makes it like. But a 
creature receives from God that which makes it like Him. The converse, 
however, does not hold. God, then, is not likened to a creature; 
rather, the converse is true” (SCG 1.29.139). I don’t take Aquinas here 
to be denying that resemblance is always transitive, but merely to be 
observing that we usually don’t express the resemblance of an image and 
its model by saying the model is like its image.  
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incompatible theological intuitions analogy was invoked to 
reconcile. If we agree that divine simplicity and 
transcendence preclude any form of qualitative identity 
between God and creatures and yet nevertheless believe that 
creation is in some sense an image and likeness of God, 
some explanation has to be provided of how this can be 
so.
405
 Though we have shown that a top-down account of 
analogical derivation may have some epistemological 
advantages over the more traditional bottom-up version, it 
does nothing to render analogical resemblance any less 
mysterious.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
405 While Scotus denies that the absence of qualitative identity is 
incompatible with univocal predication, he never shows that it is 
compatible with some form of resemblance.  
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